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Abstract 
 
Even though major advances in economic theory and modelling have in some 
cases furthered our understanding of how the economy works, the system as a 
whole has become more complex. If policymakers had perfect knowledge about 
the actual state of the economy, the various transmission mechanisms as well as 
the true underlying model, monetary intervention would be greatly simplified. In 
reality, however, the monetary authorities have to contend with considerable 
uncertainty in relation to the above-mentioned factors. 
 
This said, uncertainty has mostly been neglected in both the theoretical and 
empirical literature focusing on monetary policy analysis. Nonetheless, findings 
from a review of theoretical literature that does exist on this topic suggest that 
optimal central banks act more conservatively when faced with uncertainty. 
Similarly, empirical findings from the literature also favour conservatism. However, 
there is some evidence to suggest that this is not always the case.  These results 
suggest that central banks do not always act optimally when faced with 
  
  
iv 
 
uncertainty. The limited number of industrial country cases examined prevents any 
generalised view from emerging. If anything, the literature findings suggest that 
central bank behaviour differs across countries. 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the empirical literature by studying the effects of 
uncertainty on monetary policy in the developing country case of South Africa. In 
simplest terms, the thesis seeks to establish whether or not the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) responded optimally to uncertainty as suggested by 
theoretical models thereof.  To this end, the thesis employs a theoretical model 
which resembles a structural rule-based approach. The optimal interest rate rule 
was derived given a set of structural equations relating to demand, the Phillips 
curve and the real exchange rate.  
 
To incorporate uncertainty, it is assumed that the coefficients are dependent on 
the variances of the exogenous variables, namely inflation, the output gap and the 
exchange rate. The uncertainty adjusted model allows us to investigate whether 
monetary policy is more aggressive or passive when uncertainty about the relevant 
exogenous variable increases. Inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty 
estimates were derived through GARCH-model specifications related to the 
structural equations as defined in the theoretical model.   
 
The investigation considered both indirect and direct uncertainty effects with a 
sample period stretching from 1990 to 2011. 
 
 
  
  
v 
 
The findings reported in this thesis provide strong evidence in support of the 
notion that uncertainty plays a significant role within the South African monetary 
policy landscape and contributes towards explaining the SARB’s actions. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that the SARB did in fact act optimally in 
responding more conservatively to target variable fluctuations on average. Also, 
the findings could potentially strengthen the case for inflation targeting as a 
monetary policy regime, as the results indicate a marked decline in the effects of 
uncertainty under inflation targeting than before. 
 
Key Terms: Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, Optimal Central Bank, SARB, GARCH 
Model, Conservatism, Aggression 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In recent years a consensus has emerged that price and output stability are the 
fundamental goals of any monetary policy regime. Even more recently however, 
central bank focus on financial stability as a secondary monetary policy objective 
has gained credence mainly due to the effects of the financial recession which 
started in 2008. To attain these goals, monetary authorities use policy instruments 
to drive the economy towards a desired state. However, prior to any policy 
decisions being made, the monetary authorities need to understand the state of 
the economy.  To determine both the current state as well as the effects of various 
interventions, policymakers use different kinds of econometric models and 
estimation techniques.  
 
Even though major advances in economic theory and modelling have in some 
cases furthered our understanding of how the economy works, the system as a 
whole has become more complex. If policymakers had perfect knowledge about 
the actual state of the economy, the various transmission mechanisms and the 
true underlying model, monetary intervention would be greatly simplified. 
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However, in reality the monetary authorities have to contend with considerable 
uncertainty in relation to the above-mentioned factors. The significance of the 
presence of uncertainty is best described in the widely cited quote below: 
 
“Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is 
the defining characteristic of that landscape.”                      (Greenspan 2003, p. 1) 
 
Notwithstanding the influential work of Brainard (1967), uncertainty has mostly 
been neglected in both the theoretical and empirical literature focusing on 
monetary policy analysis. Recent years have witnessed a change in this trend as a 
number of academics and practitioners alike have acknowledged the effects of 
uncertainty modelling and policy analysis.   
 
Significant progress has been made in theoretical models of uncertainty and the 
impact thereof within the monetary policy landscape (Estrella and Mishkin 1998, 
Svensson 1997, Sack 1998a, Soderstrom 1999, Wieland 2002 and Moessner 2005). 
The theoretical literature primarily focuses on what constitutes optimal central 
bank behaviour when faced with different types and degrees of uncertainty.  
 
However, much less work has been done on the empirical counterpart to this 
topic. Moreover, the empirical literature is primarily concerned with a handful of 
industrial country investigations (Martin and Salmon 1999, Martin and Milas 2005, 
Shuetrim and Thompson 1999 and Chung 2005). The literature has largely ignored 
the effects of uncertainty on monetary policy in developing countries.  
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This thesis aims to contribute to the empirical literature by studying the effects of 
uncertainty on monetary policy in the developing country case of South Africa. In 
simplest terms, the thesis will try to establish whether or not the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) has responded optimally to uncertainty as suggested by 
theoretical models thereof.   
 
Chapter 2 considers the definition of uncertainty in the context of the monetary 
policy landscape. Given the abstract nature of the subject of uncertainty, a 
clarification of the concept is required before attempting to establish how it 
affects the policy decisions of the SARB. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical 
literature focusing on monetary policy in the face of uncertainty. The chapter 
examines what constitutes an optimal central bank policy response in the presence 
of uncertainty.  
 
This theoretical understanding gives the necessary background to the question of 
whether or not the SARB has behaved optimally in this regard, which is studied 
later in this thesis. Chapter 4 reviews the sparse empirical research on the topic in 
some detail. A review of the empirical literature sheds light on whether central 
bank actions in practice resembled theoretically optimal behaviour. This review of 
applied work also informs and guides the methodology used to study the effects of 
uncertainty on the SARB in the following chapters.   
 
In contrast to the first four chapters, which are focused on reviewing the findings 
from the literature, the subsequent four chapters comprise a case study of the 
effects of uncertainty regarding the SARB. Chapter 5 derives a theoretical 
uncertainty model applicable to an open-economy developing country, while 
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chapter 6 derives uncertainty estimates from the theoretical model specifically for 
the case of South Africa. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 simulate the complete 
econometric model with data from South Africa, and interpret the results. 
Chapters 7 and 8 are primarily concerned with finding answers to the following 
related questions:  
 
• Does the evidence suggest that the SARB took uncertainty into account when 
designing policy? 
• If so, did the SARB’s actions reflect optimal behaviour as proposed by theory? 
• If the results are mixed in relation to the question above, what may have led to 
this outcome? 
 
The closing chapter summarises the findings and draws the final conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Defining Uncertainty in the Monetary Policy 
Landscape 
 
 
 
If policymakers had perfect knowledge about the actual state of the economy and 
the various transmission mechanisms, as well as the true economic model, 
monetary intervention would be substantially simplified. In reality, however, 
monetary authorities face considerable uncertainty relating to the above-
mentioned factors. Even though major advances in economic theory and modelling 
have in some cases furthered our understanding regarding the intricacies of how 
the economy operates, in so doing reducing the amount of uncertainty, the system 
as a whole has become more complex. 
 
“Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed conceptually and 
empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience 
with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, even with large 
advances in computational capabilities and greater comprehension of economic 
Defining Uncertainty in the Monetary Policy Landscape 
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linkages, our knowledge base is barely able to keep pace with the ever-increasing 
complexity of our global economy.”                        (Greenspan 2003, p. 1) 
 
Given the omnipresence of such uncertainty, how should monetary authorities 
respond?  In other words, how should central banks act when faced with differing 
types and degrees of uncertainty? Considering the theme of this thesis, this 
question ultimately reduces to what constitutes optimal behaviour for the South 
Africa’s central bank (the SARB) assuming the presence of significant uncertainty. 
 
Given the abstract nature of the subject of uncertainty, some clarification of this 
concept will be helpful before attempting to link it to the policy decisions of the 
SARB.   
 
Uncertainty is generally thought of as arising from imperfect knowledge of a 
specific event or phenomenon. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty is related 
to the amount of available information about an event as well as the accuracy of 
that information. With regard to the monetary policy landscape, imperfect 
knowledge is the norm rather than the exception. Imperfect knowledge about the 
actual state of the economy, linkages between key macroeconomic variables and 
transmission mechanisms mean that the monetary authorities must contend with 
significant degrees of uncertainty when making policy decisions.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the meaning of uncertainty specifically within 
the context of monetary policy. As mentioned above, this exercise will be helpful 
before trying to understand the effects thereof on the SARB. Section 2.1 examines 
the three main sources of uncertainty as highlighted in the literature on this topic 
Defining Uncertainty in the Monetary Policy Landscape 
7 
 
with specific reference to the monetary policy landscape. Section 2.2 considers a 
more collective and holistic view of uncertainty.   
 
2.1   Sources of Uncertainty 
 
In broad terms, uncertainty arises from imperfect knowledge of a specific 
phenomenon. With regard to monetary policy, three sources of uncertainty are 
highlighted in the literature. These are: 
 
• Uncertainty about the data 
• Uncertainty about the model 
• Uncertainty about the parameters 
 
The rest of this section examines each of these in turn. 
 
2.1.1 Data uncertainty 
 
Data uncertainty refers to the inaccuracy of economic data. Consideration of a 
theoretical approach to distinguish this type of uncertainty from the other sources 
mentioned above proves useful in this case.  
 
To this end, Figure 2.1 below represents a reduced form Phillips-Curve equation 
implying a linear relationship between inflation () and the output gap (), 
adapted from Svensson (1997). As is evident from Figure 2.1, data uncertainty 
influences the simple theoretical model through its impact on the actual 
Defining Uncertainty in the Monetary Policy Landscape 
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exogenous and endogenous variables due to the inaccuracy of the data used to 
estimate the variable values.  
 
Figure 2.1: Theoretical depiction of data uncertainty 
Source: Adapted from Svensson (1997) 
 
This could occur due to measurement inefficiencies or errors arising during data 
capturing. Although data capturing errors could theoretically be avoided, 
measurement inefficiency is considerably more difficult to curtail. Here, 
measurement inefficiency refers specifically to the process of estimating 
macroeconomic variables and the erroneousness thereof. In order to guide policy, 
central banks rely on statistical models containing estimates or approximations of 
economic variables. However, due to the difficulty often associated with 
estimating these variables, estimates are often inaccurate: 
 
“Many of the variables that a central bank reacts to in the course of setting its 
interest-rate instrument are in fact poorly measured.” (Dotsey and Plosser 2012, p. 2) 
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As an example of measurement inefficiencies, Longworth (2004) refers to the case 
of the output gap, defined as the difference between actual and potential output. 
Potential output is not observed directly, but rather has to be estimated using 
other relevant indicators.  
 
According to Longworth (2004), the central bank of Canada tries to lessen the 
uncertainty about estimates of the output gap by using a host of other variables 
which are more easily observable and thus are less uncertain. One of these 
indicators is the difference between the actual and projected inflation rate.  Thus, 
if actual inflation is substantially different from what was originally projected, the 
central bank may adjust its estimate of the output gap accordingly.  
 
Even though “unobservable” variables, such as potential output, are normally 
associated with considerable uncertainty, “observable” variables are also subject 
to a certain degree of inherent uncertainty. To make this point, Dennis (2005) 
refers to actual real GDP measurements in the United States. Dennis (2005) 
highlights the fact that, in the United States, three estimates of real GDP are 
released at different intervals. These are the advance estimate, the preliminary 
estimate and the final estimate. The final estimate is characterised as being the 
most accurate, as most of the data are actually measured, rather than estimated.  
 
Another common example of the above is evident when considering the revised 
South African Gross Domestic Product figures. Every 5 years or so, Statistics South 
Africa (Stats SA) revises the GDP estimates, acknowledging that the national 
accounts data rely on various sources, all of which differ with regard to accuracy, 
frequency and detail.  The revision process involves a rebasing procedure, where 
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the base year is changed to a more recent period. The decision regarding the base 
year is often influenced by the availability of recent data and often coincides with a 
period when a survey or other large scale data gathering initiatives took place, 
such as a census.  
 
Thus in 1999, Stats SA released revised GDP estimates for the period from 1993 to 
1998. The process involved changing the base year to 1995 while also 
incorporating data obtained from new sources. The difference between the 
original and the revised series, reported in Figure 2.2 below, clearly highlights a 
source of data uncertainty.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: SA revised GDP vintage 1995       
Source: Stats SA, 2009 
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Stats SA again revised the SA GDP estimates in 2004, when the base was changed 
to the year 2000 while also incorporating other updated data and using new 
sources. The results are reported in Figure 2.3.  
 
This time the difference between the original and revised estimates is significantly 
lower than with the previous rebasing exercise. However, bearing in mind that the 
figure compares two estimates, rather than actual values, the gap might well be 
much larger in reality.  
 
In other words, Figure 2.3 compares one estimate with another, but no conclusion 
is possible regarding the accuracy of the estimates as such. Rather, it is assumed 
that the revised series represents an improved estimate. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: SA revised GDP vintage 2000 
Source: Stats SA, 2009 
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Similarly, other macro variables are also revised on a periodic basis. For example, 
Statistics South Africa also reviews the inflation data. In 2013, adjustments to CPI 
figures are based on the Income Expenditure Survey. 
 
Thus, in practice, there is considerable uncertainty about the accuracy of economic 
variables, whether they are observed or approximated. Finally, data uncertainty 
directly contributes to the degree of parameter and model uncertainty. 
Uncertainty regarding data influences both the parameters being estimated as well 
as the model used to represent the economy.  
 
These two remaining uncertainty sources are considered below. 
 
2.1.2 Model uncertainty 
 
Model uncertainty refers to imperfect knowledge about the true economic model.  
Figure 2.4 below distinguishes model uncertainty from data and parameter 
uncertainty. Evident is the fact that model uncertainty arises due to the presence 
of imperfect knowledge pertaining to how the model should be constructed. In 
other words, which variables should be included in the model and the functional 
relationship between them? 
 
Basically, this is the problem of model specification: knowing which factors 
influence any particular variable (Longworth, 2004). Even though theory provides a 
guide as to how specific economic variables influence others, reality is often 
substantially more complex.  
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Figure 2.4: Theoretical depiction of model uncertainty 
Source: Adapted from Svensson (1997) 
 
This is exacerbated by the influence of unobservable variables, which are often 
difficult to measure and model mathematically. In illustrating this, Longworth 
(2004) directs attention towards the practice of modelling inflation.  
 
Before the introduction of rational expectations in macroeconomics during the 
early 1970s, the expected inflation rate was modelled on the basis of past 
experiences with inflation (adaptive expectations). Increasingly after this time 
however, inflation expectations have been modelled under the assumption that 
economic agents do not ignore available pertinent information and are forward-
looking (rational expectations). However, there is considerable uncertainty in 
practice as to which approach is relevant, and as a result there exists uncertainty 
about the correct formulation of an inflation expectations model.  
 
According to Longworth (2004), the central bank of Canada tries to alleviate the 
presence of model uncertainty by using a variety of model specifications and 
different techniques before arriving at final policy recommendations. Furthermore, 
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tests are carried out to establish the sensitivity of policy recommendations with 
regard to different assumptions in the model. 
 
Batini, Martin and Salmon (1999) echo this approach towards combating model 
uncertainty, noting that policy rules are purposefully designed to be robust across 
a range of different economic models. While acknowledging that a robust rule 
might perform poorly when compared to the optimal rule of a specific model, the 
optimal rule will by definition perform worse for a range of different model 
specifications. Thus, on aggregate, a derived robust rule would perform best across 
a range of different model specifications. Even though there have been attempts 
at investigating the plausibility and viability of robust policy rules (McCallum 1999 
and Sargent 1998), consensus on how such a robust rule should be derived has yet 
to emerge.  
 
Another relevant example of model uncertainty is evident when considering how 
business cycle indicators are computed. Composite business cycle indicators are 
modelled by incorporating a host of different variables into a single time series 
aimed at predicting turning points in the business cycle. The South African Reserve 
Bank publishes three composite business cycle indicators, namely the leading, 
coincident and lagging indicators. However, there exists considerable uncertainty 
with regards to which variables to include when computing these business cycle 
indicators.   
 
“The time series included in the composite business cycle indicators represent only 
a small sample of the total number of available indicators portraying various 
aspects of economic activity.”    (Venter and Pretorius 2004, p. 67) 
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Venter and Pretorius (2004) highlight the fact that the choice regarding the 
component variables to include in the business cycle time series needs to be re-
evaluated periodically. Various factors influence this decision such as structural 
changes to the economy and the availability of data.  
 
2.1.3 Parameter uncertainty 
 
Distinct from data and model uncertainty is parameter uncertainty. Parameter 
uncertainty refers to the inaccuracy of the estimated parameters in the models. 
Figure 2.5 below distinguishes parameter uncertainty from data uncertainty 
through the use of the same simple theoretical model as in Figure 2.1 above.  
 
Figure 2.5: Theoretical depiction of parameter uncertainty 
Source: Adapted from Svensson (1997) 
 
When constructing models aiming to approximate the economic environment, 
parameters serve as estimates of the relationship between different variables 
within the model. In this case, the parameter estimate (“ɑ” in Figure 2.5 above) 
indicates the relationship between inflation in the current period and one period 
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lagged inflation. In other words, how does the inflation rate in the previous period 
influence current inflation?  
 
As mentioned earlier, even though practitioners have sophisticated statistical 
techniques at their disposal to estimate the model parameters, there is still 
significant uncertainty regarding their accuracy.  
 
This is partially due to the presence of data and model uncertainty. Stated 
differently, uncertainty regarding parameters is partly caused by uncertainty 
related to the data and partly to the model being used.  
 
To make this point clear, consider first the effect of inaccurate data on parameters. 
Even if the model is a true representation of the economy, introducing inaccurate 
data would lead to inaccurate parameter estimates. Since the data used in the 
model are significantly different from the true data, the parameter estimates 
based on the inaccurate data would be significantly different to the true 
parameters. Secondly, even if the data were accurate, an incorrectly specified 
model would still lead to inaccurate parameter estimates.  
 
A simple example illustrating this is the decision on whether there exists a linear or 
quadratic relationship between variables. In other words, if a variable is incorrectly 
added to a model in quadratic form rather than linear form, the parameter will be 
inaccurate. Moreover, adding unnecessary explanatory variables to the model (or 
omitting relevant variables) will also affect the parameters being estimated.  
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Finally, since there are a host of different estimation techniques, such as least 
squares or the method of moments, the choice of technique will also influence the 
final parameter estimates. Central banks try to address uncertainty about 
parameters using different models and techniques to establish whether the 
parameters are robust in respect of the different approaches. Parameter 
robustness suggests that the estimates are not influenced significantly by a specific 
model, thus alleviating the degree of uncertainty arising from imperfect knowledge 
of the true economic model.  
 
2.2  Uncertainty about the State of the Economy 
 
The section above focuses mainly on “narrow” definitions of uncertainty. Although 
very specific and distinct by definition, these narrowly defined sources of 
uncertainty are not mutually exclusive. As explained above, data uncertainty 
contributes directly to both model and parameter uncertainty. In addition, model 
uncertainty directly influences parameter uncertainty.  
 
However, a far more general type of uncertainty confronts policymakers on a 
continual basis. General uncertainty in this sense refers to imperfect knowledge 
about the actual past, current and future states of the economy. Although closely 
related to imperfect data, uncertainty about the state of the economy is also 
concerned with imperfect knowledge of the actions of economic agents and the 
ultimate effect thereof in the future. 
 
In other words, assuming that the data on hand represent a perfect reflection of 
the actual current state of the economy and that data for all economic variables 
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were readily available, there would still be uncertainty regarding the future 
economic state due to the inability to perfectly predict agent behaviour in the 
future. Also, further assuming perfect knowledge regarding the relevant economic 
and agent behavioural models and the relationships between the economic 
variables (parameters), would subsequently result in perfect knowledge of the 
future economic state. In this case, uncertainty in all its forms would cease to exist. 
In other words, assuming perfect knowledge of everything means that nothing is 
uncertain. 
 
Thus, in general, uncertainty about the actual state of the economy represents a 
summation of the narrowly defined sources of uncertainty.  Figure 2.6 below 
attempts to summarise the definitions and underlying relationships between the 
different types of uncertainties.  
 
 
2.3  Concluding Remarks 
 
Even though major advances in estimation and modelling techniques have 
furthered our understanding of how the economy operates, policymakers are still 
challenged by the presence of considerable uncertainty due to the ever-evolving 
and increasingly complex economic system. How central banks, and more 
specifically the SARB, behave in the face of this uncertainty and whether such 
actions reflect optimal behaviour, is an important policy issue. However, before 
trying to answer this question it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the 
concept of uncertainty. Thus, this chapter focused on defining uncertainty within 
the monetary policy landscape.  
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The three main sources of uncertainty pertaining specifically to monetary policy 
are data, model and parameter uncertainty. Data uncertainty refers to the 
presence of imperfect data. This is brought about by errors made in data capturing 
and measurement. Although the former can in principle be avoided, measurement 
errors are far more common and difficult to quantify. Measurement inefficiencies 
refer to the difficulty in obtaining all the relevant information to measure a specific 
economic variable. To compensate for this lack of information, various estimates 
are used. Additionally, theory often relies on abstract variables which are not 
observable. These “unobservable” variables are thus approximated by estimates of 
observable variables.   
 
Model uncertainty refers to imperfect knowledge about the true economic model. 
In other words, there may be considerable uncertainty about which variables are 
exogenous and how they influence the endogenous variables included in the 
model. Although theory provides a guide as to how specific economic variables 
influence others, the situation in practice is more complex as, for example, when 
two or more variables have feedback effects on each other.  
 
Distinct from data and model uncertainty is parameter uncertainty. This is 
determined by the inaccuracy of the parameters within the models being used. 
When constructing models aiming to approximate the economic environment, 
parameters serve as estimates of the relationship between different variables 
within the model. As mentioned earlier, even though practitioners have 
sophisticated statistical techniques at their disposal to estimate the model 
parameters, there is still significant uncertainty regarding their accuracy. 
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Although very specific and distinct, these narrowly defined sources of uncertainty 
are not mutually exclusive. Data uncertainty contributes directly towards both 
model and parameter uncertainty. Also, model uncertainty directly influences 
parameter uncertainty.  
 
Moreover, a far more general type of uncertainty confronts policymakers on a 
continual basis. General uncertainty in this sense refers to imperfect knowledge 
about the actual past, current and future states of the economy. Although closely 
related to imperfect data, uncertainty about the state of the economy is more 
concerned with imperfect knowledge regarding the actions of economic agents 
and the ultimate effect thereof in the future. Thus, uncertainty about the state of 
the economy represents a summation of the three narrow definitions of 
uncertainty. 
 
As the origins of uncertainty have been considered, the next step involves 
investigating how optimal central banks act when confronted with significant 
uncertainty. Determining the optimal theoretical approach to negating the effects 
of uncertainty is necessary before it can be established how uncertainty influenced 
the actions of the SARB and whether or not those actions reflected optimal 
behaviour.  To this end, the next chapter considers a review of the theoretical 
literature on this topic before investigating practical evidence and experiences in 
the subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Review of Optimal Uncertainty 
Policy 
 
 
 
The previous chapter explained how uncertainty is defined and described the main 
sources of uncertainty regarding the monetary policy landscape. Such an 
understanding is essential before considering the impact of uncertainty on the 
actions of the SARB.  
 
As indicated above, the three main sources of uncertainty are data, parameter and 
model uncertainty. Furthermore, it was shown that these sources are not mutually 
exclusive and collectively contribute to a far more general source of uncertainty 
pertaining to the state of the economy. Uncertainty about the state of the 
economy takes into account the presence of imperfect knowledge in predicting 
future agent behaviour. 
 
Even though this provided the necessary information on how uncertainty is 
defined and the various forms in which it could arise, an understanding of how 
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optimal central banks act when confronted with this uncertainty has yet to 
emerge. This chapter summarises the theoretical literature on this topic. It explains 
how, in theory, optimal policymakers should respond when faced with uncertainty. 
This background is necessary before studying the effects of uncertainty on the 
actions of the SARB in particular and deciding whether or not its responses 
reflected optimal behaviour. 
 
As chapter two distinguished between three narrow definitions of uncertainty, this 
chapter will follow a similar approach in categorising the various theories. The first 
section considers the case of parameter uncertainty. Brainard (1967) represents 
one of the first attempts in theoretically investigating the effects of parameter 
uncertainty on monetary policy, and his paper is generally regarded as the 
benchmark in this respect. The remaining two sections consider a review of 
theoretical findings pertaining to model and data uncertainty. The chapter 
concludes with final comments.   
 
3.1  Theories of Parameter Uncertainty 
 
The paper by Brainard (1967) serves as the benchmark for subsequent 
investigations. It is thus informative to review the Brainard case in some detail. 
Thereafter, deviations from the Brainard case will be considered. 
 
3.1.1  Brainard conservatism 
 
Brainard (1967) represents one of the first attempts to investigate the theoretical 
implications of uncertainty with respect to the conduct of policy. More specifically, 
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the paper focuses on the effect of parameter uncertainty on the choice of optimal 
monetary policy. 
 
Parameter uncertainty, in the Brainard sense, stems from the presence of 
structural changes occurring in the economy. When fundamental structural 
changes occur within the economy, the relationships between exogenous and 
endogenous variables change. Uncertainty is present when policymakers are 
unsure whether or not such structural changes have occurred.  
 
To study the theoretical implications of parameter uncertainty, Brainard (1967) 
considers a model with one target variable and one policy instrument variable: 
 
 =  +  	                 (3.1) 
(Brainard 1967, p. 412) 
 
where  is the target variable (such as the inflation rate),  is the policy instrument 
(such as interest rates or government spending),  represents the response to a 
policy action, and the net effect of other exogenous variables is denoted by 	.  
 
Thus, uncertainty could originate from 	, as policymakers might be unable to 
accurately estimate the effects of various exogenous variables, or from , as 
policymakers might be unsure about the response of  to policy actions and 
whether  will be equal to its expected value.  
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The first type of uncertainty, entering through the exogenous variables captured 
by 	, is not affected by the actions of policymakers. Thus, policymakers should 
adhere to “certainty equivalence”, or in other words, they should act as if the 
expected values are accurate.  Brainard (1967) states that in the face of 
uncertainty regarding 	, a change in policy action shifts the distribution of  but 
does not affect its variance.  
 
However, regarding the second type of uncertainty entering through , the actions 
of policymakers influence both the distribution and variance of . This is due to the 
multiplicative factor. Stated differently, due to  being multiplied by , any values 
of  different from what was expected would change both the distribution and 
variance of . Thus, the actions of policymakers influence the distribution of the 
target variable.  
 
To show how uncertainty about the response to a policy action () may affect the 
policy action itself (), Brainard (1967) assumes that policymakers aim to maximise 
the expected value of the following utility function: 
 

 = − − ∗                 (3.2) 
(Brainard 1967, p. 413) 
 
Thus, the policymaker aims to keep the difference between the target value * 
and the true value  to a minimum.  Brainard (1967) further makes the following 
reasonable assumptions: 
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• the response parameter  is a random variable1  
•  is correlated with the additive term 	 from equation 3.1 so that corr(, 	) ≠ 
0.
2
  
 
The variance of the target variable  is given by: 
 
 =   +  +  2                 (3.3)3 
(Brainard 1967, p.414) 
 
To ascertain the optimal policy action, the expected utility derived from a specific 
policy action has to be calculated. This is done by substituting equation 3.1 into 
equation 3.2 and taking the expected value of the resulting equation: 
 

 =  −[̅ +  	 ̅ −   ∗ +  +   +  2]          (3.4)4 
(Brainard 1967, p.414) 
To find the optimal value of , the first order derivative of equation 3.4 is set equal 
to zero, which results in: 
 
* = [ ∗ − 	̅ − 2] / [̅2 + 2]             (3.5) 
(Brainard 1967, p.414) 
                                            
1
 Brainard (1967) stresses that even if the true population parameter were assumed to be non-random, it would 
have to be estimated using sample data, which would result in a random estimation variable. 
2
 Brainard (1967) shows that the results hold, even if the two terms are uncorrelated.  
3
 Equation 3 is obtained by substituting equation 3.1 into  = E(y2) – [E(Y)]2. Subsequently, the equation is 
further manipulated by using the correlation formula of θ	 = [E(θ	) – E(θ)E(	)]/	. 
4
 Take into account that E(U) = -E(y-y*)2. This reduces to E(U) = -[E(y2) - 2y* - (y*)2]. Also, E(y2) could be 
replaced by 2 + 2. This further reduces the formula to E(U) = -[( - y*)2 + 2). Finally, substituting  
with equation 3.1 and 2 with equation 3.3 yields the final result. 
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Equation 3.5 shows that policymakers should take into account the expected 
values and variances of the exogenous variables 	 and the parameter  when 
setting optimal policy. This is in contrast to “certainty equivalence”, where 
policymakers set policy assuming they know the true population parameters and 
thus simply use the expected values as substitutes.    
 
Thus, if certainty is assumed, the variance of the parameter  is equal to zero. By 
contrast, the variance increases as uncertainty about the parameter increases. Due 
to the variance of the  parameter (2) which enters equation 3.5 in the 
denominator, any increase in the parameter variance leads to a decrease in the 
optimal value of *. Thus it is concluded that increased uncertainty should in 
theory lead to a more conservative policy response. 
 
3.1.2 Deviations from the conservatism principle 
 
The findings by Brainard (1967), which suggest that monetary authorities should 
act less aggressively when faced by uncertainty, served as a benchmark for later 
studies. Similar findings to that of Brainard (1967) have been reported by Estrella 
and Mishkin (1998), Svensson (1997) and Sack (1998a).  
 
However, Soderstrom (1999) argues that the findings of Brainard (1967) and 
Svensson (1997) are incomplete, as both papers investigate the special case where 
central banks are concerned only with inflation. In other words, uncertainty enters 
the central bank’s objective function only through the effect on the inflation 
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parameter. By contrast, Soderstrom (1999) considers a more general approach by 
including both inflation and output in a dynamic macroeconomic model.   
 
In examining the “time path” of policy after a shock to the model, Soderstrom’s 
results show that the central bank’s response might in some instances be more 
aggressive when faced with greater uncertainty about the parameters. More 
specifically, uncertainty regarding the “persistence of inflation” parameter results 
in the central bank being more aggressive, while uncertainty about the other 
parameters still results in the central bank being more cautious. Soderstrom (1999) 
attributes this result to the addition of output to the objective function of the 
central bank. 
 
“In the special case analyzed by Svensson, when the weight on output stabilization 
in the central bank's objective function is zero, uncertainty about the persistence of 
inflation does not affect the policy response. For positive weights on output, 
however, the policy response is increasing in the variance of the persistence 
parameter, so policy becomes more aggressive as the amount of uncertainty 
increases.”         (Soderstrom 1999, 1) 
 
Soderstrom (1999) argues that a central bank more concerned with output 
stability may be more inclined to keep inflation in check due to the added 
possibility of increased output volatility in the future. In the absence of the output 
stability objective, a central bank would be less inclined to act more aggressively in 
the face of increased uncertainty about the persistence of inflation.  
 
 Theoretical Review of Optimal Uncertainty Policy 
 
28 
 
Thus in cases where the difference between actual and target inflation remains 
persistently large after past policy actions to curb this trend, central banks might 
opt to act more aggressively due to the expectation that a weak response might 
again not have the desired outcome.  
 
Kimura
 
and Kurozumi (2003) support the general findings of Soderstrom (1999). 
However, they use a forward-looking model with micro foundations instead of the 
backward-looking model used by Soderstrom (1999). However, their model also 
suggests that central banks should respond more aggressively to shocks when 
faced with increasing uncertainty about the dynamics of inflation (inflation 
persistence).  
 
Kimura
 
and Kurozumi (2003) state that their findings differ from the conventional 
Brainard result due to two distinct dissimilarities in the modelling process. Firstly, 
Brainard used a static model, whereas Kimura
 
and Kurozumi use a dynamic 
forward-looking model. The dynamic model allows for investigating the time path 
of inflation and inflation persistence. As inflation moves away from its target, the 
variance of both inflation and the output gap increases. In other words, the further 
these variables move away from their set targets, the greater is the level of 
uncertainty associated with these variables as their statistical variances have 
increased. Thus, central banks have to be more aggressive to move the variables 
back to their target levels. Secondly, Brainard (1967) assumed a fixed objective 
function, whereas this assumption is relaxed in the Kimura
 
and Kurozumi (2003) 
study. 
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Moessner (2005) also uses a forward-looking dynamic model, similar to that used 
by Kimura
 
and Kurozumi (2003), to study the influence of parameter uncertainty. 
However, the Moessner (2005) study differs in that it focuses on the case where it 
is assumed that the central bank acts discretionally compared to the rule-bound 
behaviour studied by Kimura
 
and Kurozumi. Moessner also found evidence 
suggesting optimal behaviour involved central banks acting more aggressively 
when confronted with uncertainty about inflation persistence.  
 
Wieland (2002) also considers the impact of parameter uncertainty on the actions 
of policymakers.  Wieland’s model, focusing on the impact of inflation persistence 
and the inflation-unemployment trade off, is tested through numerical 
simulations. The results seem to support the Brainard result, suggesting that 
policymakers act more conservatively in the static version of the model.  
In the dynamic version of the model Wieland finds that there is room for a more 
aggressive policy response. However, Wieland states that optimal policy seems to 
balance the aggressive and conservative approaches, with the conservative 
response dominating in most instances. 
 
3.2  Theories of Model Uncertainty 
 
Investigations concerned with explaining the effects of model uncertainty on the 
conduct of monetary policy are typically complex and tedious in nature. Most of 
the findings are dependent on both the methodology as well as the associated 
assumptions, which make general conclusions from the literature difficult.   
 
 Theoretical Review of Optimal Uncertainty Policy 
 
30 
 
Regarding the methodologies used, most investigations use either a Bayesian 
approach or a “worst-case” method. The Bayesian approach typically aims to solve 
decision rules given a set of prior conditions related to the parameters in different 
models. Put differently, the approach aims to derive a “robust rule” which achieves 
the lowest average loss, derived from the loss or objective function, from all the 
different model classifications included in the study. By contrast, the worst-case 
approach aims to derive a rule which minimises the loss only in the worst case 
model.  
 
Cateau (2005) uses a combination of both the “robust” and “worst-case” 
approaches in examining how uncertainty influences the actions of central banks. 
Cateau notes that a disadvantage of the worst case approach is that it 
automatically assumes a more conservative and pessimistic central bank, designing 
policy based on the worst case scenario. Also, the worst case approach disregards 
the central bank’s preference for a specific model, which might be viewed as being 
more plausible or realistic at the time.  
 
By contrast, the robust approach allows the central bank more flexibility in 
designing a robust rule with more emphasis on the model deemed to be most 
plausible. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that it assumes that the 
central bank takes a risk management approach rather than exhibiting optimal 
behaviour.   
 
Cateau (2005) assumes that the central bank is mainly concerned with two types of 
risk. The first-order risk focuses on the uncertainty regarding a specific model. The 
second-order risk focuses on the uncertainty across the set of models. Thus Cateau 
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(2005) uses a combination of the worst case and robust approaches. Furthermore, 
the central bank is permitted to be model uncertainty averse or neutral.  
 
The worst case approach represents one end of the spectrum, signifying a central 
bank which is particularly averse to model uncertainty. The robust approach is the 
other limiting case, representing a central bank which is model uncertainty neutral. 
Cateau (2005) further assumes that the central bank has a choice between three 
different models. The first model, from Woodford (2002), is a forward-looking one. 
The second model, originally put forward by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), is a 
backward-looking model. The third model, by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), is a 
combination of both forward- and backward-looking models.  
 
Subsequently, in arriving at a result, Cateau investigates how the derived optimal 
rule changes when the central bank’s aversion to risk is altered. Thus a strongly 
uncertainty averse central bank would signify conservatism.  In examining the 
effects of various changes in the risk aversion of the central bank, the results 
indicated that the optimal rule tended towards the worst case approach. Put 
differently, Cateau (2005) found that policy became more conservative as the 
central bank’s behaviour tended towards increased uncertainty aversion.  
 
Onatski and Stock (2002) use the robust control approach in investigating the 
effects of model uncertainty.  After specifying a set of likely modelling errors, the 
robust control method defines optimal policy (robust policy) as the policy which 
would minimise the maximal risk across all the modelling errors within the specific 
set. Onatski and Stock also use the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model 
formulation and find that the derived robust policies are more aggressive than the 
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optimal policies in the absence of model uncertainty. In other words, Onatski and 
Stock (2002) find that central bankers act more aggressively when faced with 
model uncertainty.  
 
3.3  Theories on Data Uncertainty 
 
Theories on data uncertainty tend to focus on the fact that real time data are 
inherently less accurate than subsequently revised releases. This is mainly due to 
the great extent to which real time data are estimated rather than measured 
accurately. With subsequent data releases, a smaller component of the data is 
estimated, thus decreasing the uncertainty associated therewith.  
 
To make this point clear, the study by Mahadeva (2007) proves insightful. In 
investigating the relationship between different data releases, Mahadeva focuses 
on a case study of the distribution, hotels and catering sector within the United 
Kingdom. Mahadeva explains that the choice of industry was guided by the fact 
that the data in this regard are particularly difficult to measure. The study thus 
focuses on a worst case scenario.  
 
The findings indicate that the initial release was not a significant predictor of the 
final estimate. Mahadeva explains that this might be due to the initial release 
being used as a building platform by the statistical office responsible for the 
measurements, rather than representing an estimate as such. Another finding 
pertains to the sensitivity of the final estimate to the historical growth of the data. 
In other words, a lot of weight is put on historical trends in estimating the current 
variable values rather than being derived from actual current measures. Although 
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this is a worst case scenario as mentioned above, the findings do highlight the 
omnipresence and significance of data uncertainty.  
  
Ghysels, Swanson and Callan (1999) concentrate on the effect of real time data on 
the formulation of optimal policy rules. Empirical studies often use only revised 
data, as by the time the investigation is undertaken, the data have already been 
substantially revised.  Thus, Ghysels, Swanson and Callan (1999) construct real 
time datasets based on the data that were available at the time of the policy 
decision, thereby recreating the information environment applicable at the time of 
policy formulation. Thus, the real time policy-setting environment is simulated 
from the real time data. The findings suggest that the decision models  differ 
significantly when using only real time data compared to using both real time and 
revised data (not available at the time of policy decision). This implies that the 
central bank would have acted differently if it had had access to the more accurate 
revised data at the time when the decisions were being taken.  
 
Jääskelä and Yates (2005) investigate how data uncertainty affects optimal 
monetary policy. They make use of a rational expectations IS-LM model as follows: 
  
Demand-side 
 =   + 1 −  ∑ "##$ −  % −   + &     
 
Supply-side 
 =  ' + 1 − '" + '  +  (                          
(Jääskelä and Yates 2005, p. 4-5) 
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where  is output,  inflation,  the  expectation conditional on information at 
time t, % the nominal interest rate, & a demand shock, ( a cost-push shock and 
the α’s and '′) are the parameters.  
 
Also, the central bank aims to minimise the following objective function: 
 
Objective Function 
* = Var () + Var () + θ Var (Δ%)       
(Jääskelä and Yates 2005, p. 8) 
 
Furthermore, the model assumes that inflation is measured perfectly while the 
output data are characterised by uncertainty. Three output variables are included 
in the model. These are a real time variable and first and second order-lagged 
variables.  Finally, Jääskelä and Yates (2005) reasonably assume that the 
measurement error, or associated uncertainty, decreases from the real time data 
towards the second lagged variable.  
 
The aim of the exercise is to observe how the monetary authority acts given 
changes in the data (thus reflecting varying degrees of uncertainty). Model 
simulations suggest that the monetary authority assigns less weight to recent data 
when it is more uncertain. Furthermore, Jääskelä and Yates (2005) find that the 
monetary authority’s response is optimal by assuming that the difference in 
accuracy between recent (real time) and revised data is larger rather than smaller. 
In other words, the central bank should act as if the most recent data (real time) 
are not very accurate, thus rather be more conservative in using recent data.  
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3.4  Concluding Remarks 
 
Chapter one explained how uncertainty is defined, and examined the main sources 
of uncertainty regarding monetary policy. However, a clear understanding of how 
optimal central banks should respond when confronted with such uncertainty has 
yet to emerge. This chapter summarised the main theoretical work on this topic 
and explained how optimal policymakers should act when faced with uncertainty. 
This gives a preview of the effects of uncertainty on the policy responses of the 
SARB and whether these accord with theoretically optimal behaviour. 
 
First, this review of the relevant theory focused on the effects of parameter 
uncertainty on optimal monetary policy. In normal circumstances, theory suggests 
a more conservative approach to policymaking when significant uncertainty is 
present (Brainard 1967, Estrella and Mishkin 1998, Svensson 1997 and Sack 
1998a).  
 
However, certain exceptions apply which could cause the monetary authority to 
act more aggressively. The main exception to the conservatism principle proposed 
by Brainard (1967) originates in the presence of considerable inflation persistence 
(Soderstrom 1999, Kimura
 
and Kurozumi 2003 and Moessner 2005). If inflation 
persists, optimising central banks might have to respond more aggressively. 
However, even in these cases, there is evidence that optimal policy requires a 
balance of aggressive and conservative approaches, with the conservative side 
dominating in most instances (Wieland, 2002). 
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Next, the focus turned to the theoretical implications of model uncertainty. These 
investigations are typically complex and tedious in nature. Most of the findings are 
largely dependent on both the choice of methodology as well as the associated 
assumptions. This makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions from the 
literature. With regard to the methodologies used, most investigations use either a 
Bayesian approach or a worst-case method. The Bayesian approach typically aims 
to solve decision rules given a set of prior conditions related to the parameters in 
different models. Put differently, the approach aims to derive a robust rule which 
achieves the lowest average loss, derived from the loss or objective function, from 
all the different model classifications included in the study. By contrast, the worst-
case approach aims to derive a rule which minimises the loss only in the worst case 
model.  
 
The findings from the literature are mostly inconclusive. Using a combination of 
the worst-case and robust-control methods, Cateau (2005) found that policy 
became more conservative in the face of increased uncertainty. By contrast, using 
the robust-control method, Onatski and Stock reported findings suggesting a more 
aggressive central bank response when confronted with increased uncertainty 
about the model. 
 
Finally, theories on data uncertainty emphasise that real time data are inherently 
less accurate than subsequently revised releases. This is mainly due to the great 
extent to which real time data are estimated, rather than directly measured. With 
subsequent data releases, a smaller component of the data is estimated, thus 
decreasing the uncertainty associated therewith. The findings suggest that central 
banks would act differently given access to the more accurate revised data at the 
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time when the decisions were being taken (Ghysels, Swanson and Callan, 1999) 
and that monetary authorities are better off assuming that the difference in 
accuracy between recent and revised data is greater rather than smaller, and thus 
act more conservatively (Jääskelä and Yates, 2005). 
 
To conclude, the conservative approach to uncertainty dominates most of the 
literature. In other words, the majority of theoretical findings suggest that central 
banks should act more conservatively when faced with uncertainty. The main 
exception is when inflation persistence is present, in which case an optimal central 
bank should act more aggressively. Besides these general findings, the review of 
the theoretical literature also sheds light on the following key lessons which should 
be noted when modelling the effects of uncertainty on central bank behaviour: 
 
• Dynamic models are more applicable than static models (Soderstrom, 
1999).  
• Forward-looking behaviour is more appropriate when investigating 
uncertainty (Kimura
 
and Kurozumi, 2003 and Moessner, 2005).   
• Models should control for inflation persistence (Kimura
 
and Kurozumi, 2003 
and Moessner, 2005). 
 
Before modelling the effects of uncertainty on the behaviour of the SARB in 
chapters 5-8, the following chapter summarises the findings of the empirical 
literature in this regard: do central banks act optimally in practice? This question is 
addressed next.    
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Chapter 4 
Central Banks and Uncertainty in Practice 
 
 
 
The theoretical review of optimal monetary policy and uncertainty in the previous 
chapter suggests that optimal central banks should respond less aggressively when 
confronted with significant degrees of uncertainty, except in the case of significant 
inflation persistence. This may justify a more aggressive policy response from the 
central bank. However, some studies still suggest that optimal policy may require a 
balance between the aggressive and conservative approaches, with the 
conservative side dominating in most instances. 
 
However, do central banks adhere to the conservatism principle in practice? In 
reality the dynamics of uncertainty and the central bank’s responses to the varying 
conditions of uncertainty may be very different from what is suggested by theory. 
This is also echoed through a remark by Blinder (1998) in defence of the original 
Brainard (1967) conservatism finding: 
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 “My intuition tells me that this finding is more general, or at least more wise, in 
the real world than the mathematics will support."                     (Blinder 1998, p. 12) 
 
This chapter reviews the empirical literature on the effects of uncertainty on 
central bank policy responses, especially whether or not they have followed the 
conservatism principle in practice. These findings give some background to the 
methodology used to investigate the effects of uncertainty on the SARB in the 
following chapters.   
 
Compared to the theoretical work on this subject, relatively little empirical 
research has been done.  Each of the sections which follow considers a specific 
paper from the literature in some detail with specific focus on data, methodology 
and findings. The following articles will be discussed in turn: 
 
• Martin and Salmon (1999) 
• Martin and Milas (2005) 
• Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) 
• Chung (2005) 
 
4.1  Martin and Salmon 
 
Martin and Salmon (1999) considered the relevance of uncertainty for monetary 
policy in the United Kingdom from 1980 to 1997. They aimed to establish whether 
the UK case provides empirical evidence to support the Brainard Conservatism 
principle. 
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4.1.1 Methodology 
 
In estimating the effects of uncertainty on the actions of the Bank of England, 
Martin and Salmon (1999) used a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) approach similar 
to that used by Sack (1998a). The authors purposefully avoid modelling the 
economy through simple first-order difference equations. Rather, the economy is 
represented by a vector (n),  comprising endogenous variables following an 
auto-regressive process up to order q. The system as a whole is simplified as 
follows: 
 
 = + + ∑ ,#"#-#$ + .               (4.1) 
(Martin and Salmon 1999, p. 18) 
 
where ,#  is a matrix of parameters, . a vector of random shocks and + is a 
constant. Martin and Salmon explain that the shocks in equation 4.1 are likely to 
be correlated. However, assuming correct identification of the model results in n 
structural equations where /  represents the uncorrelated disturbance vector as 
follows: 
 
B1y3 = k + ∑ B5y3"565$ + v3                           (4.2) 
(Martin and Salmon 1999, p. 18) 
 
Furthermore, if correctly identified, the first n-1 equations from 4.2 above 
represent the structural form of the economy and the n
th
 equation the central 
bank’s policy reaction function
5
.  
                                            
5
 The authors purposefully include the interest rate as the final nth endogenous variable, thus representing the 
interest rate response to fluctuations in the other n-1 variables.  
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Next, Martin and Salmon define a state vector 89 which includes all the 
endogenous variables up to order q, with the exception of the current interest rate 
term. Subsequently, it is assumed that the central bank’s loss function is 
represented by: 
 
* = −   ∑ ':;:$ <: − <∗′><: − <∗                                    (4.3) 
(Martin and Salmon 1999, p. 19) 
 
where <∗ represents the vector of target values while > is a matrix of zeros except 
the diagonal entries which represent the weights which the central bank assigns to 
each target variable. Finally, the loss function in equation 4.3 above is solved to 
arrive at the optimal interest rate rule
6
. 
 
Uncertainty arises by assuming that the values of the state variables are not 
observed directly, but rather based on expectations as follows: 
 
<? = "<                                                         (4.4) 
(Martin and Salmon 1999, p. 19) 
 
 
The same process is followed to derive an uncertainty adjusted optimal interest 
rate rule through substituting equation 4.4 into equation 4.3. This ultimately 
translates into an optimal rule where the interest rate decision is dependent on 
both the expected value and variance of state variables. Interest rates derived 
from the optimal rule excluding uncertainty are then compared to the optimal rule 
                                            
6
 See Martin and Salmon (1999, p19) for computational details regarding the matrix algebra and subsequent 
derived optimal interest rate rule.  
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including uncertainty to ascertain whether uncertainty resulted in conservatism on 
the part of the Bank of England.  
 
4.1.2 Data 
 
Besides the official base interest rates, Martin and Salmon (1999) include CPIX 
inflation, real GDP at 1995 prices and the Dollar/Pound exchange rate as 
endogenous variables. Also, it is assumed that the central bank responds to the 
output gap rather than GDP levels. The output gap is constructed through applying 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter
7
. As noted above, uncertainty enters the model through 
the variances of the state variables.  
 
4.1.3 Results 
 
The results suggest that optimal interest rates assuming uncertainty tended to be 
smoother than optimal rules assuming no uncertainty. Also, when faced with 
inflation or output shocks, optimal rules under uncertainty propose a less 
aggressive response than optimal rules assuming no uncertainty. Furthermore, 
Martin and Salmon (1999) note that even though the initial response is slower 
under uncertainty, ultimately the same level of the interest rate is achieved. In 
other words, the interest rate will eventually reach the same level under both the 
presence and absence of uncertainty, but the dynamics are slower assuming 
uncertainty. These results are in line with Brainard’s conservatism principle.  
                                            
7
 The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a statistical method used to separate the cyclical component in a time series 
from the fitted trend. For more information, see Hodrick and Prescott (1980). 
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4.2  Martin and Milas 
 
Martin and Milas (2005) follow a more generalised approach to investigating the 
effects of uncertainty on the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank. Abstaining from 
focusing on a specific type of uncertainty (data, model or parameter uncertainty), 
Martin and Milas consider a broader definition. Their investigation is concerned 
with the effects of uncertainty about the true state of the economy. As explained 
in chapter 2, uncertainty in this sense refers to imperfect knowledge about the 
actual past, current and future states of the economy. Although closely related to 
imperfect data, uncertainty about the state of the economy is also concerned with 
imperfect knowledge of the actions of economic agents and the ultimate effects 
thereof in the future. 
 
4.2.1 Methodology 
 
The model includes a Taylor-type rule where the weights on inflation and the 
output gap are not constant but are rather functions of inflation and output gap 
uncertainty respectively. Uncertainty is introduced through the weights on 
inflation and the output gap and approximated by their variances derived through 
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasiticity (GARCH) models of 
inflation and the output gap.  
 
As a point of origin, Martin and Milas employ the Federal Funds rate target as 
specified by Clarida et al (1998) as follows: 
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@̃ = B∗ + C − ∗ +                                      (4.5) 
(Martin and Milas 2005, p.3) 
 
with @̃ representing the target federal funds rate, B∗ the equilibrium interest rate, 
 the inflation rate, ∗ the inflation target,  the output gap,  the expectations 
operator and C and  the weights on inflation and the output gap respectively.  
 
Next, the authors assume the actual interest rate adjusts towards the target rate 
as follows: 
 
B = #*B" + 1 − # @̃                           (4.6) 
(Martin and Milas 2005, p.4) 
 
where #* =  # + #* … … #E*E" 
 
Substituting equation 4.6 into 4.5 yields: 
 
B = F + #*B" + 1 − #C +            (4.7) 
(Martin and Milas 2005, p.4) 
where F = 1 − #B∗ + C∗ 
 
However, as Martin and Milas (2005) explain, the model outlined in equation 4.7 
above does not allow for the effects of uncertainty, as the weights are assumed to 
be constant. To address this issue, the authors adapt the model in equation 4.7 as 
follows: 
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B = F + #*B" + 1 − #C +            (4.8) 
(Martin and Milas 2005, p.4) 
 
with C = C + CCC + C  
          =  + CC +   
 
The variance terms above,   and C , represent measures of uncertainty of the 
output gap and inflation respectively. These variances are derived through GARCH 
models of inflation and the output gap equations as follows: 
 
Inflation Equation 
 = " + G" + .       
 
where   C = H1 + H." + H C"    
 
Output Gap Equation
8
 
  = I1 + I" + I" + IJ@̅ − " + K   
(Martin and Milas 2005, p.14) 
where   = L1 + LK" + L "  
 
The approach above differs from studies that rely solely on the standard deviation 
or variance of the various endogenous regressors as approximations to 
uncertainty. Using GARCH models in this case allows for capturing the volatility of 
                                            
8
 See Martin and Milas (2005, p.14) for definitions and an explanation of @ ̅and . 
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the remaining unexplained residuals after controlling for the explainable effects of 
the regressors. Thus, only “unexplainable” effects are captured as uncertainty, as 
the models outlined above control for deviations in the data which can be 
explained and as a result are known rather than representing uncertainty.  
  
After calculating uncertainty through the GARCH models above, the authors 
investigate the behaviour of the parameters in equation 4.8 to establish whether 
such uncertainty resulted in a more passive or aggressive response from the 
central bank. For example, CC < 0 would suggest a more passive response when 
faced with increased uncertainty about inflation. The model outlined above also 
allows for investigating the effect of inflation uncertainty on the response to the 
output gap and vice versa. This is observed through C and C. 
 
Finally, comparing the predicted interest rates from equation 4.7 (assuming no 
uncertainty) and equation 8 (assuming uncertainty) allows for gauging the overall 
effect of uncertainty on interest rates. This is achieved through measuring the 
difference between what the interest rates would have been, assuming no 
uncertainty and the resulting interest rates if uncertainty was taken into account 
by the central bank.  
 
4.2.2 Data 
 
Martin and Milas (2005) investigate the case of the United States from 1983 to 
2003. The Federal funds rate is used as the model interest rate, the annual change 
in the Consumer Price Index as the inflation rate and the difference between the 
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logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of potential GDP as the output gap measure. 
As noted above, uncertainty is measured through applying the GARCH estimation 
technique to the assumed structural equations.  
 
4.2.3 Results 
 
Simulating the model with data from the United States, the results indicate that 
policymakers acted less aggressively towards inflation and output when these 
variables were more uncertain. Furthermore, greater uncertainty about one 
variable induced a greater response to the other variable. In other words, when 
uncertainty about inflation was greater, the Fed responded more aggressively to 
changes in output.  
 
Applying a similar approach to the case of the United Kingdom, Martin and Milas 
(2006) found results which support the findings for the United States. Once again, 
the results suggest less aggressive behaviour when policymakers are faced with 
greater uncertainty. 
 
4.3  Shuetrim and Thompson 
 
Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) investigate the discretionary policy case of 
Australia. Although the authors focus on parameter uncertainty, similar to the 
original study by Brainard (1967), their methodology and treatment of uncertainty 
is distinctly different from the “rule-based” approach commonly used by other 
studies investigating the same phenomenon.   
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4.3.1 Methodology 
 
Instead of designing and estimating structural economic equations from theory, 
Shuetrim and Thompson use a model of the Australian economy as developed by 
the Reserve Bank of Australia. The model consists of seven structural equations 
explaining the dynamics of output, prices, labour costs, import prices, real 
exchange rate, nominal exchange rate and the real interest rate
9
.  Model 
parameters are obtained through applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation from a sample period ranging from 1980 to 1997. 
 
Next, the authors assume that the central bank is concerned with minimising the 
following intertemporal loss function: 
 
*O)) =  [P ∑ (QRSR$ + ' ∑ TR − ∗USR$ + G ∑ TBR − BR"U]SR$      (4.9) 
(Shuetrim and Thompson 1999, p.6) 
 
where B is the short-term interest rate, (Q the output gap,  inflation and ∗ the 
inflation target. The central bank preferences are denoted by P, ' and G 
respectively.  The atypical third term in the loss function represents the central 
bank’s preference to avoid large single period changes in the interest rate (interest 
rate smoothing). 
 
                                            
9
 See Shuetrim and Thompson (1999, p.7) for detailed model specifications. 
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The model excluding uncertainty is solved by estimating the structural equations 
and obtaining estimates of the parameters. These parameters are assumed to be 
the true population parameters. Subsequently, the structural equations and 
estimated parameters are then substituted into the loss function in equation 4.9 
above. The minimisation problem is solved and the central bank’s preference 
weights observed, thus reflecting the central bank’s preference in the absence of 
parameter uncertainty.   
 
Parameter uncertainty is induced through using the parameter variances and the 
associated distributions. This is often labelled as the frequency-sampling 
technique. The authors randomly draw a large number of different parameter 
estimates from each respective parameter distribution. Instead of assuming any 
particular parameter “draw” as the true population parameter set, all the 
parameter estimates for each exogenous variable in the structural equations are 
simulated through the model. The loss function is subsequently minimised across 
various different parameter draws from the respective parameter distribution to 
finally arrive at the central bank’s preference weights
10
.  
 
In essence, the uncertainty adjusted model assumes that the central bank aims to 
minimise the loss across all the possible structural parameter permutations. This 
technique may be thought of as a risk minimisation approach on the part of the 
central bank. 
 
                                            
10
 Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) employ a multivariate vector model to this end. For more information in 
this regard, see Shuetrim and Thompson (1999, p.14-16) 
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The difference between the model without uncertainty and the model including 
parameter uncertainty is observed after inducing various types of shocks to the 
system.  
 
4.3.2 Data 
 
As mentioned above, Shuetrim and Thompson study the effects of parameter 
uncertainty on the actions of the Australian central bank over a sample from 1980 
to 1997. A structural model originally designed by the Australian Reserve bank is 
used to characterise the dynamics of the Australian economy. Due to the elaborate 
nature of the model, discussing all the different measures used is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, only the main variables will be discussed briefly
11
.    
 
Output is measured by real non-farm gross domestic product. The output gap is 
measured as actual output less a production function-based measure of potential 
output. Furthermore, the nominal cash rate is used as the interest rate variable, 
and the consumer price index as the price level. All variables enter the model in 
logarithm form. Finally, model parameters are estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). 
 
4.3.3 Results 
 
Surprisingly, the findings reflect that policymakers might be more aggressive when 
the degree of uncertainty is higher. Shuetrim and Thompson find that for shocks to 
                                            
11For detailed information on all variables and their respective definitions, see Shuetrim and Thompson (1999, 
p. 7). 
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output, import prices, inflation and labour costs, the responses taking account of 
parameter uncertainty are more aggressive. Only when real exchange rate shocks 
were simulated did the response reflect conservatism when taking uncertainty into 
account.  
 
The results, in contrast to Brainard Conservatism, are explained as being a 
consequence of the persistence of shocks and the ineffectiveness of policy. 
However, Shuetrim and Thompson note that even though the findings are in stark 
contrast to conventional Brainard Conservatism, the results are greatly dependent 
on the model specification, parameter estimates and the type of shocks analysed.  
 
A key distinguishing feature of the model relates to the specific inclusion of an 
interest rate smoothing preference in the central bank’s loss function. In other 
words, the model used by Shuetrim and Thompson implicitly assumes that the 
central bank tends towards conservatism through a preference of minimising 
interest rate deviations. This is due to interest rate smoothing type behaviour 
closely resembling conservatism, as in both cases the central bank prefers not to 
change the interest rate substantially from one period to another.  
 
Although other studies typically include a lagged interest rate term towards 
controlling for the effects of interest rate smoothing
12
, this is not modelled as a 
central bank objective. Thus, in such cases, optimal behaviour is not influenced by 
the central bank’s preferences to interest rate deviations, and no assumption is 
                                            
12
 See for example Martin and Milas (2005). 
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made about the central bank’s inclination to either conservatism or aggression. 
The different approach employed by Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) might thus 
act to “absorb” conservatism-type behaviour and thus lead to their contrary 
results. 
 
4.4  Chung 
 
Chung (2005) investigates how changes in inflation and output uncertainty affect 
the Federal Reserve’s interest rate response. Similar to other studies, uncertainty 
is derived through the variances of inflation and output respectively. The 
methodology is explored in more detail below. 
 
4.4.1 Methodology 
 
Chung uses a generalised Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
Structural Vector Auto Regression (GARCH-SVAR) approach to study the effects of 
uncertainty on the central bank’s interest rate responses. Chung motivates the 
choice in estimation technique on the basis that it simultaneously allows for 
variances to be derived through GARCH processes while also enabling the 
investigation of how policy reacts in response to shocks.  
 
As a point of origin, Chung assumes a standard reduced-form VAR in matrix 
notation as follows: 
 
V = W + ∅V" +  … … + ∅YV"Y + Z                                    (4.10) 
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Z = 0, Ω 
(Chung 2005, p.4) 
  
where V is a vector of endogenous variables, ∅Y is a diagonal matrix of lagged 
coefficients, C a matrix of constants and Ω the covariance matrix of the residuals. 
The vector V contains endogenous variables such as the inflation rate, output gap, 
unemployment and the federal funds rate. However, the equation above does not 
allow for structural economic dynamics. In other words, equation 4.10 does not 
explain the interdependencies amongst the variables contained in the model. 
These interdependencies are necessary to estimate the GARCH variances needed 
to approximate inflation and output gap uncertainty. To this end, Chung assumes 
the following structural counterpart to equation 4.10 above: 
 
B1V = [ + BV" +  … … + \YV"Y + 	                                 (4.11) 
	 = B1Z  
 (Chung 2005, p.5) 
 
where B is a matrix with coefficients explaining the inter-relationships between 
the endogenous variables and [ = B1W. Thus, the structural equation parameters 
are captured through the coefficients in B13. 
 
                                            
13
 Chung (2005) derives these coefficients through assuming B is a lower triangular matrix identified through a 
Cholesky decomposition of Ω. For more details in this regard, see Chung (2005, p. 5). 
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After following a similar approach to Jorda and Salyer (2003) by allowing the 
structural equations to evolve through GARCH processes, Chung finally arrives at 
the following model
14
: 
 
B1V = [ + BV" +  … … + \YV"Y + Ψ> + 	                     (4.12) 
> = _i … _"YB)’ 
(Chung 2005, p.6) 
 
where Ψ is a coefficient matrix containing the GARCH effects and _ is the 
covariance matrix of the residuals 	. Thus, Ψ captures the effect of uncertainty on 
the interest rate response (i). 
 
4.4.2 Data 
 
The model outlined above contains four variables aimed at representing the 
Federal Reserve’s main target variables and policy instrument. These variables are 
the industrial output gap, unemployment gap, inflation gap and the federal funds 
rate. The quarterly sample stretches from 1960 to 2003. The data are obtained 
from the Congressional Budget Office publications.  
 
4.4.3 Results 
 
The results reported by Chung are mixed. First, the results indicate that the Federal 
Reserve responded less aggressively when confronted by a positive shock in order 
                                            
14
 The transitional steps taken to arrive at equation 4.12 are beyond the scope of this chapter. For more details 
in this regard, see Chung (2005, p. 5). 
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to dampen the economic expansion. By contrast, the Federal Reserve acted more 
aggressively after a negative shock, in so doing stimulating the economy to prevent 
a substantial downturn. Thus, based on these findings, the Federal Reserve is 
seemingly more lenient when a particular shock implies economic expansion 
rather than a contraction.  This behaviour may partly be explained by the 
asymmetric nature of business cycles. Keyens (1936) explains this phenomenon as 
follows: 
 
“the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place 
suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning point 
when a upward is substituted for a downward tendency”   (Keyens, 1936) 
 
The asymmetric nature of business cycles, that recessions are often more severe 
and last for shorter time horizons than compared to expansions, has been 
reported in a number of empirical studies (Neftci 1984, Acemoglu and Scott 1997; 
Beaudry and Koop 1993). Thus, based on this evidence, the Federal Reserve might 
be prompted to act more aggressively in the face of a negative shock seeing as the 
effect on the economy would be more severe than compared to the case of a 
positive shock. 
 
4.5  The SARB and Uncertainty 
 
The preceding sections reviewed the empirical literature focusing on the actions of 
central banks in the face of uncertainty. Seeing as this thesis is concerned with 
investigating the effects of uncertainty for the developing country case of South 
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Africa, it would be useful to devote this section to a review of how the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) has addressed uncertainty in practice.  
 
Aron and Muellbauer (2006) explain that the SARB followed three broad monetary 
policy systems since the 1960’s.  The first regime, in operation until the early 
1980’s, was a liquid asset ratio-based system with controls on interest rates and 
credit.  
 
The period from 1981 to 1985 witnessed a range of monetary policy reforms as the 
SARB moved to a cash reserves-based system. The discount rate was used to 
influence overnight lending and subsequently market interest rates. In 1986, the 
SARB announced money supply targets (M3) with the aim of containing inflation 
and encouraging real GDP growth.  
 
However, Aron and Muellbauer (2006) note that the process and decisions around 
setting these targets were not transparent. Also, the money supply targets served 
more as guidelines than strict rules.  
 
The effectiveness of the money supply targets was reduced mainly due to 
increased financial liberalisation and larger capital flows. During the early 1990’s 
the money supply targets were replaced by an eclectic set of guidelines. These 
guidelines included indicators of exchange rates, asset prices, the output gap, the 
balance of payments, wages, credit and fiscal policy. The third system was 
implemented in 1998 with the introduction of the Repurchase (Repo) Interest 
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Rate. The Repo Rate was initially determined by the market through daily tenders 
of repurchase agreements but was subsequently fixed and set by the SARB
15
.  
 
Almost no information is available regarding how the SARB dealt with or aimed to 
address uncertainty during the period discussed above. This lack of transparency 
was a key characteristic of the monetary policy regimes during this period. 
 
“Policy was very opaque in this period, and this diminished the accountability of the 
SARB.”       (Aron and Muellbauer 2006, p.4) 
 
In 2000 the SARB formally adopted an inflation targeting monetary policy regime. 
Mishkin (2001) defined an inflation targeting framework as encompassing five key 
characteristics as follows: 
 
→ A public announcement of a numerical target for inflation.  
→ Institutional commitment to price stability as the primary monetary policy 
objective.  
→ The implementation of various information sources above and beyond 
monetary aggregates and exchange rates when making policy decisions. 
→ Improved transparency. 
→ Increased accountability.   
 
                                            
15
 For more information regarding the conduct and frameworks of monetary policy during this period, see 
Aron and Muellbauer (2006).  
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Van der Merwe (2004) provides four reasons to explain the rationale for the 
SARB’s decision to implement a formal inflation targeting regime. Firstly, a formal 
inflation targeting framework is considerably more transparent and the objective 
and actions of the central bank are usually better understood by the general 
public. Secondly, inflation targeting results in better coordination between 
monetary policy and other policies if the target is consistent with other policy 
objectives. Thirdly, inflation targeting results in improved accountability. In cases 
where the SARB failed to reach the inflation target, appropriate reasons need to be 
provided as to why this was the case. Again, this disciplines the central bank while 
also improving the public’s understanding of policy. Finally, Van der Merwe (2004) 
notes that inflation targeting assists in anchoring inflation expectations assuming 
the inflation targets are credible. This should subsequently serve to lower actual 
future inflation.  
 
The adoption of the inflation targeting framework also coincided with a more 
formal approach to dealing with and communicating uncertainty. The technique 
used to this end is the so-called “fan chart” methodology. The fan chart was first 
published by the Bank of England during 1996. The fan chart basically represents 
the central bank’s inflation forecast in the form of a probability distribution. The 
fan chart is described more formally below: 
 
“The fan chart uses confidence bands to depict varying degrees of certainty. The 
darkest band of the fan chart covers the most likely 10 per cent of probable 
outcomes foreseen for inflation, including the central projection. Each successive 
band, shaded slightly lighter and added on either side of the central band, adds a 
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further 10 per cent to the probability, until the whole shaded area depicts a 90 per 
cent confidence interval.        (SARB, 2012) 
 
The fan chart is constructed through the combination of various inputs. Based on 
the outcomes of the models used by the SARB, a central inflation forecast is 
estimated. The uncertainties around the central inflation forecast (width of the 
confidence bands) as well as the balance of risks (skewness of probability 
distribution) are incorporated based on the assumptions and decisions made by 
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).  
 
The SARB publishes qualitative information on the view of the MPC and the 
associated risk probability scenarios in arriving at the forecast probability 
distribution. However, quantitative data with regards to the specific assumptions is 
not made available which prevents a thorough empirical analysis of the SARB’s 
actions and formulation of uncertainty at different time periods. 
 
Also, although the fan chart represents a useful technique to assist the MPC while 
also communicating future uncertainty to the public, individual interest rate 
decisions are still subjective and ultimately based on the view of the MPC at the 
time.   
 
4.6  Concluding Remarks 
 
A review of the theoretical landscape in the previous chapter provided insightful 
information regarding the way optimal central banks act when faced with 
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considerable uncertainty. Under normal circumstances, Brainard Conservatism 
dominates the theoretical literature. The only exception to this finding arises in the 
presence of significant inflation persistence. This chapter reviewed some of the 
empirical work on the actions of central banks, taking uncertainty into account.  
 
Martin and Salmon (1999) consider the relevance of uncertainty for monetary 
policy in the United Kingdom from 1980 to 1997. The authors try to establish 
whether the UK case provides empirical evidence to support the Brainard 
Conservatism principle. Using a Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) approach, the results 
indicate that optimal interest rates assuming uncertainty tended to be smoother 
than optimal rules without uncertainty. Thus, the results support Brainard 
Conservatism.  
 
Martin and Milas (2005) followed a more generalised approach to investigating the 
effects of uncertainty on the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States. Their 
model includes a Taylor-type rule where the weights on inflation and the output 
gap are not constant but rather functions of inflation and output gap uncertainty 
respectively. Uncertainty is induced through the weights on inflation and the 
output gap and approximated by their variances derived through General 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasiticity (GARCH) models of inflation and 
the output gap. Once again, the results suggest conservatism on the part of the 
Fed in responding to greater levels of uncertainty.  
 
Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) studied the discretionary policy case of Australia. 
They used an economic model constructed by the Australian central bank, and 
optimal rules are solved using a frequency-sampling technique. Surprisingly, the 
findings reflect that policymakers might be more aggressive when the degree of 
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uncertainty is higher. Shuetrim and Thompson find that for shocks to output, 
import prices, inflation and labour costs, the responses taking account of 
parameter uncertainty are more aggressive. Only in the case of real exchange rate 
shocks did the central bank response reflect conservatism when taking uncertainty 
into account. The results, in contrast to Brainard Conservatism, are explained as 
being a consequence of the persistence of shocks and the ineffectiveness of policy.  
 
Finally, Chung (2005) investigates how changes in inflation and output uncertainty 
affect the Federal Reserve’s interest rate response. Chung uses a generalised Auto 
Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Structural Vector Auto Regression 
(GARCH-SVAR) approach to study the effects of uncertainty on the central bank’s 
interest rate responses. The results reported by Chung are mixed. First, the results 
indicate that the Federal Reserve responded less aggressively when confronted by 
a positive shock in order to dampen the economic expansion. By contrast, the 
Federal Reserve acted more aggressively after a negative shock, thereby 
stimulating the economy to prevent a substantial downturn. Thus Chung’s study 
suggests that the Fed is biased towards stimulating growth rather than containing 
inflation in the face of uncertainty. 
 
Thus, although the empirical findings favour conservatism, there is some evidence 
to suggest that this is not always the case.  The results suggest that central banks 
do not always act optimally when faced with uncertainty. Furthermore, the limited 
number of industrial country cases examined prevents any generalised view from 
emerging. If anything, the findings suggest that central bank behaviour differs 
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across countries. The review of the empirical literature provides some possible 
explanations in this regard:  
 
• Different monetary policy regimes could result in different central bank 
behaviour in the face of uncertainty. Empirically, neglected structural 
breaks could lead to spurious results. 
 
• Although it might be expected that different countries show diverse 
monetary responses to uncertainty, in some cases a specific country could 
also act differently under different circumstances, such as opting to act 
aggressively in response to a negative shock and more conservatively in 
response to a positive shock.  
 
• Central banks may act differently in response to different target variable 
uncertainty. For example, a central bank may act aggressively to inflation 
uncertainty while choosing to be more cautious when faced with output 
uncertainty.  
 
• Particular target variable persistence could result in a more aggressive 
central bank response. However, the difficulty in distinguishing empirically 
between a more passive response to uncertainty compared to interest rate 
smoothing behaviour could result in the wrong conclusions being drawn. 
This arises due to the close resemblance between a central bank reluctant 
to substantially change the interest rate and a central bank acting 
cautiously. Econometrically, controlling for interest rate smoothing may 
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partially absorb the conservative policy response effect and thus wrongly 
portray a more aggressive central bank. The VAR estimation approach is 
especially sensitive in this regard, as multiple lagged regressors often enter 
the vectors to be estimated.  
 
Seeing as this thesis is concerned with investigating the effects of uncertainty for 
the developing country case of South Africa, the final section of this chapter was 
devoted to a review of how the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) addressed 
uncertainty in practice. The review highlighted that almost no information is 
available in this regard for the period prior to the inflation targeting regime. 
However, the adoption of the inflation targeting framework also coincided with a 
more formal approach of dealing with and communicating uncertainty. The 
technique used to this end is the so-called “fan chart” methodology. The fan chart 
basically represents the central bank’s inflation forecast in the form of a 
probability distribution.  
 
The remaining five chapters empirically investigate how the South African central 
bank behaves in the face of uncertainty. In other words, do the SARB’s actions 
reflect optimal behaviour as suggested by theory? Chapter 5 derives a theoretical 
uncertainty model applicable to an open-economy developing country while 
chapter 6 derives empirical uncertainty estimates from the theoretical model. 
Chapters 7 and 8 then estimate the general model including the uncertainty 
variables, and analyse the results.  
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Chapter 5 
An Open Economy Uncertainty-Adjusted 
Model 
 
 
 
The previous three chapters reviewed the literature focusing on the way in which 
optimal central banks act when confronted with significant degrees of uncertainty. 
A first attempt at answering this question was the influential theoretical work of 
Brainard (1967). Brainard advocated the conservatism principle, that optimal 
policy be characterised by central banks acting less aggressively when faced with 
higher degrees of uncertainty.  
 
Later studies supported the conservatism principle, suggesting that optimal 
central banks generally act more passively when faced with greater uncertainty 
(Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Svensson 1997; Sack 1998b and Wieland, 2002).  
 
However, certain exceptions apply which could make central banks respond more 
aggressively. The main exception to the conservatism principle arises in the 
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presence of considerable inflation persistence (Soderstrom 1999; Kimura and 
Kurozumi 2003; Moessner 2005). Thus, if higher than desired inflation persists, 
central banks may have to be more aggressive to achieve their targets.  
 
Empirical studies investigating whether or not modern central banks adhere to the 
conservatism principle in practice are surprisingly scarce and focus almost 
exclusively on the experience of a few industrialised nations. Nonetheless, 
although empirical studies generally favour conservatism (Martin and Salmon 
1999; Martin and Milas 2005; Chung 2005), there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that this is not always the case in the face of uncertainty (Shuetrim and Thompson 
1999). The limited number of industrial country cases examined prevents any 
generalised view from emerging. If anything, the findings suggest that central 
bank behaviour is not uniform across countries.  
 
The remainder of this thesis investigates the case of the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB). In this sense, the thesis represents a first attempt at investigating a 
developing country in an open economy setting. Ultimately, the aim is to establish 
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the notion that uncertainty has 
played a role in the SARB’s policy decisions and whether those actions reflect 
conservatism. From this point forward, all theoretical and empirical work is that of 
the author, unless where explicitly otherwise stated.  
 
This chapter is devoted to the development of an open economy theoretical 
model. Section 5.1 briefly considers an explanation of the methodology used in 
developing the theoretical model. This was deemed essential as the theoretical 
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model serves as the basis for the subsequent empirical work in chapters 6 and 7. 
Section 5.2 discusses the various assumptions in relation to the structure of the 
economy. The final two sections are devoted to deriving both the base and 
uncertainty-adjusted theoretical models.  
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
The SARB published its core forecasting model in 2007 (SARB, 2007). The Bank 
explained that the model was developed from 1999 onwards and is frequently 
reviewed and amended to remain up to date with industry and econometric 
developments. The process in generating the final forecast is best described as 
follows: 
 
“The forecasting cycle for the MPC meeting begins approximately five to six weeks 
before the scheduled MPC meeting. Data are updated and the current state of the 
domestic and international economy is analysed and interpreted. In producing the 
forecast, the knowledge and experience of internal and external sources are used. 
Where there are external agencies with greater expertise than the Bank producing 
forecasts for some exogenous variables (such as world economic growth, global 
inflation, and government consumption expenditure) the Bank will, in most cases, 
incorporate the forecasts from these agencies. The members of the MPC then 
finalise the assumptions and request alternative scenarios, if deemed necessary, at 
a special assumptions meeting. Once these assumptions are finalised, a forecast 
over an 8-to-12-quarter horizon (depending on the available number of quarters of 
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actual data) is produced. Alternative simulations highlight the significance of the 
transmission channels and the impulse responses to shocks.”        (SARB 2007, p.3) 
 
The model in its entirety is best described as a medium-sized Type II hybrid model 
(Pagan, 2003). The model consists of 18 structural equations.  These equations 
aim to describe the price formation process, exchange rates, gross domestic 
product and its components (wages, employment, the external sector and interest 
rates). The Repo Rate and government policy is assumed exogenous for 
forecasting purposes. Also, the Bank implements a Taylor-rule for alternative 
simulation analysis with equal weights assigned for inflation and the output gap.   
 
However, replicating the SARB’s model for the purpose of this investigation would 
be ineffective. The reasoning behind this is twofold. Firstly, this study is concerned 
with monetary policy over a longer time period. The model outlined above was 
developed with the advent of the inflation targeting regime to present a better 
and more detailed representation of new monetary policy objectives as well as the 
changing monetary policy landscape and transmission mechanisms. Thus, in order 
to investigate the effects of uncertainty over a larger sample, it was deemed more 
appropriate to employ a generic model which would apply to different regimes 
and allow comparability. Secondly, uncertainty isn’t directly incorporated into the 
SARB’s model. Rather, uncertainty is dealt with by scenario simulations based on 
the assumptions generated by the MPC. Without data pertaining to these 
assumptions during the inflation targeting regime as well as uncertainty estimates 
from the previous regime, employing the model above was deemed 
inappropriate. Ultimately, the theoretical and empirical models need to be able to 
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address uncertainty and the theme of the thesis adequately. Thus, it was 
necessary to turn to the empirical literature on this topic for guidance.  
 
Besides simply investigating the findings, the empirical literature review in the 
previous chapter allowed for scrutiny of the different techniques employed to 
examine the effects of uncertainty. Decisions regarding the methodology and 
empirical techniques are necessary prior to the development of a theoretical 
model, as the model will serve as the basis of the subsequent empirical study.  
 
As is often the case with investigations into the monetary policy landscape, a clear 
divide is evident with regard to the methodologies employed. This divide arises 
due to differing preferences on the employment of either a Vector Autoregressive 
model (Martin and Salmon 1999) or a Rule-based structural approach (Martin and 
Milas 2005). Although the technical differences between these two techniques are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief discussion will help motivate the use of 
one approach rather than the other. 
 
The main difference between the two techniques revolves around the way in 
which economic theory is treated.  Sims (1971) and subsequent work by the same 
author criticised the restrictive limitations of structural models and the stern 
reliance on theory. In opposition, Sims (1971) recommended the use of simple 
VAR models, where fewer theoretical assumptions are necessary. The structural-
rule approach requires prior assumptions with respect to the variables included in 
the model, the relationships between those variables (endogenous or exogenous), 
lag structures and the number of lags to include for each variable. By contrast, the 
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VAR approach merely requires assumptions with respect to which variables to 
include in the model and occasionally the number of lags. Besides this, economic 
relationships are determined solely on the basis of the data.  
 
This characteristic of VAR models is immediately evident when considering a 
simple VAR(1) model of output(,) and inflation(,) as follows: 
 
Output Equation: 
, = ` + P,," + P,," + &, 
 
Inflation Equation: 
, = ` + P,," + P,," + &,  
 
or in matrix notation: 
a,,b = c
`
`d + , a
,","b + a
&,&,b 
where , = aP, P,P, P,b 
 
The model assumes that all variables are both endogenous and exogenous and 
evolve with similar lag structures. In other words, the variables are treated 
symmetrically. Thus, rather than using theoretical relationships to construct the 
model, the approach relies on capturing the effects within the data. 
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One of the main drawbacks of this approach stems from the fact that simple VAR 
models often capture spurious relationships. This occurs due to the difficulty in 
distinguishing between correlations and causality. 
 
By contrast, proponents of the structural rule-based approach advocate the 
necessity of basing any econometric model on theory, as this allows for 
interpreting the parameters of a model based on predicted theoretical behaviour.  
 
However, structural models are highly sensitive to the identification of the model.  
This risk becomes increasingly more pertinent as the size and complexity of the 
model increases due to the likelihood of a growing divergence between the model 
and theory.   
 
The argument against simple VAR models has resulted in the development of 
structural VAR models. These models take advantage of the strengths of VAR 
models while also imposing theoretical structure on the model (Chung, 2005). This 
is achieved through deliberately changing the contents of the coefficient matrix A 
in the example above, in so doing incorporating theoretical assumptions regarding 
relationships and lag lengths and structures. However, although very attractive on 
the surface, structural VARs have been criticised in the literature. The main 
criticism in the literature is summarised by Stock and Watson (2001) as follows: 
 
“What really makes up the VAR shocks? In large part, these shocks, like those in 
conventional regression, reflect factors omitted from the model. If these factors 
are correlated with the included variables then the VAR estimates will contain 
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omitted variable bias. These considerations, when omitted from the VAR end up in 
the error term and (incorrectly) become part of the estimated historical shock used 
to estimate an impulse response.”           (Stock and Watson 2001, p. 13) 
 
To date, consensus has yet to emerge on which modelling technique is superior; 
any decision in this regard revolves mainly around the model’s reliance on theory.  
 
In this light, this thesis opted to employ a purely structural rule-based approach to 
investigate the effects of uncertainty on the SARB. The reasoning behind this 
choice stems from the fact that the main aim of the investigation involves studying 
the effects of uncertainty. As a consequence, the model should aim to adequately 
capture what the policymaker knows about the economy and the underlying 
relationships between the target and policy variables.  
 
In other words, the model should portray the economy as the monetary agents 
expect it to behave. Any deviations from these expectations would contribute to 
uncertainty.  Simple VAR models often capture a range of different relationships 
which are not always explainable by conventional theory, but rather portray the 
inherent dynamics of the data. In this sense, a VAR model could conceal the true 
uncertainty experienced at the time.  
 
By contrast, a structural rule-based approach allows for adequately approximating 
the way central bankers expect the economy to behave at the outset, and 
distinguishes between these effects and deviations from the expectations 
(uncertainty). Put differently, this thesis would argue that a structural rule-based 
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approach enables greater control of what constitutes uncertainty, by means of 
theoretical assumptions on the structure of the economy.  To this end, the 
assumed structure of the economy is discussed next. 
 
5.2 The Structure of the Economy 
 
It is assumed that the structure of an open economy like that of South Africa is 
characterised by the open-economy model used by Ball (1998). The main reason 
for using this structure stems from the fact that the model represents generic and 
conventional theory. The set of equations has also been used for analysis or as a 
benchmark in numerous studies investigating the monetary policy landscape 
(Cavoli and Rajan 2008; Mohanty and Klau 2004; Taylor 1999). 
 
The structure of the economy is thus approximated by the following equations: 
 
 =  e − e% − eJf +  .              (5.1) 
 
 =   − L −  Lf − f" + g             (5.2) 
 
f =  Φ% +  i                            (5.3) 
(Ball 1998, p.3) 
 
where % denotes the real interest rate,  is the rate of inflation,  is the output 
gap and f is the real exchange rate where a decrease in f refers to a real 
depreciation of the domestic currency. Output, inflation and exchange rate shocks 
are denoted by ., g and i respectively.  
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Equation 5.1, an open-economy IS-curve, suggests that the output gap in the next 
period is determined by the current output gap, the real exchange rate and the 
real interest rate. The negative relationship between the output gap and the real 
exchange rate stems from the latter’s effect on net exports. An appreciation in the 
domestic currency, represented by an increase in f, results in a decrease in 
exports and an increase in imports. The relationship between the output gap and 
the real interest rate stems from the latter’s effect on real disposable income and 
private investment.  
 
Put differently, an appreciation in the domestic currency results in a decrease in 
net exports and subsequently a decrease in the output gap. Reasoning this way 
assumes that the output gap was positive to start with. If it is assumed that the 
output gap was negative to start with, the same logic applies. However, in this 
case, the output gap would become larger negative, but the statistic still declines, 
thus resulting in the negative relationship. 
 
Equation 5.2 represents an open-economy Phillips curve, where inflation is 
determined by its own lag and lagged variables of the output gap and the change 
in the real exchange rate. The exchange rate affects inflation through import 
prices. Inflation also reacts to the income effect from the output gap.  
 
Finally, equation 5.3 suggests a positive relationship between the real exchange 
rate and real interest rate. Changes in the interest rate affect the attractiveness of 
local assets, thus influencing the exchange rate. The exchange rate subsequently 
influences net exports.  
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As the structure of the economy has been defined, the next step is to describe the 
policymaker’s problem. This is achieved in the next section.  
 
5.3 The Base Model 
 
To start with, it is assumed that the central bank seeks to minimise a standard 
intertemporal loss function similar to that stipulated by Svensson (1998): 
 
ℒ = 1 −  I ∑ Ik;k$1 *k]                            (5.4) 
(Svensson 1998, p.166) 
 
where  denotes the expectations operator, I (0 < I < 1) is the discount factor 
and * is the period loss function. In order to minimise equation 5.4 above, the 
central bank has to minimise *in each period. Formally, the period loss function is 
described by: 
 
* =  [l − ∗ +  l]               (5.5) 
 
where ∗ is the target rate of inflation. Thus, the policymaker aims to minimise 
the sum of the squared deviation of inflation from the inflation target and the 
squared difference between current output and potential output. The weights on 
inflation and the output gap, l and l  describe the central bank’s preference 
towards moving either inflation closer to its target value or output closer to 
potential output respectively. Hypothetically, l = 1 and l = 0.2 would describe 
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a central bank considerably more concerned with keeping inflation close to its 
target value compared to moving the economy towards potential output.
16
 
 
The optimal policy interest rate @̂ is defined as the interest rate which minimises 
equation 5.5 subject to equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. To arrive at the optimal interest 
rate rule, equation 5.3 is substituted into equation 5.1 and 5.2, thus eliminating f 
from the equations: 
 
 =  e − e% − eJΦ% + i + .           (5.6) 
 
 =   − L −  LΦ% + i − Φ%" −  i" +  g         (5.7) 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
Subsequently, equations 5.6 and 5.7 are substituted into equation 5.5, set equal 
to zero and differentiated with respect to %. Substituting equations 5.6 and 5.7 
back into equation 5.5 and subsequently reorganising and simplifying the resulting 
equation is an arduous task. For simplification, these steps are not reported here. 
However, if necessary, these calculations will be made available upon request.  
 
Thereafter, substituting % = @̂ −  results in: 
 
 
 
                                            
16The situation where l = 1 and l = 0 would describe the behaviour of a strict inflation targeting central 
bank (Cavoli and Rajan, 2008). 
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lLΦ + lo@̂ 
 = lLLΦ + leo + lLΦ + lLΦ + lo + lLΦf" 
 −lL∗Φ − lLΦ + leJoi             (5.8)
  
with o =  e + eJΦ         (Author’s calculations) 
 
Finally, substituting f −  Φ% for i from equation 5.3 into 5.8 above and 
reorganising results in: 
 
@̂ =  ∅ + ∅ + ∅J + ∅pf +  ∅qf"                                 (5.9) 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where the coefficients are defined as: 
 
∅ =  −lL
∗Φ
l[o − eJΦo] r  
∅ =  lLLΦ +  leo l[o − eJΦo] r  
∅J = 1 +  lLΦ l[o − eJΦo]r   
∅p = lL
Φ + leJo l[eJΦo − o] r  
∅q =  lL
Φ 
l[o − eJΦo] r  
(Author’s calculations) 
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The model above is similar to other studies investigating monetary policy using a 
rule-based approach such as the model outlined by Cavoli and Rajan (2008).  
 
However, equation 5.9 deviates from the optimal policy rule derived by Cavoli and 
Rajan (2008) due to the re-substitution of equation 5.5 into the differentiated 
equation, thus resulting in the inclusion of the lagged exchange rate term.  
 
Additionally, the constant term in equation 5.9 is the effect of incorporating an 
inflation target explicitly in the period loss function, rather than combining the 
difference between actual and target inflation as one variable as in Cavoli and 
Rajan (2008).   
 
Finally, it is assumed that the central bank adjusts the actual interest rate 
gradually towards the desired level
17
. The adjustment process is represented by: 
 
B =  B" +  1 −  @̂ + &               (5.10) 
 
Substituting 10 into 9 yields: 
 
B =  + B" + J + p + qf + sf" + &        (5.11) 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where: 
                                            
17See for example Sack and Wieland (1999) and Woodford (2002). 
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 =  1 − ∅ 
 =   
J =  1 − ∅ 
p =  1 − ∅J 
q =  1 − ∅p 
s =  1 − ∅q 
 
The optimal interest rate specification in equation 5.11 serves as the baseline 
model. The structure of equation 5.11 is similar to rule-based models used by 
Taylor (1999), Ball (1998), Svensson (2000) and Mohanty and Klau (2004) in 
investigating the effect of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules.   
 
Taylor (2001) explains that the effect of the exchange rate in equation 5.11 might 
be trivial, seeing that it is assumed that shocks to the exchange rate represent 
temporary deviations from the long term value, in which case q would tend very 
close to -s.  
 
However, if exchange rate deviations are large and persistent, the signs of the 
coefficients on q and s will be the same and the combined values thereof larger, 
depending of course on the central bank’s preferred response to exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
 
It is also important to consider the role of financial development. Financial 
development increases the lag between interest rate changes and the point when 
the change reaches maximum impact. In equation 5.11 above, this would affect 
the period specification of the exogenous variables. Different period specifications 
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for the rule above are introduced in Chapter 7. Besides this, lag structures were 
allowed to deviate from the specification in equation 5.11 during the empirical 
analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 
5.4 The Uncertainty Adjusted Model 
 
The model outlined in equation 5.11 above is unsuitable for an investigation of the 
effect of uncertainty on monetary policy, due to the implicit assumption that 
interest rate adjustments to inflation, output and exchange rate fluctuations are 
constant over time. 
 
To address this problem in a closed economy setting, Martin and Milas (2005) 
defined the weights on inflation and the output gap as functions of uncertainty, 
where uncertainty was approximated by the variances of the endogenous 
variables. Following a similar approach, equation 5.11 from the baseline model is 
altered as follows: 
 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &        (5.12) 
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where: 
 =   + CC +  tt +    
 
C =  C + CCC +  Ctt +  C  
 
t =  t +  tCC + ttt + t  
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and , C, t are measures of output, inflation and exchange rate uncertainty 
respectively.  
 
This model allows us to investigate whether monetary policy is more or less 
aggressive as uncertainty about the relevant exogenous variable increases. Thus, 
> 0 would signify a more aggressive interest rate response as uncertainty about 
output increases. 
 
The model also allows us to see whether uncertainty about a specific variable 
influences the response to other variables. Thus, C < 0 would signify that 
increased uncertainty about inflation weakens the response to output 
fluctuations.  
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The empirical review in chapter 4 suggested that the literature investigating the 
effects of uncertainty on monetary policy is particularly scarce and focuses almost 
exclusively on the experience of a few industrialised nations. Although the findings 
seem to favour conservatism in general, there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that this might not always be the case. Furthermore, the limited number of 
industrial country cases examined prevents the emergence of any generalised 
view. If anything, the findings suggest that central bank behaviour is not uniform 
across countries.  
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In this light, this thesis is aimed at contributing to the above literature through 
investigating the case of the South African Reserve Bank. In this sense, the thesis 
represents a first attempt at investigating a developing country in an open 
economy setting. Ultimately, the aim is to establish whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the notion that uncertainty played a role in the SARB’s policy 
decisions and whether those actions reflect conservatism.  
 
To this end, this chapter was devoted to deriving a theoretical model to 
approximate the structure of the economy as well as providing a theoretical 
platform for the subsequent empirical work.  
 
The model is based on a structural rule-based approach rather than a VAR 
methodology. The optimal interest rate rule is derived from a set of structural 
equations developed by Ball (1998). The base model rule suggests that the 
interest rate is changed in response to deviations in a lagged interest rate term, 
inflation, the output gap and current and lagged exchange rate variables.  
 
However, the base model is unsuitable for an investigation into the effect of 
uncertainty on monetary policy, due to the implicit assumption that interest rate 
adjustments to inflation, output and exchange rate fluctuations are constant over 
time. This is due to the assumption that the parameter values are constant over 
time.  
 
To address this problem in a closed economy setting, Martin and Milas (2005) 
defined the weights on inflation and the output gap as functions of uncertainty. 
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Following a similar approach, the base model was altered to allow the coefficients 
in an open economy model to change over time.  
 
To incorporate uncertainty, it is assumed that the coefficients are dependent on 
the variances of the endogenous variables, namely inflation, the output gap and 
the exchange rate. The uncertainty-adjusted model allows us to investigate 
whether monetary policy is more aggressive when uncertainty about the relevant 
exogenous variable increases. 
 
However, prior to applying the derived model to the SARB case, it is necessary to 
derive empirically the uncertainty estimates. This is explored in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Uncertainty Estimates for South Africa 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 developed a model to approximate the structure of an open economy 
like South Africa as a theoretical platform for the empirical work to follow in 
chapters 6, 7 and 8. The model was derived using a structural rule-based 
approach, based on a set of structural equations obtained from Ball (1998).  
 
This chapter derives monetary policy uncertainty estimates for South Africa. 
Section 6.1 provides an introduction to the data used in the empirical exercise. 
Section 6.2 explores the stationarity condition and investigates whether the data 
adhere to the requirements in this regard.  
 
Section 6.3 explains the empirical methodology used to approximate uncertainty. 
The results are considered in section 6.4. Eviews 7.1 was used as the preferred 
econometric package for all econometric exercises in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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6.1 The Data 
 
The sample consists of quarterly data extending from quarter 1 in 1990 to quarter 
3 in 2011. The data frequency decision was guided by the simultaneous availability 
of all the variables needed for the empirical investigation.  
  
All the raw data originate from South African Reserve Bank statistics (SARB, 2011), 
with the exception of the annual inflation rate which was retrieved from the Stats 
SA database (Stats SA, 2011). Each of the raw data series used to approximate the 
variables in the model is introduced below:  
 
6.1.1 Inflation 
 
As mentioned above, inflation data were retrieved from the Stats SA statistical 
database (Stats SA, 2011). The retrieved series contained monthly figures of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) year-on-year growth rates (base year 2008). Rather 
than averaging the data for each quarter as with most of the other variables, the 
inflation rates as at the end of each quarter were included in the sample. The 
reason for this is twofold.  
 
Firstly, as the retrieved data were already in annual average format, further 
averaging would have been excessive. As the inflation rate usually does not move 
significantly from one quarter to another, the annual rates as at the end of each 
quarter were deemed more appropriate. Also, whether the central bank assigns 
more weight to changes in annual rates from one quarter to the next or quarterly 
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rates is debatable. However, the annual rate is certainly more popular in public 
consumption and subsequently more relevant in describing what economic agents 
base their decision on.  
 
Figure 6.1 below shows the evolution of the time series over the sample period: 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Inflation time series (CPI year-on-year growth rates) 
Source: Stats SA, 2011 
 
Figure 6.1 suggests that inflation peaked near the start of the sample period in 
1992. The high inflation rates prior to 1994 were associated with increased 
isolation from the global economy. In addition, South Africa’s focus on financial 
stability rather than containing inflation in the aftermath of the Debt Standstill of 
1985 also contributed to higher inflation rates during this period . Also, escalating 
sanctions led to a sharp depreciation of the rand, resulting in higher imported 
inflation (Hanival and Maia, 2006).  
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Thereafter, the trend generally suggests decreasing inflation up until shortly after 
the turn of the century, mainly due to South Africa’s re-integration into the global 
economy and price competition from international markets. Inflation peaked 
again in 2002/3 after the September 11 event in the United States of America. This 
followed a sharp depreciation of the rand after a global sell-off of emerging 
market currencies, again resulting in inflationary pressure from imports. After a 
sharp decline in 2003/4, inflation rose steadily until the end of quarter 2 in 2008. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis inflation declined until the second 
quarter of 2010. 
 
6.1.2 Output gap 
 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) series was obtained from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) statistical database (SARB, 2011). The series contained 
quarterly GDP figures at constant 2005 prices. This thesis opted to steer clear of 
any seasonally adjusted figures or figures altered by other common smoothing 
mechanisms. Rather, the unadjusted GDP figures are used in this regard to 
prevent smoothing mechanisms from removing some of the volatility in the 
original data.  
 
The series is portrayed in Figure 6.2 below: 
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Figure 6.2: Output time series (Quarterly GDP at Constant 2005 Prices) 
Source: SARB, 2011 
 
The trend suggests stagnant or even negative growth until around 1993, mainly 
due to the effects of trade and financial sanctions against the apartheid regime in 
the decade prior to 1994. Thereafter, growth rates improved significantly and 
reached levels around 4% before declining steadily in 1998, mainly due to the 
effects of the Asian economic crisis and the high domestic interest rates at the 
time (Hanival and Maia, 2006). The period from 1998 to 2003 witnessed 
comparatively volatile growth rates, with GDP growth improving to above 4% in 
2000 after recovering from the shocks of the emerging market crises, only to 
decline again in the aftermath of the September 11 event in the United States. 
From 2004 to 2008, a clear increasing GDP trend is visible, indicative of improved 
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growth rates over the period. Thereafter, a small decline in growth is evident, 
mainly as a result of the global financial crisis.  
 
However, the model outlined in chapter 5 includes the output gap, rather than 
actual output or GDP. Here, the output gap is defined as the difference between 
actual and potential output. In order to derive the output gap from the series 
above, a Hodrick-Prescott filter was used to obtain the GDP trend. This trend was 
used to approximate potential output. Subsequently, the output gap was 
measured as the difference between the logarithm of gross domestic product 
(GDP at constant prices) and the logarithm of trend GDP (potential output). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Output gap time series (Difference in Actual and Potential Output) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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6.1.3 Interest rates 
 
The official policy instrument in this respect is the Repo Rate, which was preceded 
by the Bank Rate during the previous monetary policy framework
18
. However, due 
to the high correlation between the above mentioned policy rates and the prime 
interest rate, the decision was made to use the latter as the policy instrument for 
the purpose of the empirical investigation. This decision avoided having to 
combine the Repo and Bank Rate datasets as data was available for the Prime 
interest rate over the entire sample period.  
 
Both the nominal and real interest rate series were obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) statistical database (SARB, 2011). The South African 
Nominal Prime Overdraft Rate is used as the policy instrument variable (nominal 
interest rate). The South African Real Prime Overdraft Rate was used as the real 
interest rate. For the purpose of the empirical investigation, both variables were 
transformed using the logarithm operator.  
 
The two raw variables (not in log form) are briefly explored in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 
below: 
 
                                            
18
 The Repo rate was introduced during 1998 and was initially determined by the market in daily tenders of 
repurchase agreements. The Repo Rate was subsequently fixed, mainly due to the fact that the interbank 
market often didn’t clear effectively. A fixed Repo Rate also served as a better signal of central bank intention. 
For more information regarding the changes during this transition period, see Aron and Muellbauer (2006). 
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Figure 6.4: Nominal interest rate time series (Quarterly Average South African 
Nominal Prime Overdraft Rate) 
Source: SARB, 2011 
 
The quarterly average prime interest rate depicted above peaked towards the end 
of 1998 and the start of 1999, shortly before the advent of a formal inflation 
targeting monetary policy framework. Interest rates during the 1990s were on 
average significantly higher than after the implementation of the inflation 
targeting framework. In the 1990s, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was 
mainly concerned with containing money supply increases. The SARB was also 
actively involved in the foreign exchange market. The domestic currency remained 
weak and under pressure mainly due to the fact that South Africa’s inflation rate 
was higher than that of its major trading partners. The SARB also intervened when 
the currency experienced marked volatility, such as during the Asian Crises in 
1998.   
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Thereafter, with the exception of a few peaks around 2002/3 and 2008/9, interest 
rates declined on average towards the end of the sample period. The 2002/3 peak 
was the result of the SARB anticipating rising inflation due to the depreciation of 
the rand after the September 11 event in the United States. The same reasoning 
applies for the 2008/9 peak, when the SARB raised interest rates over concern of 
the impact of the global financial crises.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Real interest rate time series (Quarterly Average South African Real 
Prime Overdraft Rate) 
Source: SARB, 2011 
 
Figure 6.5 above depicts the evolution of the real prime overdraft rate over the 
sample period.  Clearly evident is the fact that real interest rates were significantly 
higher from 1996 to 2000 than the sample average. Thereafter, real interest rates 
hovered around a relatively stable trend between 6% and 8% up until 2007/8. 
Thereafter, the real interest rate dropped slightly towards the end of 2008, but 
recovered close to pre-shock levels before decreasing again in 2011.  
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6.1.4 Exchange rate 
 
The monthly real effective exchange rate of the rand (base year 2000), weighted 
on the basis of trade in manufactured goods with the 15 largest trading partners, 
was used to approximate the real effective exchange rate used in the empirical 
investigation.   
 
The data were retrieved from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) statistical 
database (SARB, 2011). For the purposes of the empirical investigation, the 
variable was transformed using the logarithm operator. 
 
The real effective exchange rate (not in log form) is considered in Figure 6.6 
below: 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Real effective exchange rate time series (Quarterly Average Real 
Effective Exchange Rate) 
Source: SARB, 2011 
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From the figure above it is clear that the rand depreciated on average from 
around 1993 until the end of 2001. During this period, the currency faced 
continued pressure due to the high level of domestic inflation compared to major 
trading partner economies (Hanival and Maia, 2006). The trough in 2001 followed 
the shock induced by the September 11 attacks in the United States. Thereafter, a 
sharp appreciating trend is evident from 2002 to the start of 2006. Thereafter, the 
real effective exchange rate depreciated slightly before recovering towards the 
end of 2010 to levels similar to those experienced during the start of 2006.  The 
trough in 2008 was again the result of the global financial crisis.  
 
6.2 Unit root tests 
 
Stationarity implies that the mean and variance of a specific variable are constant 
over time and that the covariance depends only on the lag between the two time 
periods and not on the actual time periods during which it is measured. 
Stationarity is important because using non-stationary variables makes standard 
hypotheses testing invalid and could lead to spurious regression results. 
 
This section will briefly discuss the tests, outcomes and transformations in 
ensuring that the various variables used in the empirical investigation satisfy the 
stationarity condition. In most cases, the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test 
was used to assess whether a variable was stationary. In ambiguous cases, the 
Phillips-Perron unit root test was also used to verify results.  The stationarity tests, 
including the complete test equations, are reported in appendix A.  
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Once it has been verified that a specific series is in fact non-stationary and thus 
contains one or more unit roots, the next step involves identifying the type of 
transformation that is required to remove the unit root. Usually, this 
transformation depends on the type of trend present in the series. A common rule 
of thumb in this case is: 
 
→ Deterministic trend: In this case, the remedial measure usually involves 
removing the deterministic trend through extracting the residuals of a 
regression on a time or linear trend.  
→ Stochastic trend: This case is usually addressed through using the 
difference operator or applying certain filters, such as for example the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter).  
 
The latter case is particularly challenging due to the choice of employing either the 
difference operator or some kind of filter, such as the HP filter. Furthermore, the 
literature seems divided on this issue. The literature review by Aadland (2002) 
adequately summarises the case for using the difference operator towards 
achieving stationarity: 
 
“Over the last two decades, the First Difference (FD) filter has been a popular 
method for removing the trend from non-stationary time series. This is due in large 
part to Nelson and Plosser (1982), who argue that many macroeconomic time 
series are difference, rather than trend stationary. When a series is measured in 
natural logarithms, the resulting FD-filtered series are approximate growth rates 
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and have been commonly used to represent the business-cycle fluctuations of a 
time series. The problem, however, with treating growth rates of series as 
business-cycle fluctuations is that the FD filter tends to exacerbate high-frequency 
noise and introduce a phase shift. Despite these criticisms, many prominent studies 
of business-cycle phenomena continue to examine the growth rates of macro 
series.                                                                                 (Aadland 2002, p. 2) 
 
The case for the HP filter is summarised by the following: 
 
An advantage of the HP filter, relative to the FD filter, is that it does not 
exacerbate high-frequency noise and does not introduce a phase shift into the 
data. As a consequence, the HP filter, introduced by Hodrick and Prescott (1980), 
has arguably become the “industry standard” for de-trending data in empirical 
macroeconomics. The HP filter, however, is not without its critics. It has been 
criticized for generating spurious cycles in difference stationary data; altering the 
persistence, variability and co-movement of time series; and (similar to the FD 
filter) for passing through high-frequency or “irregular” variation.                          
             (Aadland 2002, p. 3) 
   
However, as alluded to by Aadland (2002) above, the HP Filter has arguably 
remained the industry standard. Furthermore, the first difference operator 
represents the data as growth rates rather than in level form and often removes 
some of the variability in the data due to the nature of the operation. In contrast, 
the HP filter merely removes the long term trend and the short-term cyclical 
component remains in level form. Due the importance of short-term fluctuations 
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for the investigation into the effects of uncertainty, this thesis opted for using the 
HP filter rather than the difference operator. The processes for transforming each 
variable are now discussed in turn below: 
 
6.2.1 Inflation 
 
The inflation variable was non-stationary for all specifications of the ADF test 
equation. In other words, the inflation variable proved non-stationary when an 
intercept was included in the test equation and remained non-stationary when a 
trend and intercept were considered simultaneously. In the latter case the test 
statistic improved, although not sufficiently. Thus, the null hypotheses of a unit 
root could not be rejected at a 5% significance level for all cases. The case of the 
inclusion of an intercept in the test equation is presented below as an example: 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: INFLATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.067297  0.2583 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
Table 6.1: Inflation unit root tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test: 
Intercept) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Upon closer examination, it became evident that the variable was stationary 
around a stochastic trend. The remedial measure used was to subtract a Hodrick-
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Prescott filter-generated trend. The resulting series proved stationary, as is 
evident through considering the results in Table 6.2 below: 
 
Null Hypothesis: INFLATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.813504  0.0054 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.593468  
 5% level  -1.944811  
 10% level  -1.614175  
          
Table 6.2: Inflation residuals root tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity 
Test: HP trend residuals) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
6.2.2 Output gap 
The output gap variable proved stationary as per the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) stationarity test for all specifications of the test equation. The simple case of 
the inclusion of an intercept is provided in Table 6.3 as an example: 
 
Null Hypothesis: OUTGAP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.356988  0.0007 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
Table 6.3: Output gap unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test: 
Intercept) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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6.2.3 Interest rates 
 
With regard to the nominal interest rate, the ADF test seemed to indicate 
stationarity around a deterministic trend. The nominal interest rate variable was 
non-stationary for both cases when an intercept was included and excluded.  
 
However, the ADF test statistic improved dramatically when a linear trend and 
intercept were included in the test equation as reported in Table 6.4, thus 
indicating that the variable might be trend stationary. 
 
Null Hypothesis: PRIME RATE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.214919  0.0885 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.069631  
 5% level  -3.463547  
 10% level  -3.158207  
     
Table 6.4: Nominal interest rate unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Stationarity Test: Intercept & Trend) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
To this end, the nominal interest rate variable was transformed through extracting 
the residuals from a regression on a constant and linear trend, which resulted in a 
stationary variable.  
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Null Hypothesis: PRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.264491  0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.592452  
 5% level  -1.944666  
 10% level  -1.614261  
Table 6.5: Nominal interest rate residuals unit root test (Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Stationarity Test: Deterministic Trend Residuals) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The real interest rate variable proved to be non-stationary for all specifications of 
the test equation. The example where an intercept was included in the test 
equation is presented in Table 6.6 below: 
 
Null Hypothesis: REAL_PRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.086326  0.2507 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
Table 6.6: Real interest rate unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity 
Test: Intercept) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The same remedial measure was used to transform the real interest rate variable 
after further inspection revealed that the presence of a deterministic trend was 
likely. The subsequent transformed variable proved stationary at a 5% significance 
level. 
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Null Hypothesis: REAL PRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.381265  0.0175 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.592129  
 5% level  -1.944619  
 10% level  -1.614288  
Table 6.7: Real interest rate residuals unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Stationarity Test: Deterministic Trend Residuals) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
6.2.4 Exchange rate 
The exchange rate variable was non-stationary for all specifications of the ADF test 
equation. The case where an intercept was included is reported in Table 6.8 
below: 
Null Hypothesis: REAL_EXCHANGE has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.087136  0.2504 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
Table 6.8: Real effective exchange rate unit root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller 
Stationarity Test: Intercept) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Upon closer examination, it became evident that the variable was stationary 
around a stochastic trend. The remedial measure used was to subtract a Hodrick-
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Prescott filter generated trend. The resulting series proved stationary as reported 
in Table 6.9 below: 
 
Null Hypothesis: REER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.519954  0.0097 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
Table 6.9: Real effective exchange rate residual unit root test (Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Stationarity Test: Stochastic Trend Residuals) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
6.3 Estimation Methodology 
 
The empirical model to be estimated, as derived in Chapter 5, is outlined below 
for reference: 
 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &                     (6.1) 
  
where =   + CC +  tt +    
 
 C =  C +  CCC + Ctt + C  
 
 t =  t + tCC +  ttt +  t  
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and , C, t are measures of output, inflation and exchange rate uncertainty 
respectively. However, prior to estimating the model above, approximations of 
uncertainty are necessary as inputs to the model. More specifically, estimates of 
, C, t are necessary before solving the model.  
 
With regard to the methodology used to derive uncertainty estimates, it has 
become common practice to approximate uncertainty about a variable with the 
variance of that variable. The rationale behind this rests upon the notion that the 
difficulty in approximating a variable is directly associated with the volatility 
thereof. In other words, higher volatility is akin to more uncertainty about the 
variable’s accuracy. Furthermore, immediately apparent from the empirical review 
in Chapter 4 was the popularity of Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models towards deriving uncertainty estimates 
(Martin and Milas 2005; Chung 2005).  
 
This popularity stems from the technique’s characteristic of allowing variable 
variances to be non-constant and subsequently controlling for the associated 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
The aim of estimating uncertainty through GARCH-type models is to capture the 
volatility of the remaining unexplained residuals after controlling for the 
explainable effects of the regressors. In this sense, GARCH models allow for 
removing the variation in the data which are explainable; thus all that remains is 
the unexplainable portion which causes uncertainty.  
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Thus, inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty estimates are derived 
through GARCH model specifications related to the structural equations as defined 
in Chapter 5. These equations are: 
 
 =  e − e% − eJf +  .                         (6.2) 
 
 =   − L −  Lf − f" + g                        (6.3) 
 
f =  Φ% +  i                                             (6.4) 
(Ball 1998) 
 
To derive each of the variable variances, the structural equations were used as 
points of reference. In other words, the structural equations aim to approximate 
what monetary agents know about the dynamics of the economy.  The residual 
variance series from the GARCH model would thus represent the uncertainty 
associated with the specific variable.  
 
Thus, the empirical exercise aimed to specify the GARCH models similar to the 
structure of the equations above. However, strict adherence to the time period 
specifications in the structural models was deemed unnecessary. Rather, time 
periods and lag structures were allowed to deviate from the structural models, 
provided that the model proved a better fit. The reason for this is twofold.  
 
First, although theory adequately explains the relationships between the various 
model variables, the period definition is less clear. In other words, whether t in the 
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structural equations refers to an annual, quarterly or a monthly period is open to 
interpretation.   
 
Second, the variables might exhibit different cycles such that adhering strictly to a 
fixed period structure could result in low model explanatory power. In turn, this 
could exaggerate the derived uncertainty as a result of misspecification.  
 
Thus, after exploring a range of alternative models, certain specifications were 
identified that were deemed most appropriate towards capturing uncertainty 
through the resulting residual variance series. To ensure that these equations 
were not incorrectly specified, the squared residuals of all the equations were 
subjected to tests for neglected serial autocorrelation. This is necessary to prevent 
uncertainty estimates from being inconsistent or biased.  
 
These equations and the corresponding serial correlation tests are described in 
turn below: 
 
6.3.1 Output gap GARCH 
 
The empirical investigation suggested that a GARCH (1, 2) model provided the best 
fit in relation to the output gap equation. The equation was modelled as follows: 
 
 = e1 + e"p −  e%" −  eJf" + .   Output Gap Equation 
 
 =  u +  u."  + uJ."  +  up"    GARCH (1, 2) 
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The results are reported in Table 6.10 below. The equation seems well specified as 
all the coefficients are statistically significant. The only exception was the 
exchange rate variable, which proved difficult to estimate satisfactorily. The latter 
is also evident when considering the R-squared statistic, indicating that the 
variables included in the output gap test equation only explain about 44 percent 
of the variation in the dependent variable, thus suggesting that a large proportion 
of the variation in the output gap model is unexplainable after observing the 
effects of the included known regressors.   
 
Coefficient Value Std Error 
vw 
 
0.003149 0.00112   
(0.0049) 
vx 
 
0.783852 0.046863 
(0.0000) 
vy 
 
0.026025 0.008981 
(0.0038) 
vz 
 
0.047905 0.033693 
(0.1551) 
R-Squared 0.44075 
ARCH LM  Prob (F-stat) 0.9994 
Table 6.10: Output gap GARCH specification     
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Next, the squared residuals from the output gap GARCH equation were tested for 
neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three. The results are reported in 
Table 6.11 below (detailed ARCH LM tests are reported in Appendix B): 
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Test for neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
F-statistic 0.005439     Prob. F(3,76) 0.9994 
Obs*R-squared 0.017171     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.9994 
Table 6.11: Output gap GARCH ARCH LM test     
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results provide strong evidence against the presence of neglected serial 
autocorrelation, as the null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the 
residuals cannot be rejected. 
 
6.3.2 Inflation GARCH 
 
With regard to inflation, the empirical investigation suggested that a GARCH (1,1) 
model provided the best fit with the data. The inflation equation was modelled as 
follows: 
 
 =  L" −  L" − LJf" − f" +  g  Inflation Equation 
 
C =  { + {g"  + {JC"      GARCH (1, 1) 
 
The results are reported in Table 6.12 below. The equation seems well specified as 
all the coefficients are statistically significant. In contrast to the output gap 
equation, the regressors included in the inflation equation explain around 65 
percent of the variation of the dependent variable, suggesting comparatively less 
inherent uncertainty. 
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Coefficient Value Std Error 
|x 
 
0.770085 0.041727 
(0.0000) 
|y 
 
0.140769 0.042561 
(0.0009) 
|z 
 
-0.2192 0.048958 
(0.0000) 
R-Squared 0.64969 
ARCH LM Prob (F-stat) 0.4189 
Table 6.12: Inflation GARCH specification     
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Again, the squared residuals from the inflation GARCH equation were tested for 
neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three. The results are reported in 
Table 6.13 below (detailed ARCH LM tests are reported in Appendix B): 
 
Test for neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
F-statistic 0.953861     Prob. F(3,78) 0.4189 
Obs*R-squared 2.901870     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4070 
Table 6.13: Inflation GARCH ARCH LM test  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results provide strong evidence against the presence of neglected serial 
autocorrelation, as the null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the 
residuals cannot be rejected. 
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6.3.3 Exchange rate GARCH 
 
A GARCH (1,1) model provided the best fit with the exchange rate data. The 
equation was modelled as follows: 
 
f = Φf" + Φ%" + ΦJ%"p + i    Exchange Equation 
 
t =  G + Gi"  + GJt"      GARCH (1, 1) 
 
The results are reported in Table 6.14. The equation seems well specified as all the 
coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
However, the exchange equation specification differs from the theoretical 
counterpart due to the inclusion of a lagged exchange rate regressor. Exclusion of 
the latter resulted in a regression equation with very low explanatory power.  
 
The decision to include the lagged exchange rate term was based upon the fact 
that the theoretical specification describes a long-term phenomenon, whereas the 
aim is rather to capture short-term uncertainty by controlling for known 
information. 
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Coefficient Value Std Error 
}x 
 
0.712868 0.06195    
(0.0000) 
}y 
 
0.000507 0.00005  
(0.0000) 
}z 
 
-0.00762 0.00013   
(0.0000) 
R-Squared 0.54853 
ARCH LM Prob (F-stat) 0.4759 
Table 6.14: Exchange rate GARCH specification 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The squared residuals from the exchange rate GARCH equation were tested for 
neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three. The results are reported in 
Table 6.15 below (detailed ARCH LM tests are reported in Appendix B): 
 
Test for neglected serial autocorrelation up to order three 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
F-statistic 0.840433     Prob. F(3,76) 0.4759 
Obs*R-squared 2.568780     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4630 
Table 6.15: Exchange rate GARCH ARCH LM test 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results again provide strong evidence against the presence of neglected serial 
autocorrelation, as the null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the 
residuals also cannot be rejected. 
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6.4 Uncertainty Estimates 
 
Uncertainty estimates were obtained from the residual variances of the GARCH 
model specifications in the previous section. All the uncertainty estimates derived 
seem plausible. All the uncertainty variables were transformed through applying 
the logarithm operator and subsequently testing for the presence of unit roots. 
These estimates and the corresponding stationarity tests are presented below: 
 
6.4.1 Output Gap uncertainty 
 
The derived output gap uncertainty series is illustrated in Figure 6.7 below. The 
results indicate that output gap uncertainty was high from 1992 to 1994, the 
period prior to the advent of democracy during which South Africa experienced 
particularly slow growth (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008).  Output gap uncertainty 
was again particularly high from 1997 to 1999, during the Asian crisis, and again 
from 2009 to 2010, due to the effects of the global recession on GDP growth in 
South Africa.  
 
The SARB’s fan chart published during 2009 reflected particular uncertainty with 
regards to the domestic growth outlook. More specifically, uncertainty about a 
deeper global slowdown and a considerable moderation in domestic growth 
induced a significant downward bias on the SARB’s inflation forecast (SARB, 2009).  
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Figure 6.7: Output gap uncertainty estimates 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The output gap uncertainty variable proved stationary according to the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (detailed unit root tests are reported in 
Appendix A). 
 
Null Hypothesis: LVAROUTGAP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.328428  0.0008 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
Table 6.16: Output gap uncertainty unit root test 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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6.4.2 Inflation uncertainty 
 
The derived inflation uncertainty series is presented in Figure 6.8 below. As 
expected, the results indicate that on average the inflation variable shows the 
least amount of uncertainty.  
 
Inflation was measured as most uncertain between 1997 and 1999, during the 
Asian Crisis and shortly prior to the implementation of the inflation targeting 
regime. Particularly high uncertainty is again evident towards the end of 2001.  
 
Thereafter, inflation uncertainty decreased up to 2009. The subsequent increase 
corresponds to the effects of the global economic recession, which effectively 
spread to South Africa during the latter half of 2008. Again, the SARB’s fan chart at 
the time reflected considerable uncertainty with regards to the inflation forecast: 
 
“The heightened levels of uncertainty and the rate of change in global 
developments make recent forecasts subject to higher risk than is usually the 
case.”         (SARB 2009, p. 35) 
 
Alternative risk probability scenarios contributing to this increase in uncertainty 
included movements in the foreign-exchange rate of the rand and oil prices. Also, 
the SARB noted that larger-than-anticipated electricity price increases exerted an 
upward bias on the inflation forecast at the time.  
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Figure 6.8: Inflation uncertainty estimates 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The ADF test result for the inflation uncertainty variable was more ambiguous as 
the evidence was not convincing in proving either the presence or absence of a 
unit root (Table 6.17). The decision was thus made not to transform the variable 
which might unnecessarily remove some of the variability in the inflation rate.   
 
 
Table 6.17: Inflation uncertainty unit root test 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LVARINF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.573668  0.1024 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
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6.4.3 Exchange rate uncertainty 
 
The derived exchange rate uncertainty series is presented in Figure 6.9 below. 
Exchange rate uncertainty is high on average compared to the other variables, 
with the peak corresponding to the drastic depreciation of the currency in 2001 
following the events of September, 11. Again, this increased uncertainty about the 
exchange rate was highlighted when the SARB published the inflation forecast fan 
chart during 2001 (SARB, 2001).  
 
 
Figure 6.9: Exchange rate uncertainty estimates 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The exchange rate uncertainty variable proved stationary according to the ADF 
test, as shown in Table 6.18 below: 
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Null Hypothesis: LVARREER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.651414  0.0067 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
Table 6.18: Exchange rate uncertainty unit root test 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
To review, the objective of this thesis is to establish whether uncertainty affected 
the actions of the SARB and whether those actions reflected conservatism. A first 
step towards achieving this objective involved deriving a theoretical model to 
approximate the structure of the economy for the subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
The next step towards achieving the stated objective involves deriving estimates 
for uncertainty pertaining to the South African economy. This chapter estimated 
inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty using GARCH-model 
specifications related to the structural equations as set out in the theoretical 
model. The structural equations approximate what monetary agents know about 
the dynamics of the economy.  The residual variance series from the GARCH 
model thus represents the uncertainty associated with each specific variable. The 
derived uncertainty estimates are plausible.  
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What remains is to substitute the uncertainty estimates into the uncertainty-
adjusted model as set out in Chapter 5.  Solving this model and obtaining the 
structural parameters allows us to investigate the SARB’s policy bias towards 
either conservatism or aggression. This issue is explored next. 
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Chapter 7 
The Effects of Indirect Uncertainty on the 
South African Reserve Bank 
 
 
 
The previous chapter derived inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty 
estimates through GARCH-model specifications related to the structural equations 
as defined in the theoretical model in Chapter 5. 
 
The next step entails solving the models to ascertain whether the SARB took 
uncertainty into account and, if so, whether the SARB’s actions reflect optimal 
behaviour as stipulated by theory. This is the aim of this chapter.  
 
Section 7.1 explores the methodology. Subsequent sections consider the results of 
the different models estimated.  Section 7.2 presents the results when estimating 
the indirect uncertainty model. Section 7.3 explores goodness of fit criteria along 
with the appropriate diagnostics. Section 7.4 considers the possibility of sample 
breaks and the effect thereof on the results. The final section aims to quantify the 
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impact of uncertainty on the actions of the SARB before closing with the concluding 
remarks.  
 
7.1 Methodology 
 
This section considers the methodology used to study the effects of uncertainty on 
the actions of the SARB. More specifically, the section explores the model, the time 
period specifications and the different uncertainty-related scenarios. 
 
7.1.1. The model 
 
To review, the uncertainty-adjusted model derived in Chapter 5 assumed that the 
coefficients are dependent on the variances of the endogenous variables, namely 
inflation, the output gap and the exchange rate. This model allows us to see 
whether monetary policy is more or less aggressive when uncertainty about the 
relevant exogenous variable increases. 
 
However, the model assumes that uncertainty only influences monetary policy 
indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to inflation, output gap and 
exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty plays a role only when the 
central bank responds to fluctuations in target variables, and as such influences the 
magnitude of the response. Since direct uncertainty will be added to the model in 
Chapter 8, it is important to clarify the distinction between the effects of direct and 
indirect uncertainty. Thus, for clarity, indirect and direct uncertainty effects are 
defined below: 
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• Indirect uncertainty effects: Uncertainty influences only the response to a 
fluctuation in the target variable. For example, the central bank raises the 
interest rate following an increase in expected inflation which is considered 
likely to be sustained and thus reflected in actual future inflation. However, 
the central bank raises the interest rate by a smaller margin due to 
uncertainty about the rate of inflation. In the absence of uncertainty, the 
central bank would still have changed the interest rate, but the magnitude of 
the change would have been different. For this reason, uncertainty enters 
the regression equation through the coefficient of the specific independent 
variable. 
 
• Direct uncertainty effects: The effect of uncertainty regardless of responding 
to a fluctuation in the target variable. This case is distinctly different as the 
central bank is not responding to a fluctuation in a target variable. Rather, 
the central bank changes the policy instrument based solely on uncertainty 
about a particular target variable. For example, even if the inflation rate is 
stable, the central bank raises the interest due to uncertainty about whether 
the status quo would be maintained going forward. In the absence of 
uncertainty, the central bank would not have changed the interest rate, all 
else held constant. For this reason, uncertainty enters the regression 
equation directly and captures the effect of a change in uncertainty about 
the target variable.  
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As mentioned above, this chapter is concerned only with indirect uncertainty 
effects. The model below, derived in Chapter 5, is thus appropriately renamed the 
indirect-uncertainty model: 
 
Indirect-Uncertainty Model: 
 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &    
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where  =   +  CC + tt +   
 
  C =  C +  CCC + Ctt + C  
 
  t =  t + tCC +  ttt +  t  
 
and , C, t are measures of output, inflation and exchange rate uncertainty 
respectively.  
 
The indirect-uncertainty model allows us to investigate whether monetary policy 
is more or less aggressive when uncertainty about the relevant exogenous variable 
increases. Thus, > 0 would signify a more aggressive interest rate response as 
uncertainty about output increases.  
 
The model also allows us to see whether uncertainty about a specific variable 
influences the response to other variables. Thus, C < 0 would signify that 
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increased uncertainty about inflation weakens the response to output 
fluctuations.  
 
7.1.2. Time period specifications 
 
In examining the effects of uncertainty on the actions of the SARB, different period 
specifications of the derived interest rate rule above were estimated. The decision 
to consider a range of different specifications was guided by the fact that there is no 
clear consensus in the literature regarding the optimal rule in characterising the 
behaviour of the South African central bank.  
 
For instance, Woglom (2003) uses a backward-looking variant of the Taylor Rule in 
identifying the way in which the advent of inflation targeting affected monetary 
policy. On the other hand, the influential work of Clarida et al (1998) seems to have 
prompted a shift towards the use of forward-looking interest rate rules, as 
employed in the South African context by Aron and Muellbauer (2000)
19
.  
 
Another variant commonly employed in the literature is the “hybrid” model, 
characterised as being a combination of the present period and forward-looking 
rules as it may specify a central bank responding to expected future inflation and 
the current output gap.  
 
                                            
19
 Besides using a forward-looking rule, Aron and Muellbauer (2000) also tested backward-looking, current 
period and hybrid rules. 
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In the context of this chapter, the time period rule specifications are represented as 
follows:   
 
Backward-Looking Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" + " + C" + tf" + &   
 
Present-Period Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &    
 
Hybrid Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &  
 
Forward-Looking Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf +  + C + tf + &  
 
The present-period reaction function is similar to the original theoretical model 
noted above. The backward-looking rule is the result after shifting the time periods 
of the exogenous regressors in the theoretical rule back by one period, suggesting a 
central bank which considers single-period lagged information when making current 
period interest rate decisions, possibly due in practice to the unavailability of 
accurate data at the time of the decision. This excludes shifting the lagged interest 
rate time period, as it was included to capture interest rate smoothing behaviour 
from the previous interest rate value to the current value. 
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The forward-looking interest rate rule considers the case of a central bank making 
decisions regarding the interest rate in the current period based on expectations of 
future target variable values. Thus in the estimation exercise, actual future values 
are substituted for expected values. 
 
Finally, a hybrid model was also estimated, characterised by the case where the 
inflation and output gap variables are forward-looking whereas the exchange rate 
terms are similar to the present period specification.  
 
In all cases, uncertainty is assumed to be a current-period phenomenon. In other 
words, in all cases outlined above, uncertainty was treated as being considered in 
the present time, rather than in the past or future.  It seems more plausible to 
assume that policymakers consider current uncertainty rather than to act on the 
basis of how uncertain they were in the past or how uncertain they think they will 
be in the future. Regarding the backward-looking specification, it is assumed that 
even though the central bank acts in response to lagged variables, uncertainty is 
derived through estimates of current-period values. The cases for present-period, 
hybrid and forward-looking central banks differ as current values are known.  
 
7.1.3. Uncertainty scenarios 
 
In addition, for each time period rule outlined above, four different model 
specifications were considered representing different uncertainty-related scenarios, 
as follows: 
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Model A: No Uncertainty 
 =    
C =  C  
t =  t  
 
Model A considers the scenario where uncertainty has no influence on the actions 
of the central bank. The model is similar in essence to a simple Taylor rule 
augmented by the presence of the exchange rate variable, as in Taylor (1999), Ball 
(1998), Svensson (2000) and subsequently Mohanty and Klau (2004).  
 
Model B: Inflation and Output Gap Uncertainty 
 =   +   
C =  C + CCC  
t =  t  
 
Model B assumes that the effects of inflation and output gap uncertainty are 
significant, while uncertainty surrounding the exchange rate variable is insignificant. 
If the exchange rate term is discarded, the model resembles the closed economy 
uncertainty model employed by Martin and Milas (2005). 
 
Model C: Inflation, Output Gap and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 
 =   +   
C =  C + CCC  
t =  t +  ttt  
 
 The Effects of Indirect Uncertainty on the South African Reserve Bank 
 
125 
 
Model C is an extension of the previous model as it assumes that exchange rate 
uncertainty also affects central bank behaviour.  The decision to distinguish 
between Models B and C was guided by the fact that such effects have not been 
studied in mainstream empirical work, prompting a stepwise approach in this 
regard. 
 
Model D: Intra-Uncertainty Effects 
 =   + CC +  tt +    
C =  C + CCC +  Ctt +  C  
t =  t +  tCC + ttt + t  
 
Model D specifically investigates whether uncertainty about a specific variable 
might influence the response towards fluctuations in other target variables. Martin 
and Milas (2005) used a similar approach with the exception of the exchange rate 
equation.  
 
Estimates of the parameters in the equations outlined above were obtained 
through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, in most cases, results obtained 
from Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey tests for the presence of heteroscedasiticity were 
inconclusive.  To this end, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimates were 
also derived. Below follows a brief discussion of the results obtained for each time 
period rule specification.  
 
For simplicity, only the GMM results are reported below. The complete regression 
outputs including the LS regression results are reported in Appendix C.  
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7.2 Indirect-Uncertainty Model Estimation 
 
This section considers the estimation results of the indirect-uncertainty model 
described above. Each of the different time period specifications is discussed in turn 
below: 
 
7.2.1. Backward-looking results 
 
The results of the backward-looking specification are reported in Table 7.1 below. 
The fact that Model A excludes any uncertainty regressors allows for comparison 
with findings from other rule-based investigations. Immediately apparent is the high 
degree of interest rate smoothing, considering both the size and significance of the 
coefficient. This suggests that the central bank was reluctant to change the interest 
rate substantially from one period to another, rather opting for smaller incremental 
adjustments. In a sense, this type of behaviour mirrors that of a central bank being 
more conservative in the face of uncertainty. Thus, controlling for this effect could 
negate or absorb some of the cautionary behaviour of the central bank when 
responding to uncertainty.  
 
The relatively large coefficient of the lagged interest rate term is common amongst 
findings in the literature (Woglom, 2003; Aron and Muellbauer, 2000; Mohanty and 
Klau, 2004) and remained robust throughout the estimation exercises.  
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"y + 99"x + 99"x + 99"x + 9  
Backward-looking Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00183     (0.2848) 
0.00006               
(0.5934) 
0.000601   
(0.6368) 
0.001738   
(0.3561) 
y 0.823959  (0.0000)*** 
0.81817  
(0.0000)*** 
0.822347  
(0.0000)*** 
0.875466  
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.464325  (0.0035)*** 
0.359224   
(0.0000)*** 
0.2330  
(0.0001)*** 
0.250407   
(0.0100)*** 
 0.339423  (0.0013)*** 
-0.27709   
(0.0219)** 
-0.23065   
(0.0325)** 
-0.20076   
(0.2594) 
 0.25641 (0.0023)*** 
0.156586  
(0.0034)*** 
0.116942  
(0.0513)** 
0.066288   
(0.4378) 
 -0.53344  (0.0020)*** 
-0.31052   
(0.0021)*** 
0.119351  
(0.3383) 
0.278961  
(0.0798)* 
  -0.09782  (0.0000)*** 
-0.08742   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.54387  
(0.0328)** 
  -0.02564  (0.0003)*** 
-0.02312   
(0.0092)*** 
0.088692   
(0.4618) 
   0.049091  (0.0006)*** 
-0.21976       
(0.2821) 
     0.27642   (0.0505)* 
     0.189537  (0.4198) 
    0.357518  (0.0502) 
     -0.50312   (0.0005)*** 
    -0.36048   (0.0099)*** 
    0.624774  (0.0024)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.867299 0.906783 0.913552 0.892568 
Σe
2
 0.04568 0.031106 0.028436 0.032265 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.523702 0.864791 0.920151 0.836493 
Parameter Stab 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying 
moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic 
generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.1: Backward-looking regression results: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Furthermore, the model seems to suggest a greater response to inflation 
fluctuations compared to output gap fluctuations. This is in contrast to the findings 
reported by Woglom (2003), where the results indicated a larger coefficient on the 
output gap variable over a sample from 1990 to 1999. Also, Woglom (2003) 
reported a negative coefficient on the output gap, whereas the results derived from 
Model A suggest positive signs on both the output gap and inflation. Aron and 
Muellbauer (2000) reported the opposite, suggesting a negative inflation response 
and positive output gap response over a sample stretching from 1986 to 1997, also 
using lagged variables as regressors. Aron and Muellbauer’s estimate of the 
inflation response turned positive only after controlling for financial liberalisation. 
Ncube and Tshuma (2010) found positive coefficients on both regressors using 
lagged values. The inconsistent results from the literature might stem from 
differences in sample periods, model specifications, estimation techniques or 
differences in the way variables are measured.  
 
The exchange rate terms enter the model significantly. However, as suggested by 
Taylor (2001), the combined countercyclical effect is comparatively small. A similar 
result was reported by Woglom (2003). 
 
When uncertainty is added in Models B and C, the explanatory power of the models 
is increased. The uncertainty variables enter the equations significantly, suggesting 
relatively small effects. Interestingly, the results suggest that a backward-looking 
SARB reacted more cautiously to both inflation and the output gap when these 
variables were more uncertain, while acting more aggressively towards exchange 
rate fluctuations when the variable was more uncertain. However, the sign of the 
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inflation variable turned negative in both cases and the one-period lagged exchange 
rate variable turned insignificant when exchange rate uncertainty was included.  
 
The results from Model D, including uncertainty cross-effects, seem to indicate that 
uncertainty about one variable did not influence the response to other variables 
over the sample period. The fit of the model also decreased significantly in the 
GMM case. Experimenting with different combinations of variables included in the 
test equation did not produce differing results. 
 
7.2.2. Present-period results 
 
The results of the present-period specification are reported in Table 7.2 below. 
Model A, excluding uncertainty effects, suggests fairly similar results to those 
reported in the backward-looking case. However, the output gap coefficient was 
only marginally significant in the GMM case. The signs on both the inflation and 
output gap coefficients were positive, with the inflation coefficient again proving 
larger. These results are similar to those reported by Aron and Muellbauer (2000) 
using current-period regressors. Furthermore, Mohanty and Klau (2004) found 
positive inflation and output coefficients; however, both the current and lagged 
exchange rate terms were negative.   
 
The explanatory power of the models increased when uncertainty was included in 
Models B and C. However, though the inflation and output gap coefficients retained 
positive signs and remained significant, the sizes seemed to be inflated. Also, in 
model C the current-period exchange rate term entered insignificantly. The 
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uncertainty variables entered significantly only in some cases, suggesting a more 
aggressive response from the central bank when uncertainty increased.  
 
~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"x + 99 + 99 + 99 + 9 
Present-period Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00107     (0.5710) 
-0.00253   
(0.0812)* 
-0.00011   
(0.9402) 
0.001875   
(0.5575) 
y 0.802604  (0.0000)*** 
0.846242   
(0.0000)*** 
0.823292   
(0.0000)*** 
0.853334   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.66787  (0.0006)*** 
0.536572   
(0.0013)*** 
0.554715   
(0.0000)*** 
0.602979   
(0.0094)*** 
 0.667356  (0.0000)*** 
3.106668   
(0.0014)*** 
1.138601   
(0.0478)** 
5.457214   
(0.1626) 
 0.153109  (0.1079) 
1.740109   
(0.0851)* 
1.666356   
(0.0480)** 
-5.79912   
(0.1294) 
 -0.80544  (0.0000)*** 
-0.53654   
(0.0002)*** 
2.281242   
(0.1353) 
3.77872            
(0.1936) 
   0.27159   (0.0101)** 
0.051874   
(0.4401) 
-0.18023   
(0.4266) 
   0.182756   (0.1279) 
0.173891  
(0.0756)* 
-0.1437              
(0.6654) 
     0.345393  (0.0745)* 
0.347743  
(0.4315) 
        0.27272       (0.3083) 
        0.477973   (0.2818) 
       0.446804   (0.2364) 
        -1.06318   (0.0322)** 
       -0.27066   (0.2643) 
       0.452282   (0.1745) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.889772 0.910201 0.914046 0.887018 
Σe
2
 0.037944 0.029966 0.028273 0.033932 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.845456 0.806788 0.879147 0.776422 
Parameter Stab 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying 
moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic 
generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.2: Present-period regression results: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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As with the backward-looking specification, Model D, including uncertainty cross-
effects, seemed to indicate that uncertainty about one variable did not influence 
the response to other variables over the sample period, as most of the coefficients 
proved statistically insignificant.  
 
7.2.3. Hybrid model results 
 
The hybrid model, reported in Table 7.3, performed comparatively well in general, 
with the exception of the exchange rate terms which proved insignificant in the 
GMM base model excluding uncertainty effects. The inflation and output gap 
variables remain significant and retain positive signs throughout Models A, B and C. 
Once again, the inflation coefficient was larger than the output gap coefficient. The 
exchange rate terms turned significant in Model B, again suggesting a small 
negative effect in the GMM case.  
 
However, when exchange rate uncertainty was added, the current period exchange 
rate term seemed inflated and unrealistically large. Upon closer examination, it was 
determined that this was caused by the presence of multicollinearity between the 
current exchange rate term and the exchange rate uncertainty variable. When the 
current period exchange rate variable was dropped from the equation, the 
exchange rate uncertainty coefficient remained significant and positive. The results 
regarding uncertainty suggest a more cautious response to inflation and output gap 
uncertainty and a more aggressive response to exchange rate uncertainty. Again, 
Model D did not yield meaningful results. 
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"x + 99x + 99x + 99 + 9 
Hybrid-model Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.000008  (0.9686) 
0.00009          
(0.4874) 
0.001543   
(0.2417) 
0.005939   
(0.0674) 
y 0.885209 (0.0000)*** 
0.82748  
(0.0000)*** 
0.807404  
(0.0000)*** 
0.849929 
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.270414  (0.1895) 
0.429462   
(0.0003)*** 
0.465131  
(0.0002)*** 
0.610732 
(0.0002)*** 
 0.676142  (0.0000)*** 
0.347572   
(0.0003)*** 
0.304016   
(0.0007)*** 
0.252375   
(0.0851) 
 0.261518 (0.0009)*** 
0.265024  
(0.0000)*** 
0.194826  
(0.0000)*** 
0.101419   
(0.1808) 
 -0.27202     (0.3130) 
-0.45899   
(0.0003)*** 
3.155095  
(0.0217)** 
7.103803  
(0.0233)** 
   -0.04159  (0.000)*** 
-0.04459   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.25745    
(0.2618) 
   -0.0157  (0.0702)*** 
-0.02291  
(0.0039)*** 
0.36105  
(0.0386)** 
     0.449676  (0.0131)** 
0.528497  
(0.1164) 
        0.082664   (0.5480) 
        0.143021   (0.5553) 
       0.19418          (0.2942) 
        -0.61256   (0.0117)* 
       -0.61256    (0.3251) 
       0.588735  (0.0103)** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.910841 0.914731 0.917780 0.877287 
Σe
2
 0.030264 0.028044 0.026649 0.036264 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.933164 0.871154 0.914112 0.902942 
Parameter Stab 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying 
moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic 
generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.3: Hybrid model regression results: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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7.2.4. Forward-looking results 
 
The most striking finding from the forward-looking models was the insignificance of 
the forward-looking exchange rate terms, seeing as this suggests that the central 
bank is not forward looking with respect to the exchange rate.  
 
However, the output gap and inflation coefficients remained positive and significant 
throughout. The inflation coefficient was also consistently larger than the output 
gap coefficient, suggesting that the central bank is more concerned with keeping 
inflation close to its target value than compared to the output gap.  
 
With regard to Models B and C, the inflation (CC) and output gap () uncertainty 
terms proved significant and negative, again suggesting a more cautious response 
when uncertainty increases (The output gap coefficient was slightly insignificant in 
the Model LS case.) Again, the inflation uncertainty coefficient was more negative 
than the output gap uncertainty coefficient in both cases. This suggests that, in this 
setting, the central bank is more cautious with regard to responses to inflation than 
compared to the output gap.  
 
Again, Model D did not yield any significant estimates, suggesting that no cross-
uncertainty effects were present. 
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9 + 99x + 99x + 99x + 9 
Forward-looking Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM GMM 
x 0.000108  (0.9489) 
0.000421   
(0.7308) 
-0.00032             
(0.7386) 
0.0034               
(0.0673) 
y 0.86986   (0.0000)*** 
0.816867    
(0.0000)*** 
0.827967   
(0.0000)*** 
0.844985  
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.130828   (0.2343) 
0.07350    
(0.3980) 
-1.94458   
(0.1130) 
0.6748             
(0.7555) 
 0.721908   (0.0000)*** 
0.421965   
(0.0000)*** 
0.468513   
(0.0000)*** 
0.519768   
(0.0000)*** 
 0.231777   (0.0019)*** 
0.246769   
(0.0000)*** 
0.286989   
(0.0000)*** 
0.217106  
(0.0057)*** 
 -0.16498    (0.3165) 
-0.12747   
(0.2359) 
-0.04364   
(0.6496) 
-0.12156   
(0.3794) 
  -0.0338   (0.0000)*** 
-0.03248   
(0.0000)*** 
0.154377   
(0.4245) 
  -0.01703  (0.0031)*** 
-0.01726  
(0.0017)*** 
0.309012   
(0.0289)** 
   -0.24808   (0.1067) 
-0.45634 
(0.0748)* 
     0.001945   (0.9910) 
     -0.1946           (0.3563) 
    -0.0480            (0.7786) 
     -0.28636       (0.1241) 
    0.197035   (0.3103) 
    0.287481   (0.0926)* 
Adj. R-Squared 0.89892 0.908217 0.908197 0.885230 
Σe
2
 0.034311 0.030186 0.029755 0.033917 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.978174 0.855737 0.880032 0.737293 
Parameter Stab 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying 
moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic 
generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.4: Forward-looking regression results: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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7.3 Goodness of Fit and Diagnostics 
 
This section explores the goodness of fit statistics for each of the regressions 
reported above. Also, the regressions are submitted to the usual diagnostic tests to 
verify validity. 
 
7.3.1. Goodness of fit 
 
The adjusted R-squared, sum of squared residuals and the significance of the 
coefficients as measures of goodness of fit were used to identify the best model for 
each of the different uncertainty scenarios. The results are summarised in Table 7.5 
below. The results indicate that the hybrid model performed best across all model 
specifications, with the exception of Model D. These results suggest that the SARB 
was forward-looking with respect to inflation and the output gap, but not so in 
relation to the exchange rate. Model D did not provide meaningful results in most 
cases. Comment with regard to the model providing the best fit is thus reserved in 
this case.  
 
Again, the inflation and output gap coefficients are positive and significant 
throughout Models A to C. Also, the coefficient on inflation remained persistently 
larger than the corresponding coefficient on the output gap, suggesting that the 
SARB was more concerned with keeping inflation close to its target level than with 
the output gap.  
 
 The Effects of Indirect Uncertainty on the South African Reserve Bank 
 
136 
 
 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
 
Hybrid Model Hybrid Model Hybrid Model Backward-Looking 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.000008             (0.9686) 
0.00009                 
(0.4874) 
0.001543                    
(0.2417) 
0.001738               
(0.3561) 
y 0.885209              (0.0000)*** 
0.82748             
(0.0000)*** 
0.807404               
(0.0000)*** 
0.875466                
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.270414                (0.1895) 
0.429462                
(0.0003)*** 
0.465131                 
(0.0002)*** 
0.250407             
(0.0100)*** 
 0.676142               (0.0000)*** 
0.347572            
(0.0003)*** 
0.304016                   
(0.0007)*** 
-0.20076                           
(0.2594) 
 0.261518                
(0.0009)*** 
0.265024             
(0.0000)*** 
0.194826                    
(0.0000)*** 
0.066288                    
(0.4378) 
 -0.27202                (0.3130) 
-0.45899           
(0.0003)*** 
3.155095                         
(0.0217)** 
0.278961                 
(0.0798)* 
   -0.04159          (0.000)*** 
-0.04459                               
(0.0000)*** 
-0.54387                               
(0.0328)** 
   -0.0157   (0.0702)* 
-0.02291                                     
(0.0039)*** 
0.088692                        
(0.4618) 
     0.449676                        (0.0131)** 
-0.21976                              
(0.2821) 
        0.27642                 (0.0505)* 
        0.189537               (0.4198) 
       0.357518               
(0.0502) 
        -0.50312                             
(0.0005)*** 
       -0.36048                            (0.0099)*** 
       0.624774               (0.0024)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.910841 0.914731 0.917780 0.892568 
Σe
2
 0.030264 0.028044 0.026649 0.032265 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.933164 0.871154 0.914112 0.836493 
Parameter Stability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PP Test Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying 
moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic 
generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.5: Best fit models: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The exchange rate coefficients were also significant for Models B and C. For model 
C, the coefficients seemed inflated and spurious at first glance. However, the large 
coefficients on the exchange rate and exchange rate uncertainty variables in Model 
C are due to the high level of multicollinearity between these variables. Upon 
removal of the current exchange rate term, the exchange rate uncertainty 
coefficient remained significant and positive, with the size of the estimate reduced 
to 0.05. 
 
With the exception of Model D, the uncertainty variables are significant throughout. 
The results suggest that the SARB responded less aggressively when inflation and 
output gap uncertainty increased, whereas the converse seems to hold with regard 
to exchange rate uncertainty.  
 
In other words, the results suggest that the SARB responded more aggressively 
towards exchange rate fluctuations as this variable became more uncertain.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the fit of the models seems to improve 
when the uncertainty variables are included. This is made clear in Figure 7.1 below: 
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Figure 7.1: Indirect uncertainty-adjusted R-squared statistics: Full sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
However, the increase in the adjusted R-Squared statistic is relatively small in most 
cases when the uncertainty variables are included. The largest increase, around 
0.04, is evident in the backward-looking case (difference between Models A and B). 
In the hybrid model case, the increase is only 0.004. This suggests that even though 
the SARB took uncertainty into consideration, it played a comparatively small role, 
as is also evident in the small size of the uncertainty related coefficients
20
. Also, 
from the figure above, it is evident that Model C seemed to perform best, 
regardless of the time period specification used.  
 
                                            
20
 Results from Martin and Milas (2005) reported a difference in R-squared statistics between the base and the 
uncertainty adjusted model of around 0.002 for the United States. 
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7.3.2. Diagnostics 
 
All the equations passed the usual diagnostic tests (test results are reported at the 
bottom of each results table). In the least squares estimations, the F-test rejected 
the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The J-
statistic reported that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions could 
not be rejected in all cases. In other words, the GMM instruments satisfy the 
orthogonality condition as these instruments are uncorrelated with the errors. Also, 
the Phillips-Peron tests supported the standard ADF unit root tests that the 
residuals were stationary in all cases.  
 
However, tests regarding parameter stability suggested the presence of breakpoints 
within the data. To this end, Quandt-Andrews breakpoint tests were used to 
establish the most likely breakpoint locations (the results are reported in Appendix 
D). Subsequently, Chow-breakpoint tests were used for the least square 
specification while the Andrews-Fair-Wald test was employed for the GMM 
specifications to verify whether breakpoints actually exist at the identified likely 
locations. The results indicated the presence of breakpoints around 1999, the year 
prior to the advent of formal inflation targeting. This is addressed in the next 
section below. 
 
7.4 Sample Breaks 
 
In addressing the problem of breakpoints around 1999, the original sample was 
divided into two sub-samples, corresponding to the timeframes 1990Q1 – 1999Q4 
and 2000Q – 2011Q3. The same estimation procedure was followed but excluding 
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Model D considering the mostly insignificant estimates reported above. Although 
some results are reported in this section, the complete regressions for each rule 
specification are included in Appendix E. The individual regression outputs for each 
period specification are considered first. Due to the wide array of models 
considered, this section concludes by identifying the best fit models and discussing 
these results in more detail. 
 
7.4.1. First sub-sample (1990 – 1999) results 
 
Considering the backward-looking specification (Table 7.6), it is clear that the 
inflation and output gap coefficients remained significant throughout. However, the 
results suggest that the SARB assigned more weight to addressing output gap 
fluctuations than to inflation disturbances. This is evident through observing that 
the output gap coefficient was larger in most cases. The exchange rate terms also 
entered significantly, with the exception of the one period lagged variable in Model 
A.  
 
Also, the results suggest the SARB was more concerned with exchange rate 
fluctuations than with the other two variables. The uncertainty variables entered 
significantly, suggesting a more conservative approach to inflation and output gap 
uncertainty and a more aggressive approach to exchange rate uncertainty.  
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Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00052         (0.7916) 
-0.003408   
(0.0001)*** 
0.005037   
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.885942   (0.0000)*** 
0.857109   
(0.0000)*** 
0.844079   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.667536   (0.0000)*** 
0.376547   
(0.0000)*** 
0.294257   
(0.0000)*** 
 0.215478           (0.0761)* 
-0.25154             
(0.0330)** 
0.068458         
(0.0789)* 
 0.31621       
(0.0019)*** 
0.150025   
(0.0104)** 
0.35492         
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.16894         (0.1895) 
0.250199   
(0.0000)*** 
0.671458   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.09804   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06464   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.04097   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03207           
(0.0000)*** 
   
0.092652     
(0.0000)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.849103 0.884769 0.904133 
Σe
2
 0.021981 0.015081 0.012001 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.909973 0.997908 0.99603 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities 
of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers 
to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.6: Backward-looking regression results: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results for the present-period specification in Table 7.7 below also show that 
the inflation, output gap and exchange rate coefficients remain significant, with the 
exception of the output gap coefficient in Model A and the exchange rate 
coefficient in Model C.  
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  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x 0.00171        (0.4837) 
0.003399   
(0.0180)** 
0.003388           
(0.1001) 
y 0.886846   (0.0000)*** 
0.922691   
(0.0000)*** 
0.92325   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.900442  (0.0000)*** 
0.55868     
(0.0036)*** 
0.541125   
(0.0280)** 
 0.712497  (0.0000)*** 
10.01401 
(0.0041)*** 
10.17733 
(0.0035)*** 
 0.1229625        
(0.1456) 
5.14528   
(0.0000)*** 
5.23586          
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.95509  (0.0000)*** 
-0.28555  
(0.0223)*** 
-0.77036       
(0.8536) 
  
1.108033   
(0.0067)*** 
1.12785         
(0.0057)*** 
  
0.570584  
(0.0000)*** 
0.580812 
(0.0000)*** 
   
0.06245           
(0.9031) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.891527 0.902953 0.898957 
Σe
2
 0.015801 0.012837 0.012809 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.721267 0.964384 0.946275 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0016 0.0004 0.0005 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The 
instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-
statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test 
values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-
Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Table 7.7: Present-period regression results: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the previous specification, the results suggest a central 
bank more concerned with inflation than with the output gap
21
.  The combined 
exchange rate effect also decreased considerably when compared to the previous 
specification.  
                                            
21The exaggerated inflation and output gap coefficients in Models B & C are due mainly to multicollinearity, 
as discussed previously.  
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However, only the inflation and output gap uncertainty terms entered significantly. 
Surprisingly, the results suggest a more aggressive approach in this setting.  
 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x 0.003275   (0.0455)** 
0.005366   
(0.0000)*** 
0.004445   
(0.0018)*** 
y 0.921979  (0.0000)*** 
0.872371 
(0.0000)*** 
0.889872  
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.512287   (0.0002)*** 
0.661276   
(0.0000)*** 
0.5915589  
(0.0000)*** 
 0.802709 (0.0000)*** 
0.399335  
(0.0000)*** 
0.456202 
(0.0000)*** 
 0.197435   
(0.0143)** 
0.197968   
(0.0000)*** 
0.24982            
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.41414  (0.0049)*** 
-0.55155   
(0.0000)*** 
-5.91316   
(0.0035)*** 
  
-0.0189    
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04493   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.03048   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.03108  
(0.0017)*** 
   
-0.6857        
(0.0063)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.890822 0.904385 0.903481 
Σe
2
 0.015904 0.012513 0.012082 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.899609 0.998243 0.997035 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.8: Hybrid model regression results: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The hybrid model again performed exceptionally well (Table 7.8), with all the 
variables included in the model proving significant throughout. Again, the results 
suggest a central bank more concerned with inflation than with the output gap. 
Also, the combined effect of the exchange rate terms is comparatively small. The 
uncertainty terms suggest conservative behaviour throughout. Somewhat surprising 
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is the finding that the SARB was especially conservative when uncertainty about the 
exchange rate increased. Again, for the forward-looking specification most of the 
coefficients entered significantly, the only exception being the exchange rate 
coefficients in Models A and C. Also, the uncertainty coefficients suggest 
conservatism in all cases.  
 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x 0.004181   (0.0194)** 
0.007143   
(0.0000)*** 
0.00537   
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.910125   (0.0000)*** 
0.865204   
(0.0000)*** 
0.891573   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.010252       (0.9380) 
-0.26982   
(0.0000)*** 
-10.3394  
(0.0000)*** 
 0.789034 (0.0000)*** 
0.572188  
(0.0000)*** 
0.623211 
(0.0000)*** 
 0.16376           (0.0118)** 
0.257699   
(0.0000)*** 
0.35849          
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.4236          (0.0045)*** 
0.257699   
(0.0313)** 
0.048961              
(0.1667) 
   -0.02965   (0.0003)*** 
-0.02208      
(0.0106)** 
   -0.02745   (0.0000)*** 
-0.03087  
(0.0000)*** 
     -1.27996  (0.0000)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.850975 0.879212 0.884999 
Σe
2
 0.021709 0.015808 0.014396 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.930854 0.997869 0.996227 
J-Statistic  Prob.  0.0000  0.0009  0.0017 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.9: Forward-looking regression results: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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7.4.2. Second sub-sample (2000 – 2011) results 
 
At first glance, the backward-looking specification again did not perform well (Table 
7.10), with most of the coefficient estimates found to be insignificant. Thus the 
inflation estimate was found to be insignificant for both the Model B and C 
formulations. Also, the uncertainty coefficients suggest conservative behaviour with 
regard to inflation and output gap uncertainty, while a more aggressive approach is 
evident in relation to exchange rate uncertainty. 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00361    
(0.0252)** 
-0.00360   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00342   
(0.0003)*** 
y 0.616909  
(0.0000)*** 
0.811449   
(0.0000)*** 
0.710823   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.369701   
(0.0045)*** 
0.161185   
(0.0031)*** 
0.1300         
(0.0069)*** 
 0.567315  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.12498       
(0.1033) 
-0.08674         
(0.3229) 
 0.239089  
(0.0026)*** 
0.16381    
(0.0060)*** 
0.142946 
(0.0050)*** 
 -0.61477  (0.0000)*** 
0.24457   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.12309        
(0.1724) 
  
-0.08591   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.08312   
(0.0000)*** 
 
 
-0.01669   
(0.0061)*** 
-0.08312  
(0.0012)*** 
   
0.012194        
(0.1528) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.904469 0.939665 0.939746 
Σe
2
 0.015724 0.009446 0.009192 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.81516 0.982018 0.996763 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0042  0.0007  0.0018 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.10: Backward-looking regression results: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Similarly to the previous specification, the present-period model (Table 7.11) did 
not perform well in general as a number of coefficients entered insignificantly. This 
is evident with the exchange rate terms and the output gap variable in Model A. 
With regard to uncertainty, the present-period specification predicts exactly the 
opposite of the backward-looking specification. Uncertainty about inflation and the 
output gap prompted a more aggressive response while conservatism was followed 
when exchange rate uncertainty increased.  
 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00472  
(0.0008)*** 
0.00757   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00729   
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.690629   
(0.0000)*** 
0.707628   
(0.0000)*** 
0.705852  
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.253106   
(0.0126)** 
0.070527             
(0.2270) 
0.050806            
(0.2958) 
 0.812761  
(0.0000)*** 
3.698081 
(0.0000)*** 
3.449524 
(0.0000)*** 
 0.044353       
(0.4767) 
3.434595   
(0.0000)*** 
3.072194 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.39654  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.19179  
(0.0006)*** 
-0.30076             
(0.5863) 
  
0.324894   
(0.0000)*** 
0.29894            
(0.0000)*** 
 
 
0.373657  
(0.0000)*** 
0.329631 
(0.0000)*** 
   
-0.01512           
(0.8261) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.933145 0.946550 0.945704 
Σe
2
 0.011004 0.008368 0.008283 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.888149 0.963049 0.992020 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.11: Present period regression results: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The most striking finding from the hybrid model (Table 7.12) is the fact that all the 
exchange rate terms entered insignificantly. The uncertainty coefficients suggest a 
more conservative approach in this setting. 
 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00428   (0.0051)*** 
-0.00324   
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0033          
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.794861  (0.0000)*** 
0.706533 
(0.0000)*** 
0.703962  
(0.0000)*** 
z -0.01896         (0.8484) 
-0.01413         
(0.6901) 
0.009499          
(0.7463) 
 0.696807 (0.0000)*** 
0.3162013  
(0.0219)** 
0.160582         
(0.0106)** 
 0.24044         
(0.0012)*** 
0.23176   
(0.0000)*** 
0.240823 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.04908          (0.6754) 
-0.0612          
(0.3558) 
-0.14067       
(0.6683) 
  
-0.06656  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06505   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.0160         
(0.0003)*** 
-0.01581   
(0.0002)*** 
   
-0.00467          
(0.9121) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.931166 0.945074 0.944027 
Σe
2
 0.011081 0.008400 0.008335 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.857381 0.978568 0.995004 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.12: Hybrid model regression results: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The forward-looking specification performed comparatively well. All the coefficients 
were significant, the only exceptions being the current period exchange rate term in 
Model A and the exchange rate uncertainty term in Model C. Again, the uncertainty 
coefficients suggest a more conservative approach as uncertainty about the 
respective variables increases.  
 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM GMM 
x -0.00394        (0.0116)** 
-0.00303   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00347    
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.806842   (0.0000)*** 
0.712298   
(0.0000)*** 
0.70723   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.039421             (0.5967) 
-0.23613  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.81342  
(0.0685)*** 
 0.765294  (0.0000)*** 
0.162596          
(0.0229)** 
0.195215 
(0.0007)*** 
 0.150335             (0.0558)* 
0.268219   
(0.0000)*** 
0.274407 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.05384              (0.6082) 
0.176789   
(0.0003)*** 
0.168571   
(0.0000)*** 
   -0.06120   (0.0003)*** 
-0.06157       
(0.0000)** 
   -0.02602  (0.0000)*** 
-0.02266   
(0.0000)*** 
     -0.07382          (0.1749) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.929456 0.946790 0.944935 
Σe
2
 0.011357 0.008138 0.008200 
F-Statistic  Prob. 0.768175 0.982389 0.994957 
J-Statistic  Prob.  0.0007  0.0002  0.0002 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments 
are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of 
over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the 
probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint 
test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.13: Forward-looking regression results: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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7.4.3. Best fit models 
 
Drawing general conclusions from the above results is complicated due to the large 
number of models estimated. For this reason, it might be beneficial to firstly 
summarise the general findings above and subsequently identify the models with 
the best fit. To this end, the findings reported above are summarised by considering 
each variable in turn: 
 
Considering the first sub-sample results for the period 1990Q1 to 1999Q4, it is 
evident that the lagged interest rate coefficient remained significant throughout. 
The exchange rate terms also remained significant in most instances, the exceptions 
being Model A in the backward-looking specification, Model C in the present-period 
specification and Models A and C in the forward-looking specification. The inflation 
and output gap coefficients proved even more robust, entering significantly in all 
cases except for the output gap coefficient in Model A of the present-period 
specification and the inflation coefficient in Model A of the forward-looking 
specification.  
 
The uncertainty-related coefficients were significant in all cases except one, the 
exchange rate uncertainty coefficient in the present-period specification. All 
specifications except the present-period specification indicated a more cautious 
approach to inflation and output gap uncertainty. However, the exchange rate 
uncertainty results were more volatile in this respect, suggesting caution in the 
hybrid and forward-looking specification but the converse in the remaining 
specifications.  
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Regarding the second sub-sample for the period 2000Q1 to 2011Q4, the lagged 
interest rate variable remained significant throughout, the major difference from 
the first sub-sample being the noticeable reduction in coefficient size in all cases, 
suggesting that interest rate smoothing was more prevalent during the nineties. The 
exchange rate coefficients are less robust than in the first sub-sample. This is clear 
from the hybrid specification, where the exchange rate terms were insignificant for 
all models.  The exchange rate terms performed best in the backward- and forward-
looking specifications. The inflation coefficient was significant in all cases except 
Models B and C in the backward-looking specification. The output gap coefficient 
remained significant in all cases except Model A in the present-period specification.  
 
The inflation and output gap uncertainty-related coefficients were significant 
throughout, suggesting a cautious response in all cases except the present-period 
specification. Surprisingly, the exchange rate uncertainty coefficient never entered 
significantly, suggesting that the SARB did not respond to exchange rate uncertainty 
during the second sample, which might be an indication of behaviour under an 
inflation targeting regime. Thus, the results suggest that the SARB responded less 
aggressively to inflation and output gap uncertainty across both sample periods. 
Exchange rate uncertainty played a role only in the first sub-sample, suggesting a 
more aggressive approach.  It should be noted that the model fit decreases slightly 
when exchange rate uncertainty is included, casting some doubt as to the effect of 
the coefficient, even though it entered significantly. Finally, in most cases, the 
response to inflation uncertainty was stronger than the response to output gap 
uncertainty.  
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Next, in order to distinguish between the specifications and related models above, 
“best-fit” models were identified based on the adjusted R-Squared and Sum of 
Squared Residual statistics. Insignificant coefficients were dropped from the 
equations when comparing the goodness-of-fit statistics. The results are reported in 
Table 7.14 below. 
 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 Sample: 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
 GMM Estimation GMM Estimation 
Coefficient 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Hybrid Hybrid Backward Hybrid Forward Forward 
x 0.003275   
(0.0455)** 
0.005366   
(0.0000)*** 
0.005037   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00428   
(0.0051)*** 
-0.00303   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00347 
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.921979  
(0.0000)*** 
0.872371 
(0.0000)*** 
0.844079   
(0.0000)*** 
0.794861  
(0.0000)*** 
0.712298   
(0.0000)*** 
0.70723   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.512287   
(0.0002)*** 
0.661276   
(0.0000)*** 
0.294257   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.01896   
(0.8484) 
-0.23613  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.81342  
(0.0685)** 
 0.802709 (0.0000)*** 
0.399335  
(0.0000)*** 
0.068458 
(0.0789)* 
0.696807 
(0.0000)*** 
0.162596 
(0.0229)** 
0.195215 
(0.0007)*** 
 0.197435  
(0.0143)** 
0.197968   
(0.0000)*** 
0.35492 
(0.0000)*** 
0.24044 
(0.0012)*** 
0.268219   
(0.0000)*** 
0.274407 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.41414  
(0.0049)*** 
-0.55155   
(0.0000)*** 
0.671458   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04908  
(0.6754) 
0.176789   
(0.0003)*** 
0.168571   
(0.0000)*** 
   -0.0189   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06464   
(0.0000)*** 
  -0.06120   
(0.0003)*** 
-0.06157   
(0.0000)** 
   -0.03048   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.03207 
(0.0000)*** 
  -0.02602  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.02266 
(0.0000)*** 
     0.092652 
(0.0000)*** 
    -0.07382 
(0.1749) 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.890822 0.904385 0.904133 0.931166 0.946790 0.944935 
Σe
2
 0.015904 0.012513 0.012001 0.011081 0.008138 0.008200 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.899609 0.998243 0.99603 0.857381 0.982389 0.994957 
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
 0.0001  0.0002  0.0001  0.0007  0.0002  0.0002 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a constant and 
five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. 
The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the 
Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 7.14: Best fit models: Split sample results 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Once again, the explanatory power of the models increases when uncertainty 
variables are included. The increase seems larger than the corresponding full 
sample results, equalling around 0.0135 in the first sub-sample and 0.0156 in the 
second sub-sample
22
.  
 
This is made clear through Figure 7.2 below: 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Indirect-uncertainty adjusted R-squared statistics: First sub-sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results from Figure 7.2 emphasises that the inclusion of the uncertainty 
regressors improved the explanatory power of the models in each case. This is 
evident through observing the differences between Models A and B for each period 
                                            
22
 Referring to the differences between Models A & B in Table 6.14. 
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specification. The hybrid model outperformed all the other period models except 
for the present-period specification of Model A uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Indirect uncertainty adjusted R-squared statistics: Second sub-sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The findings are similar when considering the results of the second sub-sample from 
2000 to 2011 in Figure 7.3. Again, the model’s explanatory power increased when 
the uncertainty regressors were included. However, in this sub-sample the present-
period specification outperforms the hybrid specification for all the uncertainty 
models considered here. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter attempted to investigate the effects of uncertainty on the actions of 
the SARB. The theoretical model derived in Chapter 4 served as the base model 
whilst the uncertainty estimates from the GARCH models of Chapter 5 were used to 
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approximate uncertainty about the rate of inflation, the output gap and the 
exchange rate.  
 
This chapter focused on solving the model to ascertain whether the SARB took 
uncertainty into account and if so, whether the SARB’s actions reflect optimal 
behaviour as stipulated by theory. 
 
However, the theoretical model assumes that uncertainty influences monetary 
policy only indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to inflation, output 
gap and exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty plays a role only 
when the central bank responds to fluctuations in target variables. Subsequently, 
the model developed in Chapter 4 was renamed the indirect-uncertainty model. 
Thus, this chapter considered only indirect-uncertainty effects. 
 
To solve the uncertainty-indirect model, various period specifications were 
considered in conjunction with differing uncertainty-related scenarios, ensuring the 
robustness of the results. The presence of a sample break around 1999 necessitated 
the sample being split into two smaller sub-samples corresponding to 1990 – 1999 
and 2000 – 2011. 
 
The results suggest that the SARB responded less aggressively to both inflation and 
output gap uncertainty across both sample periods. This finding supports the idea 
that the SARB behaves like its counterparts in other countries in following the 
Brainard (1967) conservatism principle. In other words, when responding to 
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inflation and output gap fluctuations, the SARB was found to be more cautious and 
altered interest rates by a lower margin when more uncertain about either variable.  
 
Exchange rate uncertainty seems to have played a significant role only in the period 
prior to the advent of inflation targeting. The exchange rate entered significantly 
only with regard to the backward-looking period specification in the formal inflation 
targeting sub-sample, whereas it was found to be significant for all time period 
specifications in the prior sub-sample. Whether the SARB’s actions reflected caution 
or aggression in this regard was thus difficult to establish, due to the results being 
volatile and dependent on period specification. 
 
The main findings from the investigation in this chapter may be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 Estimated rules including uncertainty performed better than models excluding 
uncertainty, suggesting that the degree of uncertainty contributes towards 
explaining the actions of the SARB over the sample period.  
 
 The SARB’s actions seem to be consistent when compared to the findings 
reported for industrialized nations in that the SARB’s responses to inflation and 
output gap uncertainty reflect conservatism. 
 
 Exchange rate uncertainty appears to have played a role only in the sub-sample 
period before the advent of inflation targeting. Whether the SARB’s actions 
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reflected caution or aggression in this regard was difficult to establish, mainly 
due to the results being volatile and dependent on period specification. 
 
However, as mentioned above, this chapter considered only indirect-uncertainty 
effects. The aim of the next chapter is to include direct-uncertainty effects to 
provide a holistic understanding of the SARB’s actions in the face of uncertainty.  
 
Furthermore, the next chapter will also attempt to quantify the impact of 
uncertainty on the SARB’s actual interest rate responses. 
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Chapter 8 
Direct Uncertainty Effects and Uncertainty 
Impact Estimates 
 
 
 
As a first step to establish whether the SARB reacted optimally in the presence of 
uncertainty, the previous chapter set out to solve the uncertainty-adjusted model 
derived in Chapter 4. The GARCH estimates from Chapter 6 were used as a proxy 
for uncertainty about inflation, output gap and the exchange rate.  
 
To solve the uncertainty model, Chapter 7 considered various period specifications 
in conjunction with different uncertainty-related scenarios, ensuring the 
robustness of the results. The presence of a sample break around 1999 
necessitated the sample being split into two smaller sub-samples corresponding to 
1990 – 1999 and 2000 – 2011. 
 
However, the theoretical model assumes that uncertainty influences monetary 
policy only indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to inflation, output 
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gap and exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty plays a role only 
when the central bank responds to fluctuations in target variables. Hence this 
model was labelled the indirect-uncertainty model.  
 
The preliminary results in the previous chapter showed that the SARB responded 
less aggressively to inflation and output gap indirect uncertainty across both 
sample periods, suggesting that the SARB acts similarly to industrial country 
central bank counterparts in following the Brainard (1967) conservatism principle. 
In other words, when responding to inflation and output gap fluctuations, the 
SARB seemed to be more cautious and altered interest rates by a lower margin 
when more uncertain about the specific variable. Exchange rate uncertainty 
appeared to play a role only in the period prior to the advent of inflation targeting. 
This signals a different approach to exchange rate uncertainty during the inflation 
targeting regime compared to the preceding regime and might be a consequence 
of the fact that the exchange rate wasn’t an explicit target during the inflation 
targeting regime. Whether the SARB’s actions during the first regime reflected 
caution or aggression in this regard was difficult to establish, mainly due to the 
results being volatile and dependent on period specification.  
 
This chapter aims to build on these findings by considering whether direct 
uncertainty effects also played a role with regard to the SARB’s decision-making.  
The first section briefly reviews the methodology used to add the direct effects to 
the model.  
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Thereafter, section 8.2 examines the results from the altered model. Section 8.3 
considers the goodness of fit and whether the inclusion of direct uncertainty 
regressors improved the model.  
 
Section 8.4 attempts to quantify the effect of uncertainty on the interest rate. 
Finally, section 8.5 investigates whether the SARB acted more conservatively or 
more aggressively. The final section concludes by summarising the main findings. 
 
8.1 Methodology 
 
To review, the uncertainty-adjusted model derived in Chapter 4 assumed that the 
coefficients are dependent on the variances of the endogenous variables, namely 
inflation, the output gap and the exchange rate. The model allows us to 
investigate whether monetary policy is more aggressive or passive when 
uncertainty about the relevant exogenous variable increases. 
 
However, the model assumes that uncertainty influences monetary policy only 
indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to inflation, output gap and 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
 
It might also be prudent to investigate whether the central bank responded 
directly to inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty; in other words, 
whether the central bank responded to uncertainty regarding a target variable 
irrespective of a response to fluctuations in that variable.  
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For clarity, the distinction from the previous chapter is revisited below: 
 
• Indirect uncertainty effects: Uncertainty influences only the response to a 
fluctuation in the target variable. For example, the central bank raises the 
interest rate following an increase in expected inflation which is considered 
likely to be sustained and thus reflected in actual future inflation. However, 
the central bank raises the interest rate by a smaller margin due to 
uncertainty about the rate of inflation. In the absence of uncertainty, the 
central bank would still have changed the interest rate, but the magnitude of 
the change would have been different. For this reason, uncertainty enters 
the regression equation through the coefficient of the specific independent 
variable. 
 
• Direct uncertainty effects: The effect of uncertainty regardless of responding 
to a fluctuation in the target variable. This case is distinctly different as the 
central bank is not responding to a fluctuation in a target variable. Rather, 
the central bank changes the policy instrument based solely on uncertainty 
about a particular target variable. For example, even if the inflation rate 
remained stable, the central bank raises the interest due to uncertainty 
about whether the status quo would be maintained going forward. In the 
absence of uncertainty, the central bank would not have changed the 
interest rate. For this reason, uncertainty enters the regression equation 
directly and captures the effect of a change in uncertainty about the target 
variable.  
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8.1.1. The model 
 
This new model, adjusted by adding uncertainty directly to the equation, is 
labelled the direct-uncertainty model (also referred to at times as the combined 
model, as it includes both direct and indirect uncertainty regressors) and is 
represented as follows
23
:   
 
B =  + B" + Jf" + ∗ + C∗ C + t∗t +  + C + tf + &
  
where  =   +  CC + tt +   
 
  C =  C +  CCC + Ctt + C  
 
  t =  t + tCC +  ttt +  t  
 
and , C, t are measures of output, inflation and exchange rate uncertainty 
respectively. The direct uncertainty coefficients are represented by ∗ , C∗  and t∗. 
 
8.1.2. Time period specifications 
 
Again, due to the fact that there has yet to emerge clear consensus in the 
literature regarding the optimal rule in characterising the behaviour of the South 
African Reserve Bank, different time period specifications were estimated. These 
are: 
                                            
23Note that this model still contains indirect-uncertainty regressors.  
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Backward-Looking Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" + ∗  + C∗ C + t∗t + " + C" + tf" + & 
  
Present-Period Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" + ∗  + C∗ C + t∗t +  + C + tf + &    
  
Hybrid Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf" + ∗  + C∗ C + t∗t +  + C + tf + &
  
Forward-Looking Rule 
B =  + B" + Jf + ∗  + C∗ C + t∗t +  + C + tf +
&   
 
As explained in Chapter 7, uncertainty is assumed to be a current-period 
phenomenon. In other words, in all cases outlined above, uncertainty was treated 
as being considered in the present time, rather than in the past or future.   
 
8.1.3. Uncertainty scenarios 
 
In contrast to the previous chapter, there is no need to consider a range of 
different uncertainty-related scenarios, as the intention of this chapter is to 
examine whether direct uncertainty affected the actions of the SARB. Thus, only 
one uncertainty scenario from Chapter 7 is considered here:  
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Uncertainty scenario: Inflation, Output Gap and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 
 =   +   
C =  C + CCC  
t =  t +  ttt  
 
Estimates were again obtained through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, to 
control for the presence of heteroscedasiticity, Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimates were also obtained. Below follows a brief discussion of the 
results for each time period rule specification.  
 
8.2 Direct-Uncertainty Model Estimation 
 
This section considers the estimation results of the direct-uncertainty model 
described above. Due to the presence of sample breaks (see Chapter 7), the original 
sample was divided into two smaller samples corresponding to the time periods 
1990 quarter 1 – 1999 quarter 4 and 2000 quarter 1 – 2011 quarter 3. Each of the 
different time period specifications is discussed in turn below: 
 
8.2.1. Backward-looking model results 
 
The results of the backward-looking specification are reported in Table 8.1 below. 
This specification performed comparatively well with regard to the first sub-
sample period, seeing as all the coefficients entered significantly.   
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Also, the inflation coefficient suggests that the SARB was considerably more 
concerned with inflation fluctuations than with the other two structural variables.  
 
However, the backward specification did not perform well for the second sub-
sample, as a number of coefficients entered insignificantly.  
 
With regard to the indirect uncertainty effects, the results again suggest caution in 
relation to inflation and output gap uncertainty. By contrast, the SARB seemed to 
be more aggressive towards exchange rate uncertainty in this setting for both sub-
samples.  
 
Surprisingly, the direct uncertainty coefficients entered significantly throughout. 
For direct inflation uncertainty, the results suggest that the SARB lowered the 
interest rate on average when more uncertain about the rate of inflation.  
 
The contrast seems to hold true for direct exchange rate uncertainty while the 
results are mixed for direct output gap uncertainty. 
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"y + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + ∗9y + 99"x + 99"x + 99"x + 9   
Backward-looking 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 0.32119          
(0.0000)*** 
-0.11187           
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.711622             
(0.0000)*** 
0.670729          
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.382704           
(0.0004)*** 
-0.01694              
(0.7129) 
 0.603943        
(0.0000)*** 
-0.01876              
(0.7998) 
 0.150073           
(0.0630)* 
0.08435                   
(0.0886)* 
 0.495776                     
(0.0000)*** 
-0.11875                
(0.1891) 
∗  -0.01227               
(0.0100)* 
-0.01554                 
(0.0000)*** 
∗  0.008243              
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0061               
(0.0000)*** 
∗  0.042791                    
(0.0000)*** 
0.010872                     
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.04905                  
(0.0001)*** 
-0.08183                   
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.01099               
(0.0020)*** 
-0.1599                   
(0.0003)*** 
 0.076914           
(0.0000)*** 
0.025647                 
(0.0000)*** 
Adj. R-Squared 0.935269 0.943229 
Σe
2
 0.006998 0.007977 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.985214 0.98992 
PP Prob. 0.0001 0.0017 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors.  With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-
statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 8.1: Combined effects backward-looking regression results: Split sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
8.2.2. Present-period model results 
 
Similarly to the previous model, the present-period specification performed well 
for the first sub-sample. However, three coefficients entered insignificantly for the 
second-sub-sample. 
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"x + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + ∗9y + 99 + 99 + 99 + 9  
Present-period 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 0.58214            
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04995                   
(0.0613)* 
y 0.717218           
(0.0000)*** 
0.704384                 
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.26191               
(0.0031)*** 
-0.06317                    
(0.3859) 
 9.877642                      
(0.0000)*** 
2.417814                  
(0.0007)*** 
 3.017859                 
(0.0000)*** 
1.988917                      
(0.0053)*** 
 -14.6936                      
(0.0000)*** 
-0.42119                  
(0.3482) 
∗  0.02222                     
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00966                    
(0.0001)*** 
∗  0.005785                    
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00414                     
(0.0000)*** 
∗  0.040889                 
(0.0000)*** 
0.010006                
(0.0000)*** 
 1.081886                   
(0.0000)*** 
0.186405               
(0.0103)** 
 0.335706                    
(0.0000)*** 
0.210736                
(0.0081)*** 
 -1.82633                  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03074               
(0.5876) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.954623 0.947489 
Σe
2
 0.004906 0.007378 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.982711 0.977317 
PP Prob.  0.0000  0.0005 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors.  With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-
statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. ***, 
**, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 8.2: Combined effects present-period regression results: Split sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Also, it should be noted that the decision to treat uncertainty as a present-period 
phenomenon might have led to spurious results regarding the present-period 
specification, due to the high possibility of multicollinearity among the regressors. 
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This is evident when considering that some coefficients in the present-period 
specifications reported values above unity. 
 
8.2.3. Hybrid model results 
 
The results for the hybrid model are reported in Table 8.3 below. The hybrid 
model performed well across both sub-samples. A few coefficients were bordering 
on the 10% significance level.  
 
The direct uncertainty coefficients remained significant throughout both sub-
samples. The coefficients suggest that the SARB lowered interest rates on average 
when more uncertain about the rate of inflation and the output gap. However, the 
SARB raised interest rates in response to higher degrees of uncertainty with 
respect to the exchange rate.   
 
With regard to indirect uncertainty, the inflation coefficient remained significant 
throughout. However, the output gap coefficient was significant only in the 
second sub-sample. Both situations suggest a more conservative approach when 
uncertainty increases. The exchange rate uncertainty coefficient was significant 
only in the first sub-sample. Surprisingly, this coefficient also suggested a more 
conservative approach.   
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9"x + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + 99x + 99x + 99 + 9 
Hybrid 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 0.515518              
(0.0000)*** 
-0.07284                   
(0.0002)*** 
y 0.725973               
(0.0000)*** 
0.707398               
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.33277             
(0.0001)*** 
-0.07638                     
(0.1012) 
 0.281506               
(0.0000)*** 
0.185598               
(0.0006)*** 
 -0.05918               
(0.1059) 
0.187357                
(0.0001)*** 
 -13.974                       
(0.0000)*** 
-0.59165                  
(0.0618)* 
∗  -0.010158                     
(0.0025)*** 
-0.0109                     
(0.0000)*** 
∗  -0.004899                  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00355                   
(0.0011)*** 
∗  0.046363                    
(0.0000)*** 
0.007651                 
(0.0006)*** 
 -0.06398                 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06702                 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.01007                   
(0.1218) 
-0.01481                    
(0.0006)*** 
 -1.72598                 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.05818              
(0.1442) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.944218 0.947082 
Σe
2
 0.006031 0.007241 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.98521 0.983808 
PP Prob.  0.0000  0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors.  With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-
statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. ***, 
**, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 8.3: Combined effects hybrid model regression results: Split sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
8.2.4. Forward-looking model results 
 
The results for the forward-looking model are reported in Table 8.4 below. Once 
again, a few coefficients entered insignificantly. 
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~9 = x + y~9"x + z9 + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + ∗ 9y + 99x + 99x + 99x + 9 
Forward-looking 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 0.584611          
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04263                 
(0.0426)** 
y 0.703265               
(0.0000)*** 
0.716685                  
(0.0000)*** 
z -16.548                
(0.0000)*** 
-0.56887                 
(0.1224) 
 0.348933                 
(0.0000)*** 
0.180742                
(0.0012)*** 
 -0.02935                        
(0.2123) 
0.187492              
(0.0000)*** 
 0.017797                         
(0.7894) 
0.141555                 
(0.0021)*** 
∗  0.014988                     
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0088                
(0.0000)*** 
∗  0.005392                    
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00312                   
(0.0000)*** 
∗  0.049083                   
(0.0000)*** 
0.008492               
(0.0001)*** 
 -0.05355                  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06712                  
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.00858                    
(0.0569)* 
-0.01848                
(0.0002)*** 
 -2.07145                  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03894                       
(0.3904) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.938173 0.947327 
Σe
2
 0.006684 0.007208 
J-Statistic  Prob. 0.987047 0.984602 
PP Prob.  0.0004  0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors.  With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-
statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. ***, 
**, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 8.4: Combined effects forward-looking regression results: Split sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
However, with the exception of the indirect exchange rate uncertainty coefficient 
in the second sub-sample, all the uncertainty-related coefficients remained 
significant. The indirect effects suggest conservatism throughout while the direct 
uncertainty results are more volatile and time-period specific.  
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8.3 Goodness-of-Fit 
 
Although the analysis above proved insightful insofar as it provided a detailed 
examination of each of the respective models, drawing general conclusions is 
tedious due to the large number of parameters estimated. For this reason, it might 
be beneficial to firstly summarise the general findings from above and subsequently 
identify the models with the best fit. To this end, the findings reported above are 
summarised by considering each variable in turn (see the combined results table in 
Appendix F). 
 
8.3.1. Findings summary 
 
Considering only the R-squared statistics, it would seem as if the present-period 
specification performed best across both sub-samples. However, it should be 
noted that the decision to treat uncertainty as a present-period phenomenon 
might have led to spurious results regarding the present-period specification, due 
to the high possibility of multicollinearity among the regressors when 
simultaneously included in the present period. This is evident when considering 
that some coefficients in the present-period specifications reported values above 
unity. This was also evident in certain other specifications, but these occurrences 
were more ad hoc. Thus, in analysing the results, the present-period specification 
findings were ignored when in obvious contrast to all other models.  
 
Once again, the interest rate smoothing coefficient proved extremely robust and 
remained significant throughout both sub-sample periods. However, the size of 
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the coefficient declined noticeably on average, particularly with regard to the first 
sub-sample, possibly hinting at neglected uncertainty effects being absorbed into 
smoothing type behaviour in traditional models. This is plausible when considering 
the similarities in central bank behaviour when smoothing interest rates and 
acting cautiously in response to uncertainty. A central bank smoothing interest 
rates would adjust the instrument gradually towards the desired level whilst a 
cautionary central bank would respond less aggressively when more uncertain.  
 
The exchange rate variables entered mostly significantly in the first sub-sample, 
whereas only the present-period and forward-looking coefficients were significant 
in the hybrid and forward-looking specifications respectively. The inflation 
coefficient entered significantly, with the exception of the backward-looking 
specification in the second sub-sample. The output gap variable also remained 
significant in most instances, except for the hybrid and forward-looking 
specifications in the first sub-sample.   
 
Considering indirect-uncertainty effects, the inflation and output gap coefficients 
were significant across samples and specifications, the only exception being the 
output gap indirect uncertainty coefficient in the hybrid specification of the first 
sub-sample, which entered slightly insignificantly. Interestingly, the exchange rate 
indirect uncertainty coefficient was significant for all specifications in the first 
sample, but for the most part entered insignificantly for the second sample. 
Excluding the present-period specification, the indirect inflation and output gap 
uncertainty coefficients predict cautionary responses. In other words, when 
responding to inflation and output gap fluctuations, the SARB seemed to be more 
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cautious and altered interest  rates by a lower margin when more uncertain about 
the specific variable. The results for the exchange rate indirect uncertainty effects 
are more volatile and dependent on period specification, but seemingly lean 
towards caution in the first sub-sample and a more aggressive response in the 
second sub-sample.  
 
The direct-uncertainty coefficients entered significantly in all instances. The direct 
inflation and output gap uncertainty effects seem to be dependent on the 
specification with regard to predicting lower or higher interest rates in the first 
sub-sample. However, in the second sub-sample, it seems that the SARB lowered 
interest rates when more uncertain about inflation or the output gap, irrespective 
of a response to fluctuations. By contrast, it would seem that when the central 
bank was more uncertain about the exchange rate, interest rates were pushed 
higher on average.   
 
8.3.2. Best fit models 
 
A first step to identify the model with the best fit amongst the different time 
period specifications involves graphing the fitted interest rate against the actual 
interest rate. This allows for visual examination of which time period specification 
most accurately approximated actual interest rates.   
 
Figure 8.1 graphs not only the fitted values obtained from the direct-uncertainty 
model above, but also includes the fitted values obtained from the base model 
excluding uncertainty (Model A from Chapter 7). This allows for simultaneously 
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investigating which model performed best in each case: the uncertainty model or 
the base model excluding uncertainty effects. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Actual vs fitted interest rates: 1992 – 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 8.1 suggests that both the base and uncertainty models seem to 
approximate actual interest rates accurately in general in relation to the first sub-
sample. However, closer examination suggests that the uncertainty model proved 
a better fit regardless of time period specification. Furthermore, when comparing 
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the different time period specifications, the present-period uncertainty 
specification appears to be the model with the best fit.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Actual vs fitted interest rates: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The results from Figure 8.2 again suggest that both models (base and uncertainty 
models) perform well in approximating actual interest rates. Also immediately 
apparent, is the fact that the uncertainty and base models seem to perform even 
better in the second sub-sample and both models exhibit less volatility around the 
actual interest rate trend. This characteristic complicates the task of identifying 
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which model or time period specification performed best. For this reason, 
attention is turned to the adjusted R-squared statistics from the different models 
and specifications. 
 
Figure 8.3 below reports the adjusted R-squared statistics for the different time 
period specifications in relation to the uncertainty model only, to establish which 
time period specification performed best. From the figure it is clear that the 
present-period specification performed best across both sub-samples. However, 
as noted above, the present-period specification suffered from severe 
multicollinearity which could have led to spurious results.   
 
Figure 8.3: Combined uncertainty adjusted R-squared statistics: Split sample 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Ignoring the present-period specification, the hybrid model performed best in 
relation to the first sub-sample (1990 – 1999) while the forward-looking model 
performed best in relation to the second sub-sample (2000 – 2011).  
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Additionally, it is important to confirm whether the inclusion of the direct 
uncertainty regressors improved the explanatory power of the uncertainty model 
in general.  
 
Thus, in other words, did the direct uncertainty regressors improve the 
explanatory power of the indirect-uncertainty model outlined in Chapter 6? Figure 
8.4 below compares the R-squared statistics of the indirect-uncertainty model 
derived in Chapter 6 with the model from this chapter which includes both 
indirect and direct uncertainty effects.  
 
 
Figure 8.4: Combined uncertainty adjusted R-squared statistics: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 8.4 suggests that the inclusion of the direct uncertainty effects improved the 
explanatory power of the model in all cases for the first sub-sample. Figure 8.5 
below considers the situation for the second sub-sample: 
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Figure 8.5: Combined uncertainty adjusted R-squared statistics: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Again, Figure 8.5 suggests that the inclusion of the direct uncertainty effects 
improved the explanatory power of the model in all cases for the second sub-
sample. 
 
8.4 Uncertainty Impact Estimates 
 
As suggested by Martin and Milas (2005), it is possible to gauge the impact of 
uncertainty on the interest rate through investigating the difference between the 
estimated model excluding uncertainty and the model including the uncertainty-
related regressors. In other words, the model excluding uncertainty serves as an 
approximation of what the interest rate would have been had uncertainty not 
been taken into account. By contrast, the model including the uncertainty-related 
regressors serves as an approximation of the level of the interest rate assuming 
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that uncertainty was indeed present and taken into account during the decision-
making process. The difference then signifies the impact of uncertainty. Positive 
values therefore reflect that interest rates were pushed higher as a consequence 
of the uncertainty effect. The opposite holds for negative values. 
 
For this purpose, the fitted values from the various regressions had to be re-
engineered to arrive at values comparable to the original interest rate dataset. 
This process involved removing the time trend and the constant used to make the 
original prime interest rate variable stationary. The logarithm operator was also 
reversed.  
 
Next, the difference was calculated between the fitted values of the baseline 
models, excluding uncertainty-related regressors, and the uncertainty models 
characterised by the inclusion of both direct and indirect uncertainty effects. This 
exercise was repeated for all the different period specifications across the two 
sub-samples.  
 
The results are examined below. 
 
8.4.1. First sub-sample: 1992 - 1999 
 
Figure 8.6 below graphs the impact of uncertainty for the first sub-sample period, 
measured as the difference between the uncertainty and base models. First, it is 
evident that the individual impact point estimates vary considerably over time. 
However, the hybrid and forward-looking specifications showed very similar point 
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estimates. This is due to the theoretical similarities between the two 
specifications, as they merely differ with regard to the exchange rate period 
specification.  
 
 
Figure 8.6: Difference between uncertainty and base models: 1992 - 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
However, a clear trend is evident from Figure 8.6, irrespective of the time period 
specification. This trend suggests that interest rates were on average pushed 
lower due to uncertainty up to the end of 1993. Nominal interest rates were also 
declining on average during this period. This reflects an uncertainty bias towards 
stimulating the economy during a time when GDP growth was especially poor due 
to trade and financial sanctions, political instability and poor economic policies 
aimed at reviving the economy but instead resulting in increased uncertainty and 
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lower investment (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008) . During this time, South Africa 
was also struggling with chronic high inflation, and an already high interest rate 
proved mainly unsuccessful in curbing this trend. The central bank’s uncertainty 
regarding the effectiveness of higher interest rates in addressing inflation and a 
bias towards stimulating growth could have been the main drivers behind the 
uncertainty impact during this period.  
 
Thereafter, interest rates were pushed higher on average due to uncertainty up 
until the end of 1997. During this short interval, growth improved dramatically 
from levels experienced pre-1994. The central bank raised interest rates on 
average during this period. However, the uncertainty impact suggests that interest 
rates were raised more so than what would have been the case in the absence of 
uncertainty. This could be the result of the central bank leaning towards further 
reducing inflation.    
 
A clear peak is evident in 1998, when uncertainty resulted in an interest rate 
significantly higher than what would have been the case in the absence of 
uncertainty. During this time the Asian crises was unfolding. Uncertainty might 
have prompted the central bank to raise interest rates more so to combat the 
effect of import inflation, seeing as the rand depreciated sharply during this 
period.  
 
Table 8.5 provides more detail on the matter above. The average uncertainty 
effect over the sample period ranged from 0.55 to 0.74 (in absolute terms) 
depending on the time period specification. The maximum impact point estimate 
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of 3.08 was reported by the forward-looking model while the minimum point 
estimate of -2.06 was reported by the present-period specification.  
 
Statistic Backward Present Hybrid Forward 
Average Effect 0.736871 0.593748 0.550586746 0.74086887 
Total Effect 22.84301 18.40619 17.06818911 22.96693498 
Maximum 2.785664 1.544183 2.246393148 3.085945664 
Max Date 1998Q3 1998Q3 1998Q3 1998Q3 
Minimum -1.59842 -2.06875 -1.8361854 -1.88122394 
Min Date 1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q1 1999Q1 
 
Table 8.5: Uncertainty effect statistics: 1992 – 1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
As is also evident from Figure 8.6 above, the effects of uncertainty were especially 
prominent in the latter half of 1998 and the first half of 1999.  
 
8.4.2. Second sub-sample: 2000 - 2011 
 
Figure 8.7 below replicates the situation above for the second sub-sample. 
Immediately evident is the fact that the uncertainty impact estimates are more 
volatile but considerably smaller on average. Again, it is evident that the individual 
impact point estimates are volatile over time. The hybrid and forward-looking 
models seem to be most similar as was the case above.  
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Figure 8.7: Difference between uncertainty and base models: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Unlike the previous sample period, no clear trends are visible. In other words, 
there are no continuous periods where interest rates were pushed higher or lower 
as a result of uncertainty as with the previous sample. However, the effects seem 
more pronounced and volatile around 2002, shortly after the September 11 event 
in the United States. The other notable peaks and troughs are evident around 
2008, during the advent of the global financial crisis. These peaks and troughs are 
in line with periods when the SARB experienced particularly high levels of 
uncertainty.   
 
As explained in Chapter 6, the SARB expressed particular uncertainty about the 
exchange rate towards the end of 2001 which had a significant impact on the 
inflation forecast fan chart (SARB 2001). Towards the end of 2002 this uncertainty 
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subsided slightly but remained significant
24
. The main risk probability scenario 
affecting the forecast at the time was the uncertainty associated with a volatile oil 
price due to rising tensions in Iraq. Unexpected changes in the exchange rate 
remained another contributing factor (SARB 2002).    
 
In 2008 the SARB highlighted the turmoil in international financial markets as the 
main factor contributing to increased uncertainty. More specifically, the main 
upside risk to the fan chart pertained to exchange rate uncertainty while the main 
downside risk pertained to uncertainty about the oil price (SARB, 2008). Also, the 
SARB’s fan chart published during 2009 reflected particular uncertainty with 
regards to the domestic growth outlook. More specifically, uncertainty about a 
deeper global slowdown and a considerable moderation in domestic growth 
induced a significant downward bias on the SARB’s inflation forecast (SARB, 2009).  
   
Table 8.6 confirms the observations from the figure above. The reported average 
uncertainty effect ranges from 0.21 to 0.31 (in absolute terms), dependent on the 
time period specification. This is considerably smaller than for the first sub-sample 
period, suggesting that uncertainty had a smaller impact under the inflation 
targeting regime.  
 
Besides the average effects, it is also evident that maximum (1.01) and minimum 
(-0.94) impact estimates are smaller than with the previous sample, again 
                                            
24
 This conclusion is reached through a crude analysis from the available fan chart graphs as no data is 
available in this regard.  
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suggesting that uncertainty played a smaller role under the inflation targeting 
regime.  
 
Statistic Backward Present Hybrid Forward 
Average Effect 0.31868 0.210635 0.219756 0.247187 
Total Effect 14.65927 9.68921 10.10878 11.37059 
Maximum 1.014197 0.564083 0.656357 0.536044 
Max Date 2002Q3 2004Q2 2008Q3 2002Q4 
Minimum -0.94795 -0.47088 -0.60931 -0.85672 
Min Date 2003Q4 2001Q4 2002Q2 2002Q2 
 
Table 8.6: Difference between Uncertainty and Base Models: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The fact that uncertainty had a smaller impact during the inflation targeting 
regime is noteworthy. However, the question of whether this is due to the nature 
of the inflation targeting regime or whether it simply represents a spurious 
relationship remains. In other words, is this finding due to coincidence, correlation 
or causality?  
 
A first step to address this question is to examine whether there exists evidence of 
causality between uncertainty and interest rate changes over the entire sample 
period as well as for each of the sub-samples respectively. The Granger Causality 
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test is a common technique used for this purpose and examines whether one time 
series is useful in determining another
25
.   
 
Sample Lags  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  
1992Q1 2010Q3 2 
 
UNCERTAINTY does not Granger Cause D(INTEREST) 2.5936 0.0819 
D(INTEREST) does not Granger Cause UNCERTAINTY 
 
0.1349 
 
0.8740 
 
1992Q1 1999Q4 1 
 
UNCERTAINTY does not Granger Cause D(INTEREST) 2.6707 0.1130 
D(INTEREST) does not Granger Cause UNCERTAINTY 
 
0.8114 
 
0.3751 
 
2000Q1 2010Q3 4 
 
UNCERTAINTY does not Granger Cause D(INTEREST) 2.3725 0.0717 
D(INTEREST) does not Granger Cause UNCERTAINTY 
 
1.4126 
 
0.2508 
 
 
Table 8.7: Granger Causality Tests 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 8.7 above reports the results from the Granger Causality tests. The results 
suggest that Granger causality is one-way from uncertainty to interest rate 
changes. This is evident as the null hypothesis that uncertainty does not Granger 
Cause interest rate changes can be rejected at the 15% significance level for all 
cases. The results provide strong evidence that the relationship between 
uncertainty and interest rate changes isn’t merely due to coincidence or 
correlation.  
 
A second step is to investigate whether this finding is consistent with the 
behaviour of the central bank during this time.  As explained in chapter 4, the 
inflation targeting framework entailed a commitment to inflation as the primary 
                                            
25
 For more information on the Granger Causality test, see Granger (1969).  
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monetary policy objective. The fact that the central bank has a single and clear 
primary objective might have contributed to lowering the impact of uncertainty. A 
central bank with multiple equally important objectives would assign the same 
weight to the associated uncertainty around each of these objectives when 
making policy decisions. In contrast, a central bank with a single primary objective 
would assign smaller uncertainty weights to secondary goals.   
 
Another characteristic associated with inflation targeting is improved 
transparency. Communicating all the relevant risks and uncertainties with the 
public could assist with influencing market expectations and subsequently actual 
behaviour in the face of uncertainty, in so doing reducing the need for the central 
bank to take more drastic actions.  
 
Finally, the adoption of the inflation targeting framework also coincided with a 
more formal approach to dealing with and communicating uncertainty. This 
technique is the so-called fan chart methodology. This approach signals that the 
central bank formally recognised the uncertainties present at the time and took 
these into account when making policy decisions.  
 
This might have resulted in uncertainty estimates not being overestimated, 
unclear or exaggerated. However, formal empirical tests are necessary before a 
final conclusion in this case. Without published data from the SARB this is not 
possible.  
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8.5 Aggression or Conservatism 
 
The previous section considered how interest rates differed due to uncertainty 
compared to the case where uncertainty was not taken into account. However, 
the analysis from the previous section does not allow for scrutinizing whether the 
SARB acted more aggressively or conservatively due to uncertainty. The reason for 
this is that the previous section considered cumulative effects. To establish 
whether the SARB acted conservatively or aggressively, we need to consider 
whether the change in the interest rate from one quarter to the next differed 
when uncertainty was taken into account. To make this distinction clear, it is 
useful to refer to Figure 8.8 below.  
 
The previous section examined the impact of uncertainty at any given point in 
time, defined as the difference between the fitted base and uncertainty interest 
rates. For example, consider the backward-looking specification from 1992Q2 to 
1993Q2. During this period, the base interest rate (no uncertainty) is continuously 
higher than the fitted interest rate, assuming that uncertainty was present. This 
suggests that interest rates were lower due to uncertainty over this period. 
 
However, it is impossible to draw any conclusion with regard to whether the SARB 
acted conservatively or aggressively. To make this clear, consider the quarter from 
1992Q2 to 1992Q3. In this quarter, both the base and uncertainty interest rates 
decreased. However, the uncertainty interest rate decreased comparatively less. 
In other words, even though the uncertainty interest rate remained below the 
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base interest rate, it decreased by a smaller margin. This situation would reflect 
conservative behaviour.  
 
In other words, wherever the fitted uncertainty interest rate line moves closer to 
the fitted base interest rate line reflects conservative behaviour. This is because 
uncertainty resulted in the SARB reducing or increasing the interest rate by a 
smaller margin than what would have been the case if uncertainty had not been 
taken into account. The converse would suggest aggression.  
 
 
Figure 8.8: Fitted base and uncertainty interest rates: 1990-1999 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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The same principle applies to Figure 8.9 below, which considers the second sub-
sample from 2000Q1 to 2011Q3: 
 
 
Figure 8.9: Fitted base and uncertainty interest rates: 2000-2011 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
However, analysing the figures above to establish conservatism or aggression is 
tedious. Rather, to formalise the analysis, we need to turn to the data in this 
regard. Firstly, the difference from one quarter to the next was calculated for the 
fitted base interest rate as well as for the fitted uncertainty interest rate. The 
difference between these values would thus indicate conservatism or aggression. 
The only exception would be when the two interest rate time series did not move 
in the same direction for a specific quarter. These cases were assumed to reflect 
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conservatism. For example, the fitted base rate might increase from one quarter 
to the next, whereas the fitted uncertainty rate might decrease. This thesis argues 
that this reflects conservatism, as uncertainty prompted the central bank not to 
chase its target more aggressively, but rather to act distinctly differently from 
what would have been the case in the absence of uncertainty.  
  
The following hypothetical depiction aims to further explain the methodology 
described above. The figure below considers a once-off quarterly change in the 
nominal interest rate:  
 
 
Figure 8.10: Methodology to establish conservatism or aggression 
Source: Author 
 
Applying this methodology to the first sub-sample period resulted in Figure 8.11 
below, where negative values reflect conservatism and positive values reflect 
aggression. The results suggest that the SARB’s behaviour was volatile from one 
quarter to the next in this regard. However, it is clear that the SARB was 
conservative more often than aggressive.  
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Figure 8.11: SARB behaviour due to uncertainty: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author 
 
Table 8.8 below is more informative in this regard. Regardless of the time period 
specification, the SARB was conservative on more occasions than aggressive. Also, 
the average effect also suggests conservatism.  
 
 
Backward-looking Present Period Hybrid model Forward-looking 
Aggressive Acts 9 7 9 9 
Conservative Acts 21 23 21 21 
Average Effect -0.46077 -0.54807 -0.36818 -0.69003 
Table 8.8: SARB behaviour due to uncertainty: 1990 - 1999 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 8.12 replicates the situation above for the second sub-sample period.  
Immediately apparent is that the effect of uncertainty is considerably smaller on 
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average. Also, the number of times the SARB was more conservative or aggressive 
is considerably closer than for the previous sample.   
 
 
Figure 8.12: SARB behaviour due to uncertainty: 2000 - 2011 
Source: Author 
 
Table 8.9 below once again suggests that, with the exception of the hybrid model, 
the SARB was conservative on more occasions than aggressive. Also, the average 
effect also suggests conservatism in all time period cases. 
 
 
Backward-looking Present Period Hybrid model Forward-looking 
Aggressive Acts 17 17 25 21 
Conservative Acts 28 28 20 24 
Average Effect -0.13601 -0.05449 -0.05203 -0.06852 
Table 8.9: SARB behaviour due to uncertainty: 2000-2011 
Source: Author 
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8.6 Concluding Remarks 
  
The theoretical model used in the previous chapter assumes that uncertainty only 
influences monetary policy indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to 
inflation, output gap and exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty 
plays a role only when the central bank responds to fluctuations in target 
variables. This chapter aimed to build on these findings by considering whether 
direct uncertainty effects also played a role with regard to the SARB’s decision-
making.  The model from Chapter 7 was altered by adding direct uncertainty 
regressors. Besides this change, the same methodology as in the previous chapter 
was employed to solve the model.  
 
The direct uncertainty effects proved significant in all instances, suggesting that 
the SARB responded to uncertainty about target variables irrespective of 
responding to fluctuations in those variables. The direct inflation and output gap 
uncertainty effects uniformly predict that the SARB lowered interest rates on 
average when more uncertain about inflation or the output gap during the 
inflation targeting regime. The results in this regard were inconclusive for the 
period prior to the advent of inflation targeting. By contrast, for both sample 
periods, it would seem that when the central bank was more uncertain about the 
exchange rate, interest rates were pushed higher on average.   
 
The next step involved examining how well the combined uncertainty model 
approximates actual interest rates. This was achieved by graphing the fitted 
interest rates against the actual interest rates. Considering not only the 
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uncertainty model, but the base model as well, suggested that both models 
provided fairly accurate approximations of the actual interest rate.  However, 
graphical examination suggested that the combined uncertainty model proved a 
better fit. This finding was substantiated when investigating the adjusted R-
squared statistics, suggesting that the addition of the direct uncertainty regressors 
improved the explanatory power of the model. Also, ignoring the present-period 
specification due to the high level of multicollinearity present within the model, 
the hybrid model performed best in relation to the first sub-sample (1990 – 1999) 
whilst the forward-looking model performed best in relation to the second sub-
sample (2000 – 2011).  
 
The next step involved estimating the impact of uncertainty. As suggested by 
Martin and Milas (2005), it is possible to gauge the impact of uncertainty on the 
interest rate through investigating the difference between the estimated model 
excluding uncertainty and the model including the uncertainty-related regressors. 
For this purpose, the fitted values from the various regressions had to be re-
engineered to arrive at values comparable to the original interest rate dataset. 
This process involved removing the time trend and the constant used to make the 
original prime interest rate variable stationary. The logarithm operator was also 
reversed. The difference was calculated between the fitted values of the baseline 
models, excluding uncertainty-related regressors, and the uncertainty models 
characterised by the inclusion of both direct and indirect uncertainty effects. This 
exercise was repeated for all the different period specifications across the two 
sub-samples.  
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With regard to the first sub-sample (1992 – 1999), a clear trend was evident 
irrespective of the time period specification. This trend suggests that interest rates 
were on average pushed lower due to uncertainty up to around 1994. Thereafter, 
interest rates were pushed higher on average due to uncertainty up until the end 
of 1997. Thereafter, with the exception of a clear peak in Quarter 3 of 1998, 
interest rates were again pushed lower on average as a result of uncertainty. The 
average uncertainty effect over the sample period ranged from 0.55 to 0.74 
depending on the time period specification. The maximum impact point estimate 
of 3.08 was reported by the forward-looking model whilst the minimum point 
estimate of -2.06 was reported by the present-period specification.  
 
The results from the second sub-sample (2000 – 2011) suggested that although 
the individual point estimates were more volatile, the average effect was 
considerably smaller. The reported average uncertainty effect ranged from 0.21 to 
0.31, dependent on the time period specification. This is considerably smaller than 
for the first sub-sample period, suggesting that uncertainty had a smaller impact 
under the inflation targeting regime. Besides the average effects, it was also 
evident that the maximum (1.01) and minimum (-0.94) impact estimates were also 
smaller than with the previous sample, again suggesting that uncertainty played a 
smaller role under the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The final step involved investigating whether the SARB was more conservative or 
aggressive when the direct uncertainty effects were included. The results 
suggested that regardless of the sub-sample or time period specification, the SARB 
was conservative on more occasions compared to being aggressive. The only 
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exception to this was the hybrid model specification for the second sub-sample. 
However, here it is important to note that the forward looking model proved the 
best fit. Also, the average effect across both sub-sample periods also suggested 
conservatism. 
 
In conclusion, the main findings from this chapter are summarised as follows: 
 
 The inclusion of direct uncertainty regressors improved the fit of the 
uncertainty model.  
 
 The results suggest that the SARB responded to uncertainty directly, 
irrespective of incorporating uncertainty through the response to target 
variable fluctuations. The SARB lowered interest rates on average when 
more uncertain about inflation or the output gap during the inflation 
targeting regime, thus preferring to stimulate the economy. By contrast, the 
SARB raised interest rates on average when more uncertain about the 
exchange rate. (For the first sub-sample, the direct uncertainty effects seem 
to be dependent on the model specification with regard to predicting lower 
or higher interest rates.) 
 
 The average uncertainty effect from 1992 to 1999 ranged from 0.55 to 0.74 
depending on the time period specification. The effects of uncertainty were 
especially prominent in the latter half of 1998 and the first half of 1999, 
shortly before the advent of the formal inflation targeting regime. The 
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reported average uncertainty effect ranged from 0.21 to 0.31 for the period 
from 2000 to 2011.  
 
 The results suggested that regardless of the sub-sample or time period 
specification, the SARB was conservative on more occasions compared to 
being aggressive. Also, the average effect across both sub-sample periods 
also suggested conservatism. 
 
 The results suggest that the implementation of a formal inflation targeting 
regime changed the SARB’s behaviour with regard to responses to 
uncertainty in that uncertainty had a smaller average impact and effect over 
the period corresponding to the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The fact that uncertainty had a smaller impact during the inflation targeting 
regime is noteworthy. However, the question of whether this was due to the 
nature of the inflation targeting regime or whether it simply represented a 
spurious relationship remained. Results from Granger causality tests provide 
strong evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and interest rate 
changes was not merely due to coincidence or correlation, irrespective of the 
time period. Furthermore, the inflation targeting framework entailed a 
commitment to inflation as the primary monetary policy objective. The fact 
that the central bank has a single and clear primary objective might have 
contributed to lowering the impact of uncertainty. A central bank with a 
single primary objective would assign smaller uncertainty weights to 
secondary goals.   
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Another characteristic associated with inflation targeting is the improved 
transparency. Communicating all the relevant risks and uncertainties with 
the public could assist with influencing market expectations and 
subsequently actual behaviour in the face of uncertainty, in so doing 
reducing the need for the central bank to take more drastic actions.  
 
Finally, the adoption of the inflation targeting framework also coincided with 
a more formal approach to dealing with and communicating uncertainty. 
This technique is the so-called fan chart methodology. This might have 
resulted in uncertainty estimates not being overestimated, unclear or 
exaggerated. However, formal empirical tests are necessary before a final 
conclusion in this case. Without published data from the SARB this is not 
possible.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In recent years a consensus has emerged that price and output stability are the 
fundamental goals of any monetary policy regime. Even more recently however, 
central bank focus on financial stability as a secondary monetary policy objective 
has gained credence mainly due to the effects of the financial recession which 
started in 2008
26
. To attain these goals, monetary authorities use policy 
instruments to drive the economy towards a desired state. However, prior to any 
policy decisions being made, the monetary authorities need to understand the 
state of the economy.  To determine both the current state as well as the effects 
of various interventions, policymakers use different kinds of econometric models 
and estimation techniques.  
 
Even though advances in economic theory and modelling have in some cases 
furthered our understanding of how the economy works, the system as a whole 
                                            
26
 Financial stability was not considered as a monetary policy objective during the empirical investigation in 
this thesis. The reason for this is that financial stability as a monetary policy goal only really gained popularity 
after 2008. Hence, the sample would have been too small to derive any meaningful results.  
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has become more complex. If policymakers had perfect knowledge about the 
actual state of the economy, the various transmission mechanisms as well as the 
true underlying model, monetary intervention would be greatly simplified. 
However, in reality the monetary authorities have to contend with considerable 
uncertainty in relation to the above-mentioned factors. 
 
Notwithstanding the influential work of Brainard (1967), uncertainty has mostly 
been neglected in both the theoretical and empirical literature focusing on 
monetary policy analysis. Recent years have witnessed a change in this trend as a 
number of academics and practitioners have acknowledged the effects of 
uncertainty in modelling and policy analysis.   
 
Significant progress has been made in theoretical models of uncertainty and the 
impact thereof within the monetary policy landscape (Estrella and Mishkin 1998, 
Svensson 1997, Sack 1998a, Soderstrom 1999, Wieland 2002and Moessner 2005). 
The theoretical literature primarily focuses on what constitutes optimal central 
bank behaviour when faced with different types and degrees of uncertainty.  
 
However, much less work has been done on the empirical counterpart to this 
topic. Moreover, the empirical literature is primarily concerned with a handful of 
industrial country investigations (Martin and Salmon 1999, Martin and Milas 2005, 
Shuetrim and Thompson 1999 and Chung 2005). The literature has largely ignored 
the effects of uncertainty on monetary policy in developing countries.  
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This thesis contributes to the empirical literature by studying the effects of 
uncertainty on monetary policy in the developing country case of South Africa. In 
simplest terms, the thesis sought to establish whether or not the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) has responded optimally to uncertainty as suggested by 
theoretical models thereof.  Answers were thus sought to the following questions: 
 
• Does the evidence suggest that the SARB took uncertainty into account 
when designing policy? 
• If so, did the SARB’s actions reflect optimal behaviour as proposed by 
theory? 
• If the results are mixed in relation to the question above, what specifically 
may have led to this outcome? 
 
However, before attempting to answer these questions it was necessary to obtain 
a clear understanding of the concept of uncertainty. 
 
9.1 Defining Uncertainty 
 
The three main sources of uncertainty pertaining specifically to monetary policy 
are data, model and parameter uncertainty. Here, uncertainty is defined to be 
distinctly different from the phenomenon of risk in the sense that the probabilities 
of the different outcomes cannot be measured accurately.  
 
Data uncertainty refers to the presence of imperfect data. This is brought about by 
mistakes made in data capturing and measurement. Although the former can in 
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principle be avoided, measurement errors are far more common and difficult to 
quantify. Measurement inefficiencies refer to the difficulty in obtaining all the 
relevant information to measure a specific economic variable. To compensate for 
this lack of information, various estimates are used. Additionally, theory often 
relies on abstract variables which are not observable. These “unobservable” 
variables are thus approximated by estimates of observable variables.   
 
Model uncertainty refers to imperfect knowledge about the true economic model. 
In other words, there may be considerable uncertainty about which variables are 
exogenous and how they influence the endogenous variables included in the 
model. Although theory provides a guide as to how specific economic variables 
influence others, the situation in practice is  more complex as, for example, when 
two or more variables have feedback effects on each other.  
 
Distinct from data and model uncertainty is parameter uncertainty. This is 
determined by the inaccuracy of the parameters within the models being used. 
When constructing models aiming to approximate the economic environment, 
parameters serve as estimates of the relationship between different variables 
within the model. As mentioned earlier, even though practitioners have 
sophisticated statistical techniques at their disposal to estimate the model 
parameters, there is still significant uncertainty regarding their accuracy. 
 
 Although very specific and distinct, these narrowly defined sources of uncertainty 
are not mutually exclusive. Data uncertainty contributes directly towards both 
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model and parameter uncertainty. Also, model uncertainty directly influences 
parameter uncertainty.  
 
Moreover, a far more general type of uncertainty confronts policymakers on a 
continual basis. General uncertainty in this sense refers to imperfect knowledge 
about the actual past, current and future states of the economy. Although closely 
related to imperfect data, uncertainty about the state of the economy is more 
concerned with imperfect knowledge regarding the actions of economic agents 
and the ultimate effect thereof in the future. Thus, uncertainty about the state of 
the economy represents a summation of the three narrow definitions of 
uncertainty. 
 
The next step involved investigating how optimal central banks act when 
confronted with significant uncertainty. Determining the theoretically optimal 
response to uncertainty was necessary before it could be established how such 
uncertainty influenced the actions of the SARB and whether or not those actions 
reflected optimal behaviour. 
 
9.2 Optimal Behaviour in Theory 
 
The theoretical review distinguished between parameter, model and data 
uncertainty.  For parameter uncertainty, theory suggests a more conservative 
approach to policymaking when significant uncertainty is present (Brainard 1967, 
Estrella and Mishkin 1998, Svensson 1997 and Sack 1998a). However, certain 
exceptions apply which could cause the monetary authority to act more 
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aggressively. The main exception to the conservatism principle proposed by 
Brainard (1967) originates in the presence of considerable inflation persistence 
(Soderstrom 1999, Kimuraand Kurozumi 2003 and Moessner 2005). If inflation 
persists, optimising central banks might have to respond more aggressively. 
However, even in these cases, there is evidence that optimal policy requires a 
balance between aggressive and conservative approaches, with the conservative 
side dominating in most instances (Wieland, 2002). 
 
Next, the focus turned to the theoretical implications of model uncertainty. These 
investigations are typically very complex. Most of the findings are dependent on 
both the choice of methodology as well as the associated assumptions. This makes 
it difficult to draw any general conclusions from the literature. With regard to the 
methodologies used, most investigations use either a Bayesian approach or a 
“worst-case” method. The Bayesian approach typically aims to solve decision rules 
given a set of prior conditions related to the parameters in different models. Put 
differently, the approach aims to derive a “robust rule” which achieves the lowest 
average loss, derived from the loss or objective function, from all the different 
model classifications included in the study. By contrast, the “worst-case” approach 
aims to derive a rule which minimises the loss only in the worst-case model.  
 
The findings from the literature are mostly inconclusive. Using a combination of 
the “worst-case” and “robust-control” methods, Cateau (2005) found that policy 
became more conservative in the face of increased uncertainty. By contrast, using 
the “robust-control” method, Onatski and Stock reported findings suggesting a 
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more aggressive central bank response when confronted with increased 
uncertainty about the model. 
 
Theories on data uncertainty emphasise that real time data are inherently less 
accurate than subsequently revised releases. This is mainly due to the great extent 
to which real time data are estimated, rather than directly measured. With 
subsequent data releases, a smaller component of the data is estimated, thus 
decreasing the uncertainty associated therewith. The findings suggest that central 
banks would act differently given access to the more accurate revised data at the 
time when the decisions were being taken (Ghysels, Swanson and Callan, 1999) 
and that monetary authorities are better off assuming that the difference in 
accuracy between recent and revised data is greater rather than smaller, and thus 
act more conservatively (Jääskelä and Yates, 2005). 
 
To summarise, the conservative approach to uncertainty dominates most of the 
literature. In other words, the majority of theoretical findings suggest that central 
banks should act more conservatively and adjust policy interest rates less when 
faced with greater levels of uncertainty.  
 
However, do central banks adhere to the conservatism principle in practice? In 
reality the dynamics of uncertainty and the central bank’s responses to the varying 
conditions of uncertainty may be very different in practice from what is suggested 
by theory.  
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9.3 Monetary Policy and Uncertainty in Practice 
 
Compared to the theoretical work on this subject, relatively little empirical 
research has been done.  Thus, the empirical review considered specific papers 
from the literature in some detail with specific focus on data, methodology and 
findings. The following articles were investigated: 
 
• Martin and Salmon (1999) 
• Martin and Milas (2005) 
• Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) 
• Chung (2005) 
 
Martin and Salmon (1999) consider the relevance of uncertainty for monetary 
policy in the United Kingdom from 1980 to 1997. The authors try to establish 
whether the UK case provides empirical evidence to support the Brainard 
conservatism principle. Using a Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) approach, the results 
indicate that optimal interest rates assuming uncertainty tended to be smoother 
than optimal rules without uncertainty. Thus, the results support Brainard 
conservatism.  
 
Martin and Milas (2005) followed a more generalised approach to investigating 
the effects of uncertainty on the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States. Their 
model includes a Taylor-type rule where the weights on inflation and the output 
gap are not constant but rather functions of inflation and output gap uncertainty 
respectively. Uncertainty is induced through the weights on inflation and the 
output gap and approximated by their variances derived through General 
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Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasiticity (GARCH) models of inflation and 
the output gap. Once again, the results suggest conservatism on the part of the 
Fed in responding to greater levels of uncertainty.  
 
Shuetrim and Thompson (1999) studied the discretionary policy case of Australia. 
They used an economic model constructed by the Australian central bank and 
optimal rules are solved using a frequency-sampling technique. Surprisingly, the 
findings reflect that policymakers might be more aggressive when the degree of 
uncertainty is higher. Shuetrim and Thompson find that for shocks to output, 
import prices, inflation and labour costs, the responses taking account of 
parameter uncertainty are more aggressive. Only in the case of real exchange rate 
shocks did the central bank response reflect conservatism when taking uncertainty 
into account. The results, in contrast to Brainard conservatism, are explained as 
being a consequence of the persistence of shocks and the ineffectiveness of 
policy.  
 
Finally, Chung (2005) investigates how changes in inflation and output uncertainty 
affect the Federal Reserve’s interest rate response. Chung uses a generalised Auto 
Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Structural Vector Auto Regression 
(GARCH-SVAR) approach to study the effects of uncertainty on the central bank’s 
interest rate responses. The results reported by Chung are mixed. First, the results 
indicate that the Federal Reserve responded less aggressively when confronted by 
a positive shock in order to dampen the economic expansion. By contrast, the 
Federal Reserve acted more aggressively after a negative shock, thereby 
stimulating the economy to prevent a substantial downturn. Thus Chung’s study 
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suggests that the Fed is biased towards stimulating growth rather than containing 
inflation in the face of uncertainty. 
 
Thus, although the empirical findings favour conservatism, there is some evidence 
to suggest that this is not always the case.  The results suggest that central banks 
do not always act optimally when faced with uncertainty. Furthermore, the 
limited number of industrial country cases examined prevents any generalised 
view from emerging. If anything, the findings suggest that central bank behaviour 
differs across countries. 
 
The remainder of this thesis was dedicated to contributing to the above literature 
through investigating the case of the SARB. In this sense, the thesis represents a 
first attempt at investigating the case of a developing country in an open economy 
setting. Ultimately, the aim was to establish whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the notion that uncertainty played a role in the SARB’s policy decisions 
and whether those actions reflect conservatism.  
 
9.4 The Open Economy Uncertainty-Adjusted Model 
 
The theoretical model resembles a structural rule-based approach. The optimal 
interest rate rule was derived given a set of structural equations obtained from 
Ball (1998). The base model rule suggests that the interest rate is changed in 
response to deviations in a lagged interest rate term, inflation, the output gap and 
current and lagged exchange rate variables.  
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B =  + B" + J + p + qf + sf" + &   
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where  =  1 − ∅ 
   =   
  J =  1 − ∅ 
  p =  1 − ∅J 
  q =  1 − ∅p 
  s =  1 − ∅q 
 
However, the base model is unsuitable for an investigation into the effect of 
uncertainty on monetary policy, due to the implicit assumption that interest rate 
adjustments to inflation, output and exchange rate fluctuations are constant over 
time. This is due to the assumption that the parameter values are constant over 
time.  
 
To address this problem in a closed economy setting, Martin and Milas (2005) 
defined the weights on inflation and the output gap as functions of uncertainty. 
Following a similar approach, the base model was altered to allow the coefficients 
in the open economy model to change over time.  
 
To incorporate uncertainty, it is assumed that the coefficients are dependent on 
the variances of the endogenous variables, namely inflation, the output gap and 
the exchange rate. The uncertainty adjusted model allows us to investigate 
whether monetary policy is more or less aggressive when uncertainty about the 
relevant independent variable increases. 
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B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &   
(Author’s calculations) 
 
where  =   +  CC + tt +   
   C =  C +  CCC + Ctt +  C  
     t =  t + tCC +  ttt +  t  
 
and , C, t are measures of output, inflation and exchange rate uncertainty 
respectively.  
 
However, prior to applying the derived model to the SARB case, it was necessary 
to empirically derive uncertainty estimates. 
 
9.5 Approximating Uncertainty for the South African Economy 
 
The next step towards achieving the thesis objective involved deriving estimates 
for uncertainty pertaining to the South African economy. This entailed obtaining 
estimates of inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty.  
 
Inflation, output gap and exchange rate uncertainty estimates were derived 
through GARCH model specifications related to the structural equations as defined 
in the theoretical model. The aim of estimating uncertainty through GARCH-type 
models is to capture the volatility of the remaining unexplained residuals after 
controlling for the explainable effects of the regressors. In this sense, GARCH 
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models remove variations in the data which are explainable. Thus all that remains 
is the unexplainable portion which may be regarded as a proxy for uncertainty.  
 
To derive each of the regressor variances, the structural equations were used as 
points of reference. In other words, the structural equations aim to approximate 
what monetary agents know about the dynamics of the economy.  The residual 
variance series from the GARCH model would thus represent the uncertainty 
associated with each specific variable.  
 
The resulting uncertainty estimates all seemed plausible. As expected, the results 
indicated that on average the inflation variable exhibits the least amount of 
uncertainty. Inflation seemed to be most uncertain between 1999 and 2003, 
during the period of the implementation of the inflation targeting monetary policy 
regime. Thereafter, inflation uncertainty decreased up to 2009. The subsequent 
increase thereafter corresponds to the effects of the global economic recession 
which effectively started spilling over to South Africa during the latter half of 2008.  
 
Output gap uncertainty was high from 1992 to 1994, the period prior to the 
advent of democracy in 1994 during which South Africa experienced particularly 
slow growth (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008).  Output gap uncertainty was again 
particularly high from 2009 to 2010, once again due to the shock of the economic 
recession on GDP growth.  
 
Exchange rate uncertainty seems high on average compared to the other 
variables, with the peak corresponding to the drastic depreciation of the currency 
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in 2001 following the events of September, 11 and the speculative attack on the 
rand in December of that year 
 
What remained was to substitute the empirical uncertainty estimates into the 
uncertainty-adjusted model as defined in the theoretical model.  Solving this 
model and obtaining the structural parameters would allow for investigating the 
SARB’s preference towards either conservatism or aggression.  
 
9.6 The Effects of Uncertainty on the SARB 
 
The final step in the investigation was essentially focused on solving the derived 
theoretical model to ascertain whether the SARB took uncertainty into account and 
if so, whether the SARB’s actions reflect optimal behaviour as stipulated by theory. 
The investigation considered the effects of both indirect and direct uncertainty. 
Both cases are described below: 
 
9.6.1. Indirect uncertainty effects  
 
The theoretical model assumed that uncertainty only influences monetary policy 
indirectly through affecting interest rate responses to inflation, output gap and 
exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, uncertainty plays a role only when the 
central bank responds to fluctuations in target variables. This model was thus 
referred to as the indirect uncertainty model. Indirect uncertainty effects are 
clarified below: 
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• Indirect uncertainty effects: The effect of uncertainty when responding to a 
fluctuation in a target variable. Thus, uncertainty influences only the 
response to a fluctuation in the target variable. For example, the central 
bank raises the interest rate following an increase in expected inflation 
which is considered likely to be sustained and thus reflected in actual future 
inflation. However, the central bank raises the interest rate by a smaller 
margin due to uncertainty about the rate of inflation. In the absence of 
uncertainty, the central bank would still have changed the interest rate, but 
the magnitude of the change would have been different. For this reason, 
uncertainty enters the regression equation through the coefficient of the 
specific independent variable. 
 
To solve the indirect uncertainty model, various period specifications were 
considered in conjunction with differing uncertainty-related scenarios, ensuring 
the robustness of the results. It is also important to control for long and variable 
lags with regards to the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. This is partly 
addressed by the different period specifications highlighted above. Furthermore, 
lag structures were allowed to deviate from the theoretical specifications during 
the empirical exercise. The presence of a sample break around 1999 necessitated 
the sample being split into two smaller sub-samples corresponding to 1990 – 1999 
and 2000 – 2011. 
 
The results indicated that the SARB responded less aggressively to inflation and 
output gap indirect uncertainty across both sample periods, suggesting that it acts 
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similarly to industrial country central bank counterparts in following the Brainard 
(1967) conservatism principle.  
 
In other words, when responding to inflation and output gap fluctuations, the SARB 
seemed to be more cautious and altered interest rates by a lower margin when 
more uncertain about either of these variables.  
  
However, exchange rate uncertainty seemed to play a role only in the period prior 
to the advent of inflation targeting, seeing as the variable entered significantly only 
with regard to the backward-looking specification in the period characterised by 
formal inflation targeting, compared to being significant throughout in the former 
sample. Whether the SARB’s actions reflected caution or aggression in this regard 
was difficult to establish, mainly due to the results being volatile and dependent on 
period specification.  
 
9.6.2. Direct uncertainty effects 
 
Besides indirect uncertainty, the SARB’s decision-making might also have been 
influenced by direct uncertainty effects.  The original model was altered by adding 
direct uncertainty regressors. Direct uncertainty effects are clarified below: 
 
• Direct uncertainty effects: The effect of uncertainty regardless of responding 
to a fluctuation in the target variable. This case is distinctly different as the 
central bank is not responding to a fluctuation in a target variable. Rather, 
the central bank changes the policy instrument based solely on uncertainty 
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about a particular target variable. For example, even if the inflation rate is 
stable, the central bank raises the interest rate due to uncertainty about 
whether the status quo would be maintained going forward. In the absence 
of uncertainty, the central bank would not have changed the interest rate, all 
else held constant. For this reason, uncertainty enters the regression 
equation directly and captures the effect of a change in uncertainty about 
the target variable.  
 
Surprisingly, the direct uncertainty effects proved significant in all instances, 
suggesting that the SARB responded to uncertainty about target variables 
irrespective of responding to fluctuations in those variables. The direct inflation 
and output gap uncertainty effects uniformly predict that the SARB lowered 
interest rates on average when more uncertain about inflation or the output gap 
during the inflation targeting regime. The results in this regard were inconclusive 
for the period prior to the advent of inflation targeting. By contrast, for both 
sample periods it would seem that when the SARB was more uncertain about the 
exchange rate, it generally responded more aggressively by pushing interest rates 
higher. 
 
The next step involved examining how well the uncertainty model approximates 
actual interest rates. This was done by comparing the fitted interest rates against 
the actual interest rates. Both the base and uncertainty modified models provided 
fairly accurate predictions of the actual interest rate.  However, the uncertainty 
model proved a better fit to the available data. This finding was substantiated 
when investigating the adjusted R-squared statistics, suggesting that the addition 
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of the direct uncertainty regressors improved the explanatory power of the 
model.  
 
The next step involved estimating the impact of uncertainty. As suggested by 
Martin and Milas (2005), it is possible to gauge the impact of uncertainty on 
central banks’ interest rate responses by measuring the difference between the 
estimated model excluding uncertainty and the model including the uncertainty-
related regressors. For this purpose, the fitted values from the various regressions 
had to be re-engineered to arrive at values comparable to the original interest 
rate dataset. This process involved removing the time trend and the constant used 
to make the original interest rate variable stationary. The logarithm operator was 
also reversed. The difference was calculated between the fitted values of the 
baseline models, excluding uncertainty-related regressors, and the uncertainty 
models characterised by the inclusion of both direct and indirect uncertainty 
effects. This exercise was repeated for all the different period specifications across 
the two sub-samples.  
 
With regard to the first sub-sample (1992 – 1999), a clear trend was evident 
irrespective of the time period specification (the backward-looking, present-
period, hybrid or forward-looking models). This trend suggests that interest rates 
were on average pushed lower due to uncertainty up to the end of 1993. Nominal 
interest rates were also declining on average during this period. This reflects an 
uncertainty bias towards stimulating the economy during a time when GDP 
growth was especially poor due to sanctions being imposed on South Africa. 
During this time, South Africa was also struggling with chronic high inflation, and 
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an already high interest rate proved mainly unsuccessful in curbing this trend. The 
central bank’s uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of higher interest rates in 
addressing inflation and a bias towards stimulating growth could have been the 
main drivers behind the uncertainty impact during this period.  
 
Thereafter, interest rates were pushed higher on average due to uncertainty up 
until the end of 1997. During this short interval, growth improved dramatically 
from levels experienced pre-1994. The central bank raised interest rates on 
average during this period. However, the uncertainty impact suggests that interest 
rates were raised more than what would have been the case in the absence of 
uncertainty. This could be the result of the central leaning towards further 
reducing inflation.    
 
A clear peak is evident in 1998, when uncertainty resulted in an interest rate 
significantly higher than what would have been the case in the absence of 
uncertainty. During this time the Asian crisis was unfolding. Uncertainty might 
have prompted the central bank to raise interest rates more to combat the effect 
of import inflation, seeing as the rand depreciated sharply during this period.  
 
The average uncertainty effect over the sample period ranged from 0.55 to 0.74 
(absolute terms) depending on the time period specification. The maximum 
impact point estimate of 3.08 was reported by the forward-looking model whilst 
the minimum point estimate of -2.06 was reported by the present-period 
specification.  
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The results from the second sub-sample (2000 – 2011) suggested that although 
the individual point estimates were more volatile, the average effect was 
considerably smaller. Unlike the previous sample period, no clear trends were 
visible. In other words, there were no continuous periods where interest rates 
were pushed higher or lower as a result of uncertainty as with the previous 
sample. However, the effects seem more pronounced and volatile around 2002, 
shortly after the September 11 event in the United States. The other notable 
peaks and troughs are evident around 2008, during the advent of the global 
financial crisis.    
 
The reported average uncertainty effect ranged from 0.21 to 0.31 (absolute 
terms), dependent on the time period specification. This is considerably smaller 
than for the first sub-sample period, suggesting that uncertainty had a smaller 
impact under the inflation targeting regime. Besides the average effects, it was 
also evident that the maximum (1.01) and minimum (-0.94) impact estimates were 
also smaller than with the previous sample, again suggesting that uncertainty 
played a smaller role under the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The final step involved investigating whether the SARB was more conservative or 
aggressive when the direct uncertainty effects were included. The results 
suggested that regardless of the sub-sample or time period specification, the SARB 
was conservative on more occasions compared to being aggressive. Also, the 
average effect across both sub-sample periods also suggested conservatism. 
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9.6.3. Main findings 
 
The main findings from the thesis are categorically summarised below: 
 
Uncertainty relevance: 
 
 Estimated rules including uncertainty performed better than models excluding 
uncertainty, suggesting that uncertainty contributed towards explaining the 
actions of the SARB over the sample period. Firstly, the indirect uncertainty 
model performed better than the base model in all instances examined. The 
addition of direct uncertainty regressors improved the fit and explanatory power 
of the models even further. The direct uncertainty regressors entered 
significantly throughout, suggesting that the SARB responded to uncertainty 
directly, irrespective of responding to fluctuations in target variables. 
 
Aggression or conservatism: 
 
 In general, the results suggest that, regardless of the sub-sample or time period 
specification, the SARB was conservative on more occasions compared to being 
aggressive (the only exception being the hybrid model for the period from 2000 
to 2011). Also, the average effect across both sub-sample periods also suggests 
conservatism. 
 
 With regard to indirect effects, the SARB’s actions seem to be consistent with the 
findings reported for industrialized nations seeing as its indirect responses to 
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inflation and output gap uncertainty reflect conservatism. The SARB acted 
optimally by responding less aggressively to inflation and output fluctuations 
when faced with greater uncertainty about these variables. Indirect exchange 
rate uncertainty played a role only in the period prior to the advent of inflation 
targeting. Whether the SARB’s actions reflected caution or aggression in this 
regard was difficult to establish, mainly due to the results being volatile and 
dependent on period specification. 
 
 For direct uncertainty effects, it was not possible to determine aggression or 
conservatism for individual variables. Rather, the model merely allowed for 
examining whether interest rates were pushed lower or higher on average due 
to uncertainty about a specific independent variable. When responding to 
direct uncertainty effects, the SARB lowered interest rates on average when 
more uncertain about inflation or the output gap during the inflation targeting 
regime, thus preferring to stimulate the economy on average. However, the 
results for the pre-inflation targeting period were inconclusive in this regard. By 
contrast, the SARB raised interest rates on average when more uncertain about 
the exchange rate, regardless of the sample used. This might indicate a 
preference to defend currency stability with a bias to strengthening the rand on 
average to prevent the effects of import inflation.   
 
Uncertainty impact: 
 
 The average uncertainty impact from 1992 to 1999 ranged from 0.55 to 0.74 (in 
absolute terms) depending on the time period specification. In other words, the 
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nominal interest rate was on average between 0.55 to 0.74 percentage points 
higher or lower due to the effect of uncertainty. Also, the effects of uncertainty 
were especially prominent in the latter half of 1998 and the first half of 1999, 
shortly before the advent of the formal inflation targeting regime.  
 
 The reported average uncertainty effect ranged from 0.21 to 0.31 (in absolute 
terms) for the period from 2000 to 2011. In other words, the nominal interest 
rate was on average between 0.21 to 0.31 percentage points higher or lower 
due to the effect of uncertainty. 
 
Sample periods and monetary policy regimes: 
 
 The results suggest that the implementation of a formal inflation targeting 
regime changed the SARB’s behaviour with regard to responses to uncertainty 
in that uncertainty had a smaller average effect in the period corresponding to 
the inflation targeting regime.  
 
The fact that uncertainty had a smaller impact during the inflation targeting 
regime is noteworthy. However, the question of whether this was due to the 
nature of the inflation targeting regime or whether it simply represented a 
spurious relationship remained. Results from Granger causality tests provide 
strong evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and interest rate 
changes was not merely due to coincidence or correlation, irrespective of the 
time period. Furthermore, the inflation targeting framework entailed a 
commitment to inflation as the primary monetary policy objective. The fact 
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that the central bank has a single and clear primary objective might have 
contributed to lowering the impact of uncertainty. A central bank with a single 
primary objective would assign smaller uncertainty weights to secondary goals.   
 
Another characteristic associated with inflation targeting is the improved 
transparency. Communicating all the relevant risks and uncertainties with the 
public could assist with influencing market expectations and subsequently 
actual behaviour in the face of uncertainty, in so doing reducing the need for 
the central bank to take more drastic actions.  
 
Finally, the adoption of the inflation targeting framework also coincided with a 
more formal approach to dealing with and communicating uncertainty. This 
technique is the so-called fan chart methodology. This might have resulted in 
uncertainty estimates not being overestimated, unclear or exaggerated. 
However, formal empirical tests are necessary before a final conclusion in this 
case. Without published data from the SARB this is not possible.  
 
 Exchange rate uncertainty appeared to play a role only in the period prior to 
the advent of inflation targeting. This signals a different approach to exchange 
rate uncertainty during the inflation targeting regime compared to the 
preceding regime and might be a consequence of the fact that the exchange 
rate wasn’t an explicit target during the inflation targeting regime.  
 
Thus, the findings reported in this thesis provide strong evidence in support of the 
notion that uncertainty plays a significant role within the South African monetary 
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policy landscape. Furthermore, the results suggest that the SARB did in fact act 
optimally in responding more conservatively to target variable fluctuations on 
average. Also, the findings could potentially strengthen the case for inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy regime, as the results indicate a marked decline in 
the effects of uncertainty under inflation targeting. 
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Appendix A 
Unit Root Tests 
 
A.1 Inflation Stationarity Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: INFLATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.067297  0.2583 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
       
  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF_LATION(-1) -0.093327 0.045144 -2.067297 0.0421 
D(INF_LATION(-1)) 0.221185 0.094445 2.341942 0.0218 
D(INF_LATION(-2)) 0.104192 0.097983 1.063367 0.2910 
D(INF_LATION(-3)) 0.042084 0.098684 0.426451 0.6710 
D(INF_LATION(-4)) -0.497671 0.096394 -5.162896 0.0000 
C 0.005604 0.003732 1.501519 0.1374 
     
     R-squared 0.400022     Durbin-Watson stat 1.807190 
     
     
 
Table A1: Inflation-Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
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The inflation variable proved non-stationary when an intercept was included in the 
test equation and remained non-stationary when the case for a trend and intercept 
was considered. However, when both the trend and intercept were included, the test 
statistic improved, but not sufficiently. Thus, the null hypothesis of a unit root could 
not be rejected at a 5% significance level for all cases. Subsequently, the inflation 
variable was transformed through applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter and extracting 
the resultant residual series. The results are reported below. 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: INFLATION has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.813504  0.0054 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.593468  
 5% level  -1.944811  
 10% level  -1.614175  
     
       
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF(-1) -0.260425 0.092562 -2.813504 0.0062 
D(INF(-1)) 0.274576 0.097730 2.809553 0.0063 
D(INF(-2)) 0.171234 0.101375 1.689112 0.0952 
D(INF(-3)) 0.112658 0.102677 1.097200 0.2760 
D(INF(-4)) -0.424510 0.103669 -4.094844 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.445654     Durbin-Watson stat 1.801341 
     
      
Table A2: Inflation (Resids) - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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A.2 Output Gap Stationarity Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: OUTGAP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.356988  0.0007 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     OUTGAP(-1) -0.379117 0.087013 -4.356988 0.0000 
D(OUTGAP(-1)) 0.085948 0.100388 0.856153 0.3946 
D(OUTGAP(-2)) 0.006566 0.087640 0.074918 0.9405 
D(OUTGAP(-3)) -0.094169 0.078187 -1.204408 0.2322 
D(OUTGAP(-4)) 0.752421 0.073349 10.25804 0.0000 
C -0.000260 0.001090 -0.238248 0.8123 
     
     R-squared 0.869741         Durbin-Watson stat 2.024005 
     
      
Table A3: Output Gap-Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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A.3 Nominal Interest Rate Stationarity Test 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: PRIME RATE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.214919  0.0885 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.069631  
 5% level  -3.463547  
 10% level  -3.158207  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 85 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PRIME_RATE(-1) -0.119175 0.037069 -3.214919 0.0019 
D(PRIME_RATE(-1)) 0.551847 0.093752 5.886263 0.0000 
C 0.158203 0.049741 3.180535 0.0021 
@TREND(1990Q1) -0.000448 0.000162 -2.761905 0.0071 
     
     R-squared 0.324968     Durbin-Watson stat 1.962344 
     
      
Table A4: Nominal Interest Rate-Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
The Prime Interest Rate variable was non-stationary for both cases when an intercept 
was included and excluded. Thus, the null hypotheses of a unit root could not be 
rejected at a 5% significance level for these cases. However, the ADF test statistic 
improved significantly when a linear trend and intercept were included in the test 
equation, thus indicating that the variable might be trend-stationary. The variable 
was transformed through a regression against a constant and a linear trend and 
subsequently extracting the residual series. The results are reported below. 
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Null Hypothesis: PRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.264491  0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.592452  
 5% level  -1.944666  
 10% level  -1.614261  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 85 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PRIME(-1) -0.119486 0.036602 -3.264491 0.0016 
D(PRIME(-1)) 0.553426 0.092350 5.992702 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.324592     Durbin-Watson stat 1.963689 
     
     
 
Table A5: Nominal Interest Rate (Resids) - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity 
Test 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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A.4 Real Exchange Rate Stationarity Test 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: REAL_EXCHANGE has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.087136  0.2504 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
     
     
  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
REAL EXCHANGE(-1) -0.094792 0.045417 -2.087136 0.0399 
C 0.192630 0.092494 2.082629 0.0403 
     
     
R-squared 0.049302     Durbin-Watson stat 1.820895 
     
     
 
 
Table A6: Real Exchange Rate - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
The exchange rate variable proved to be non-stationary for all specifications of the 
test equation. Thus, the null hypotheses of a unit root could not be rejected at a 5% 
significance level for all cases. On closer examination, it became evident that the 
variable was stationary around a stochastic trend. To address the issue, the variable 
was transformed through subtracting a Hodrick-Prescott generated trend. The results 
are reported below. 
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Null Hypothesis: REER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.519954  0.0097 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REER(-1) -0.256867 0.072975 -3.519954 0.0007 
C 4.51E-05 0.002094 0.021537 0.9829 
     
     R-squared 0.128541     Durbin-Watson stat 1.769437 
     
     
 
Table A7: Real Exchange Rate (Resid) - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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A.5 Real Interest Rate Stationarity Test 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: REAL_PRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.086326  0.2507 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REAL_PRIME(-1) -0.112176 0.053767 -2.086326 0.0400 
C 0.088568 0.044334 1.997733 0.0490 
     
     R-squared 0.049266     Durbin-Watson stat 1.921098 
     
     
 
Table A8: Real Prime Interest Rate - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
The real interest rate variable proved to be non-stationary for all specifications of the 
test equation. Thus, the null hypotheses of a unit root could not be rejected at a 5% 
significance level for these cases. On closer examination, it became evident that the 
variable was stationary around a deterministic trend. The variable was transformed 
through a regression against a constant and a linear trend and subsequently 
extracting the residual series. The results are reported below. 
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Null Hypothesis: RPRIME has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.381265  0.0175 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.592129  
 5% level  -1.944619  
 10% level  -1.614288  
     
       
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RPRIME(-1) -0.129360 0.054324 -2.381265 0.0195 
     
     R-squared 0.062489     Durbin-Watson stat 1.915113 
     
     
 
Table A9: Real Prime Interest Rate (Resid) - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity 
Test 
 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 5% significance level. 
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A.6 Output Gap Uncertainty Stationarity Test 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LVAROUTGAP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.328428  0.0008 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
       
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LVAROUTGAP(-1) -0.381986 0.088251 -4.328428 0.0000 
C -3.306254 0.766073 -4.315849 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.189753     Durbin-Watson stat 1.698788 
     
     
 
Table A10: Output Gap Uncertainty - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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A.7 Inflation Uncertainty Stationarity Test 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LVARINF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.573668  0.1024 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.508326  
 5% level  -2.895512  
 10% level  -2.584952  
     
       
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LVARINF(-1) -0.144353 0.056088 -2.573668 0.0118 
C -1.289403 0.506144 -2.547501 0.0127 
     
     R-squared 0.073091     Durbin-Watson stat 1.883428 
     
     
 
 
Table A11: Exchange Rate Uncertainty - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can only be rejected at 10.5% significance level. 
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A.8 Exchange rate Uncertainty Stationarity Test 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LVARREER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob. 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.651414  0.0067 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.512290  
 5% level  -2.897223  
 10% level  -2.585861  
     
       
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LVARREER(-1) -0.117899 0.032289 -3.651414 0.0005 
C -0.953307 0.268913 -3.545040 0.0007 
     
     R-squared 0.142852     Durbin-Watson stat 1.847234 
     
     
 
Table A12: Exchange Rate Uncertainty - Augmented Dickey Fuller Stationarity Test 
 
 
 
 
The null hypotheses of a unit root can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
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Appendix B 
Serial Correlation Tests 
 
 
B.1 Output Gap Uncertainty Serial Correlation Test 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 0.005439     Prob. F(3,76) 0.9994 
Obs*R-squared 0.017171     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.9994 
     
     Test Equation:    
Included observations: 80 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.967227 0.238819 4.050034 0.0001 
WGT_RESID^2(-1) 0.012513 0.114350 0.109427 0.9132 
WGT_RESID^2(-2) 0.007094 0.114499 0.061954 0.9508 
WGT_RESID^2(-3) 0.001893 0.114883 0.016474 0.9869 
     
     R-squared 0.000215     Mean dependent var 0.988373 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999443    
     
     
 
Table B1: Output Gap ARCHLM Test 
 
 
The null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the residuals cannot be rejected. 
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B.2 Inflation Uncertainty Serial Correlation Test 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 0.953861     Prob. F(3,78) 0.4189 
Obs*R-squared 2.901870     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4070 
     
     Test Equation:    
Included observations: 82 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.465925 0.305187 4.803369 0.0000 
WGT_RESID^2(-1) 0.055231 0.112593 0.490538 0.6251 
WGT_RESID^2(-2) -0.141654 0.111467 -1.270817 0.2076 
WGT_RESID^2(-3) -0.098600 0.112415 -0.877109 0.3831 
     
     R-squared 0.035389     Mean dependent var 1.238357 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.418878    
     
     
 
Table B2: Inflation ARCH LM Test 
 
 
The null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the residuals cannot be rejected. 
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B.3 Exchange Rate Uncertainty Serial Correlation Test 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
     
     F-statistic 0.840433     Prob. F(3,76) 0.4759 
Obs*R-squared 2.568780     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4630 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Included observations: 80 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.779571 0.261461 2.981593 0.0039 
WGT_RESID^2(-1) 0.052641 0.114008 0.461732 0.6456 
WGT_RESID^2(-2) 0.132430 0.113153 1.170359 0.2455 
WGT_RESID^2(-3) 0.086705 0.114039 0.760310 0.4494 
     
     R-squared 0.032110     Mean dependent var 1.067848 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.475912    
     
     
 
Table B3: Exchange Rate ARCH LM Test 
 
 
The null hypothesis of no ARCH up to order three in the residuals cannot be rejected. 
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Appendix C 
Full Sample Regression Results: LS & GMM  
 
 
C.1 Backward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
Backward-Looking Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" + " + C" + tf" + & 
 
C.2 Present-period regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
Present-Period Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + & 
 
C.3 Hybrid model regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
Hybrid Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + &  
 
C.4 Forward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
Forward-Looking: 
B =  + B" + Jf +  + C + tf + & 
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C.1 Backward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coeff LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
x 
-0.00037  
(0.8855) 
-0.00183  
(0.2848) 
-0.00004  
(0.9841) 
0.00006 
(0.5934) 
0.000005   
(0.9809) 
0.000601  
(0.6368) 
0.000166   
(0.9432) 
0.001738 
(0.3561) 
y 
0.8356591 
(0.0000)*** 
0.823959 
(0.0000)*** 
0.859342  
(0.0000)*** 
0.81817  
(0.0000)*** 
0.859729 
(0.0000)*** 
0.822347 
(0.0000)*** 
0.876757 
(0.0000)*** 
0.875466 
(0.0000)*** 
z 
0.34719    
(0.0173)** 
0.464325 
(0.0035)*** 
-0.23176   
(0.0651)*** 
0.359224      
(0.0000)*** 
0.204608  
(0.0954)* 
0.2330  
(0.0001)*** 
0.209185  
(0.0766)* 
0.250407   
(0.0100)*** 
 
0.342303  
(0.032)** 
0.339423 
(0.0013)*** 
-0.28496  
(0.1233) 
-0.27709 
(0.0219)** 
-0.22628  
(0.2125) 
-0.23065   
(0.0325)** 
-0.07146  
(0.7020) 
-0.20076 
(0.2594) 
 0.1313458  (0.0157)** 
0.25641 
(0.0023)*** 
0.138201(0
.2331) 
0.156586 
(0.0034)*** 
0.113637 
(0.3156) 
0.116942 
(0.0513)** 
0.084525 
(0.4466) 
0.066288   
(0.4378) 
 
-0.30214  
(0.0288)** 
-0.53344 
(0.0020)*** 
-0.075 
(0.5516) 
-0.31052 
(0.0021)*** 
0.132197 
(0.2893) 
0.119351 
(0.3383) 
0.305765 
(0.0512)* 
0.278961 
(0.0798)* 
 
  -0.09296 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.09782 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.08335 
(0.08335)* 
-0.08742 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.16944  
(0.3556) 
-0.54387 
(0.0328)** 
 
  -0.02607  
(0.0521)* 
-0.02564 
(0.0003)*** 
-0.02462  
(0.0597)* 
-0.02312   
(0.0092)*** 
0.115538(0
.4208) 
0.088692   
(0.4618) 
 
    0.033874 
(0.0267)** 
0.049091 
(0.0006)*** 
0.718203   
(0.0019)*** 
-0.21976 
(0.2821) 
  
      -0.2185   
(0.2162) 
0.27642 
(0.0505)* 
  
      0.333501 
(0.0674)* 
0.189537 
(0.4198) 
       -0.08704   (0.6464) 
0.357518 
(0.0502) 
        -0.05722   (0.7486) 
-0.50312   
(0.0005)*** 
 
      -0.36962   
(0.0254)** 
-0.36048   
(0.0099)*** 
 
      -0.24801 
(0.1979) 
0.624774 
(0.0024)*** 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.87335 0.867299 0.909866 0.906783 0.914549 0.913552 0.922786 0.892568 
Σe
2
 0.04376 0.04568 0.030286 0.031106 0.028330 0.028436 0.023523 0.032265 
F-StatProb 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
J-StatProb  0.523702  0.864791  0.920151  0.836493 
Parameter 
Stab 
0.0022 0.0000 0.0902 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. For the LS estimation, the parameter stability test 
values are the F-statistic probability values of a Chow Breakpoint test with date specified as 1999. With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-
identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated 
through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table C1: Backward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
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C.2 Present-period regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
x -0.0005 
(0.8152) 
-0.00107 
(0.5710) 
-0.001242 
(0.5847) 
-0.00253 
(0.0812)* 
-0.00006   
(0.9769) 
-0.00011  
(0.9402) 
-0.000198   
(0.9476) 
0.001875 
(0.5575) 
y 0.831641 
(0.0000)*** 
0.802604 
(0.0000)*** 
0.848072 
(0.0000)*** 
0.846242   
(0.0000)*** 
0.840879 
(0.0000)*** 
0.823292  
(0.0000)*** 
0.856618 
(0.0000)*** 
0.853334 
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.3194 
(0.0100)*** 
0.66787 
(0.0006)*** 
0.308373 
(0.0137)** 
0.536572(0
.0013)*** 
0.398208 
(0.0036)*** 
0.554715 
(0.0000)*** 
0.47329  
(0.0766)* 
0.602979 
(0.0094)*** 
 0.621776 
(0.0000)*** 
0.667356 
(0.0000)*** 
2.748869 
(0.0276)** 
3.106668 
(0.0014)*** 
2.664417 
(0.0309)** 
1.138601 
(0.0478)** 
2.992247 
(0.1097) 
5.457214 
(0.1626) 
 0.1267468 
(0.0121)** 
0.153109 
(0.1079) 
2.284264 
(0.0612)* 
1.740109 
(0.0851)* 
2.286513 
(0.0582)* 
1.666356 
(0.0480)** 
0.590482 
(0.8283) 
-5.79912   
(0.1294) 
 -0.32265 
(0.0055)*** 
-0.80544 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.322288  
(0.0058)*** 
-0.53654 
(0.0002)*** 
2.305859 
(0.1500) 
2.281242 
(0.1353) 
0.924807 
(0.4864) 
3.77872 
(0.1936) 
 
  
  
0.240938 
(0.0828)* 
0.27159 
(0.0101)** 
0.233319 
(0.0893)* 
0.051874(0
.4401) 
-0.000001   
(1.0000) 
-0.18023  
(0.4266) 
     0.233565 
(0.1006) 
0.182756 
(0.1279) 
0.23281 
(0.0979)* 
0.173891 
(0.0756)* 
0.188161 
(0.1341) 
-0.1437   
(0.6654) 
         0.338585 
(0.1007) 
0.345393 
(0.0745)* 
0.668218 
(0.0207)** 
0.347743 
(0.4315) 
              -0.103233   
(0.5260) 
0.27272 
(0.3083) 
              0.397697 
(0.0106)** 
0.477973 
(0.2818) 
             -0.109846   
(0.6170) 
0.446804 
(0.2364) 
              -0.039467   
(0.7835) 
-1.06318   
(0.0322)** 
             -0.292924   
(0.1109) 
-0.27066   
(0.2643) 
             -0.166957 
(0.4360) 
0.452282 
(0.1745) 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.911139 0.889772 0.914345 0.910201 0.916311 0.914046 0.918751 0.887018 
Σe
2
 0.030729 0.037944 0.028781 0.029966 0.027746 0.028273 0.024753 0.033932 
F-Stat 
Prob 
0.00000   0.00000   0.00000   0.000000   
J-Stat Prob   0.845456   0.806788   0.879147   0.776422 
Parameter 
Stab 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. For the LS estimation, the parameter stability test values are the F-
statistic probability values of a Chow Breakpoint test with date specified as 1999. With regards to the GMM estimation, the instruments are a 
constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter 
stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to 
Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table C2: Present-period regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
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C.3 Hybrid model regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
x -0.00053 (0.8069) 
-0.000008 
(0.9686) 
-0.000008 
(0.9681) 
0.00009 
(0.4874) 
0.000834   
(0.7430) 
0.001543  
(0.2417) 
-0.00012   
(0.9625) 
0.005939 
(0.0674) 
y 0.888289 (0.0000)*** 
0.885209 
(0.0000)*** 
0.845985 
(0.0000)*** 
0.82748  
(0.0000)*** 
0.837946 
(0.0000)*** 
0.807404 
(0.0000)*** 
0.869585 
(0.0000)*** 
0.849929 
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.234445 (0.0500)** 
0.270414 
(0.1895) 
0.286912 
(0.0241)** 
0.429462 
(0.0003)*** 
0.361333 
(0.1779) 
0.465131 
(0.0002)*** 
0.43406  
(0.0025)*** 
0.610732 
(0.0002)*** 
 
0.604556 
(0.0000)*** 
0.676142 
(0.0000)*** 
0.297744 
(0.0751)* 
0.347572 
(0.0003)*** 
0.270105 
(0.0109)** 
0.304016 
(0.0007)*** 
0.238065 
(0.1527) 
0.252375 
(0.0851) 
 0.214759 (0.0450)** 
0.261518 
(0.0009)*** 
0.209395 
(0.0564)* 
0.265024 
(0.0000)*** 
0.189231 
(0.0335)** 
0.194826 
(0.0000)*** 
0.135897 
(0.2165) 
0.101419   
(0.1808) 
 -0.22298 (0.0684)* 
-0.27202 
(0.3130) 
-0.2542  
(0.0375)** 
-0.45899 
(0.0003)*** 
1.77552 
(0.1104) 
3.155095 
(0.0217)** 
-0.4897 
(0.7803) 
7.103803 
(0.0233)** 
     
-0.04237 
(0.0241)** 
-0.04159 
(0.000)*** 
-0.04366 
(0.0071)*** 
-0.04459 
(0.0000)*** 
-0.07095 
(0.7050) 
-0.25745 
(0.2618) 
     -0.01955 (0.1427) 
-0.0157 
(0.0702)*** 
-0.02147 
(0.0464)** 
-0.02291  
(0.0039)*** 
0.153978 
(0.2723) 
0.36105  
(0.0386)** 
         0.262525 (0.0690)* 
0.449676 
(0.0131)** 
0.670425   
(0.0101)** 
0.528497 
(0.1164) 
              -0.25472   (0.1543) 
0.082664 
(0.5480) 
              0.294045 (0.1155) 
0.143021 
(0.5553) 
             -0.16686   (0.3839) 
0.19418   
(0.2942) 
             -0.00633   (0.9724) 
-0.61256   
(0.0117)* 
             -0.30864   (0.0634)* 
-0.61256  
(0.3251) 
             -0.32519 (0.1037) 
0.588735 
(0.0103)** 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.909494 0.910841 0.915755 0.914731 0.916391 0.917780 0.922260 0.877287 
Σe
2
 0.03087 0.030264 0.027907 0.028044 0.027322 0.026649 0.023316 0.036264 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
  0.933164   0.871154   0.914112   0.902942 
Parameter 
Stab 
0.0005 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. For the LS estimation, the parameter stability test 
values are the F-statistic probability values of a Chow Breakpoint test with date specified as 1999. With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-
identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated 
through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table C3: Hybrid model regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
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C.4 Forward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
 
Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Coefficient LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM LS GMM 
x 
-0.00053   
(0.8079) 
0.000108  
(0.9489) 
-0.00005   
(0.9819) 
0.000421   
(0.7308) 
-0.00016   
(0.9510) 
-0.00032 
(0.7386) 
-0.00091   
(0.7266) 
0.0034   
(0.0673) 
y 
0.864963   
(0.0000)*** 
0.86986   
(0.0000)*** 
0.829582   
(0.0000)*** 
0.816867    
(0.0000)*** 
0.830968   
(0.0000)*** 
0.827967   
(0.0000)*** 
0.852732   
(0.0000)*** 
0.844985  
(0.0000)*** 
z 
-0.16019  
(0.1974) 
0.130828   
(0.2343) 
-0.16948   
(0.1857) 
0.07350   
(0.3980) 
-0.40111   
(0.8236) 
-1.94458   
(0.1130) 
-2.2428  
(0.3262) 
0.6748   
(0.7555) 
 
0.602037   
(0.0000)*** 
0.721908   
(0.0000)*** 
0.360108   
(0.0406)** 
0.421965   
(0.0000)*** 
0.363512   
(0.0242)** 
0.468513   
(0.0000)*** 
0.344825  
(0.0263)*** 
0.519768   
(0.0000)*** 
 0.24499   (0.0249)** 
0.231777   
(0.0019)*** 
0.234159  
(0.0384)** 
0.246769   
(0.0000)*** 
0.236113   
(0.0040)*** 
0.286989   
(0.0000)*** 
0.193477   
(0.0511)* 
0.217106  
(0.0057)*** 
 
0.129668   
(0.2662) 
-0.16498  
(0.3165) 
0.125828   
(0.2873) 
-0.12747  
(0.2359) 
0.129483   
(0.2335) 
-0.04364   
(0.6496) 
0.076325   
(0.2863) 
-0.12156   
(0.3794) 
 
  -0.02761   
(0.1383) 
-0.0338   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.02772   
(0.0274)** 
-0.03248   
(0.0000)*** 
0.068287   
(0.5527) 
0.154377   
(0.4245) 
 
  -0.02564   
(0.0611)* 
-0.01703  
(0.0031)*** 
-0.02534   
(0.0083)*** 
-0.01726  
(0.0017)*** 
0.187724   
(0.1797) 
0.309012   
(0.0289)** 
 
    -0.0290   
(0.8962) 
-0.24808  
(0.1067) 
0.297547   
(0.1844) 
-0.45634 
(0.0748)* 
  
      -0.29816   
(0.0405)** 
0.001945   
(0.9910) 
  
      0.212331   
(0.1952) 
-0.1946   
(0.3563) 
       -0.23758   (0.1269) 
-0.0480   
(0.7786) 
        0.032595   (0.8051) 
-0.28636  
(0.1241) 
 
      -0.15628   
(0.1513) 
0.197035   
(0.3103) 
 
      -0.36408   
(0.1926) 
0.287481   
(0.0926)* 
Adj. R-
Squared 
0.90644 0.89892 0.910845 0.908217 0.909649 0.908197 0.911258 0.885230 
Σe
2
 0.031911 0.034311 0.029533 0.030186 0.029525 0.029755 0.026616 0.033917 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.000000 
 
0.000000 
 
0.000000 
 
0.000000 
 
J-Statistic  
Prob.  
0.978174 
 
0.855737 
 
0.880032 
 
0.737293 
Parameter 
Stab 
0.0044 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 
PP Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. For the LS estimation, the parameter stability test 
values are the F-statistic probability values of a Chow Breakpoint test with date specified as 1999. With regards to the GMM 
estimation, the instruments are a constant and five lags of the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-
identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated 
through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table C4: Forward-looking regression results: Full sample LS & GMM 
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Appendix D 
Parameter Stability Tests  
 
 
Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data 
Number of breaks compared: 60 
    
    Statistic Value    Prob.   
    
    Maximum LR F-statistic (1999Q1) 5.888209  0.9899 
Maximum Wald F-statistic 
(1999Q1) 5.888209  0.9899 
 
 
Table D1: Model A Quandt-Andrews Tests for LS Specification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D2: Model B Quandt-Andrews Tests for LS Specification 
 
 
 
 
Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data 
Number of breaks compared: 57 
    
    Statistic Value    Prob.   
    
    Maximum LR F-statistic (1999Q1) 5.016407  1.0000 
Maximum Wald F-statistic 
(1999Q1) 5.016407  1.0000 
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Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data 
Number of breaks compared: 57 
    
    Statistic Value    Prob.   
    
    Maximum LR F-statistic (1999Q1) 4.050589  1.0000 
Maximum Wald F-statistic 
(1999Q1) 4.050589  1.0000 
 
Table D3: Model C Quandt-Andrews Tests for LS Specification 
 
 
 
 
Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
Null Hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data 
Number of breaks compared: 49 
    
    Statistic Value    Prob.   
    
    Maximum LR F-statistic (1999Q1) 3.399028  1.0000 
 
Table D4: Model D Quandt-Andrews Tests for LS Specification 
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Appendix E 
Split Sample Regression Results: LS & GMM  
 
 
E.1 Backward-looking regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
Backward-Looking Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" + " + C" + tf" + & 
 
E.2 Present-period regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
Present-Period Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + & 
 
E.3 Hybrid model regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
Hybrid Rule: 
B =  + B" + Jf" +  + C + tf + & 
 
E.4 Forward-looking regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
Forward-Looking: 
B =  + B" + Jf +  + C + tf + & 
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E.1 Backward-looking regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 Sample: 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
  Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x -0.00052   (0.7916) 
-0.003408   
(0.0001)*** 
0.005037   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00361   
(0.0252)** 
-0.00360   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00342   
(0.0003)*** 
y 0.885942   (0.0000)*** 
0.857109   
(0.0000)*** 
0.844079   
(0.0000)*** 
0.616909  
(0.0000)*** 
0.811449   
(0.0000)*** 
0.710823   
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.667536   (0.0000)*** 
0.376547   
(0.0000)*** 
0.294257   
(0.0000)*** 
0.369701   
(0.0045)*** 
0.161185   
(0.0031)*** 
0.1300   
(0.0069)*** 
 0.215478  (0.0761)* 
-0.25154  
(0.0330)** 
0.068458 
(0.0789)* 
0.567315  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.12498  
(0.1033) 
-0.08674 
(0.3229) 
 0.31621  (0.0019)*** 
0.150025   
(0.0104)** 
0.35492 
(0.0000)*** 
0.239089  
(0.0026)*** 
0.16381  
(0.0060)*** 
0.142946 
(0.0050)*** 
 -0.16894  (0.1895) 
0.250199   
(0.0000)*** 
0.671458   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.61477 
(0.0000)*** 
0.24457   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.12309   
(0.1724) 
  
-0.09804   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06464   
(0.0000)***  
-0.08591   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.08312   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.04097   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03207 
(0.0000)***  
-0.01669   
(0.0061)*** 
-0.08312 
(0.0012)*** 
   
0.092652 
(0.0000)***   
0.012194 
(0.1528) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.849103 0.884769 0.904133 0.904469 0.939665 0.939746 
Σe
2
 0.021981 0.015081 0.012001 0.015724 0.009446 0.009192 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.909973 0.997908 0.99603 0.81516 0.982018 0.996763 
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.0007  0.0002  0.0001 0.0042  0.0007  0.0018 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a constant and five lags of 
the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability 
test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP 
refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table E1: Backward-looking regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Appendix E 
258 
 
E.2 Present-period regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 Sample: 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
  Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 0.00171   (0.4837) 
0.003399   
(0.0180)** 
0.003388   
(0.1001) 
-0.00472  
(0.0008)*** 
0.00757   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00729   
(0.0000)*** 
y 0.886846   (0.0000)*** 
0.922691   
(0.0000)*** 
0.92325   
(0.0000)*** 
0.690629   
(0.0000)*** 
0.707628   
(0.0000)*** 
0.705852  
(0.0000)*** 
z 0.900442  (0.0000)*** 
0.55868  
(0.0036)*** 
0.541125   
(0.0280)** 
0.253106  
(0.0126)** 
0.070527 
(0.2270) 
0.050806   
(0.2958) 
 0.712497  (0.0000)*** 
10.01401 
(0.0041)*** 
10.17733 
(0.0035)*** 
0.812761  
(0.0000)*** 
3.698081 
(0.0000)*** 
3.449524 
(0.0000)*** 
 0.1229625  (0.1456) 
5.14528   
(0.0000)*** 
5.23586 
(0.0000)*** 
0.044353  
(0.4767) 
3.434595   
(0.0000)*** 
3.072194 
(0.0000)*** 
 -0.95509  (0.0000)*** 
-0.28555  
(0.0223)*** 
-0.77036 
(0.8536) 
-0.39654  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.19179  
(0.0006)*** 
-0.30076 
(0.5863) 
  
1.108033   
(0.0067)*** 
1.12785 
(0.0057)***  
0.324894   
(0.0000)*** 
0.29894 
(0.0000)*** 
  
0.570584  
(0.0000)*** 
0.580812 
(0.0000)***  
0.373657  
(0.0000)*** 
0.329631 
(0.0000)*** 
   
0.06245 
(0.9031)   
-0.01512 
(0.8261) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.891527 0.902953 0.898957 0.933145 0.946550 0.945704 
Σe
2
 0.015801 0.012837 0.012809 0.011004 0.008368 0.008283 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.721267 0.964384 0.946275 0.888149 0.963049 0.992020 
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.0016 0.0004 0.0005 0.0010 0.0005 0.0004 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a constant and five lags of 
the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability 
test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP 
refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table E2: Present-period regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
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E.3 Present-period regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 Sample: 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
  Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 
0.003275   
(0.0455)** 
0.005366   
(0.0000)*** 
0.004445   
(0.0018)*** 
-0.00428   
(0.0051)*** 
-0.00324   
(0.0005)*** 
-0.0033   
(0.0000)*** 
y 
0.921979  
(0.0000)*** 
0.872371 
(0.0000)*** 
0.889872  
(0.0000)*** 
0.794861  
(0.0000)*** 
0.706533 
(0.0000)*** 
0.703962  
(0.0000)*** 
z 
0.512287   
(0.0002)*** 
0.661276   
(0.0000)*** 
0.5915589  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.01896   
(0.8484) 
-0.01413   
(0.6901) 
0.009499  
(0.7463) 
 
0.802709 
(0.0000)*** 
0.399335  
(0.0000)*** 
0.456202 
(0.0000)*** 
0.696807 
(0.0000)*** 
0.3162013  
(0.0219)** 
0.160582 
(0.0106)** 
 
0.197435  
(0.0143)** 
0.197968   
(0.0000)*** 
0.24982 
(0.0000)*** 
0.24044 
(0.0012)*** 
0.23176  
(0.0000)*** 
0.240823 
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.41414  
(0.0049)*** 
-0.55155   
(0.0000)*** 
-5.91316   
(0.0035)*** 
-0.04908  
(0.6754) 
-0.0612   
(0.3558) 
-0.14067  
(0.6683) 
  
-0.0189   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04493   
(0.0000)***  
-0.06656  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06505   
(0.0000)*** 
  
-0.03048   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.03108 
(0.0017)***  
-0.0160   
(0.0003)*** 
-0.01581   
(0.0002)*** 
   
-0.6857 
(0.0063)***   
-0.00467 
(0.9121) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.890822 0.904385 0.903481 0.931166 0.945074 0.944027 
Σe
2
 0.015904 0.012513 0.012082 0.011081 0.008400 0.008335 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.899609 0.998243 0.997035 0.857381 0.978568 0.995004 
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a constant and five lags of 
the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability 
test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP 
refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table E3: Hybrid model regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
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E.4 Present-period regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
 
 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 Sample: 2000Q1 - 2011Q3 
  Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Coefficient GMM GMM 
x 
0.004181   
(0.0194)** 
0.007143   
(0.0000)*** 
0.00537   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00394 
(0.0116)** 
-0.00303   
(0.0001)*** 
-0.00347 
(0.0000)*** 
y 
0.910125   
(0.0000)*** 
0.865204   
(0.0000)*** 
0.891573   
(0.0000)*** 
0.806842   
(0.0000)*** 
0.712298   
(0.0000)*** 
0.70723   
(0.0000)*** 
z 
0.010252  
(0.9380) 
-0.26982   
(0.0000)*** 
-10.3394  
(0.0000)*** 
0.039421  
(0.5967) 
-0.23613  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.81342  
(0.0685)*** 
 
0.789034  
(0.0000) 
0.572188  
(0.0000)*** 
0.623211 
(0.0000)*** 
0.765294  
(0.0000)*** 
0.162596 
(0.0229)** 
0.195215 
(0.0007)*** 
 
0.16376  
(0.0118)** 
0.257699   
(0.0000)*** 
0.35849 
(0.0000)*** 
0.150335 
(0.0558)* 
0.268219   
(0.0000)*** 
0.274407 
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.4236  
(0.0045)*** 
0.257699   
(0.0313)** 
0.048961   
(0.1667) 
-0.05384  
(0.6082) 
0.176789   
(0.0003)*** 
0.168571   
(0.0000)*** 
 
  -0.02965   
(0.0003)*** 
-0.02208   
(0.0106)** 
  -0.06120   
(0.0003)*** 
-0.06157   
(0.0000)** 
 
  -0.02745   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03087 
(0.0000)*** 
  -0.02602  
(0.0000)*** 
-0.02266 
(0.0000)*** 
 
    -1.27996 
(0.0000)*** 
    -0.07382 
(0.1749) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.850975 0.879212 0.884999 0.929456 0.946790 0.944935 
Σe
2
 0.021709 0.015808 0.014396 0.011357 0.008138 0.008200 
F-Statistic  
Prob. 
0.930854 0.997869 0.996227 0.768175 0.982389 0.994957 
J-Statistic  
Prob. 
 0.0000  0.0009  0.0017  0.0007  0.0002  0.0002 
Numbers in parentheses are the probability values of the standard errors. The instruments are a constant and five lags of 
the variables in the estimated rule. The J-statistic is a test of over-identifying moment conditions. The parameter stability 
test values are the probabilities of a Chi Square statistic generated through the Andrews-Fair-Wald Breakpoint test. PP 
refers to Phillips-Peron unit root tests. 
***, **, * represent coefficient significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table E4: Forward-looking regression results: Split sample LS & GMM 
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Appendix F 
Combined Uncertainty Regression Results: 
LS & GMM  
 
 
F.1 Combined uncertainty regression results: 1990 – 1999 
 
 
F.2 Combined uncertainty regression results: 2000 – 2011 
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F.1 Combined uncertainty regression results: 1990 - 1999 
 
 
GMM 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 
Backward Present Hybrid Future 
x 
0.32119     
(0.0000)*** 
0.58214           
(0.0000)*** 
0.515518   
(0.0000)*** 
0.584611   
(0.0000)*** 
y 
0.711622   
(0.0000)*** 
0.717218   
(0.0000)*** 
0.725973   
(0.0000)*** 
0.703265   
(0.0000)*** 
z 
0.382704   
(0.0004)*** 
0.26191           
(0.0031)*** 
0.33277          
(0.0001)*** 
-16.548        
(0.0000)*** 
 
0.603943        
(0.0000)*** 
9.877642   
(0.0000)*** 
0.281506      
(0.0000)*** 
0.348933       
(0.0000)*** 
 
0.150073                
(0.0630)* 
3.017859        
(0.0000)*** 
-0.05918            
(0.1059) 
-0.02935          
(0.2123) 
 
0.495776   
(0.0000)*** 
-14.6936       
(0.0000)*** 
-13.974          
(0.0000)*** 
0.017797            
(0.7894) 
∗  
-0.01227          
(0.0100)* 
0.02222         
(0.0000)*** 
-0.010158   
(0.0025)*** 
0.014988   
(0.0001)*** 
∗  
0.008243        
(0.0001)*** 
0.005785        
(0.0001)*** 
-0.004899 
(0.0000)*** 
0.005392         
(0.0001)*** 
∗  
0.042791   
(0.0000)*** 
0.040889   
(0.0000)*** 
0.046363   
(0.0000)*** 
0.049083   
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.04905   
(0.0001)*** 
1.081886   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06398       
(0.0000)*** 
-0.05355        
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.01099        
(0.0020)*** 
0.335706         
(0.0000)*** 
-0.01007                   
(0.1218) 
-0.00858         
(0.0569)* 
 
0.076914             
(0.0000)*** 
-1.82633                
(0.0000)*** 
-1.72598            
(0.0000)*** 
-2.07145                 
(0.0000)*** 
Adj. R
2 0.935269 0.954623 0.944218 0.938173 
Σe
2
 0.006998 0.004906 0.006031 0.006684 
J-Stat Prob. 0.985214 0.982711 0.98521 0.987047 
PP Prob. 0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0004 
 
Table F1: Combined uncertainty regression results: 1990 – 1999 
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F.2 Combined uncertainty regression results: 2000 - 2011 
 
GMM 
Sample: 1990Q1 - 1999Q4 
Backward Present Hybrid Future 
x 
-0.11187   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.04995           
(0.0613)* 
-0.07284    
(0.0002)*** 
-0.04263       
(0.0426)** 
y 
0.670729   
(0.0000)*** 
0.704384   
(0.0000)*** 
0.707398   
(0.0000)*** 
0.716685   
(0.0000)*** 
z 
-0.01694                
(0.7129) 
-0.06317                  
(0.3859) 
-0.07638               
(0.1012) 
-0.56887            
(0.1224) 
 
-0.01876           
(0.7998) 
2.417814        
(0.0007)*** 
0.185598            
(0.0006)*** 
0.180742             
(0.0012)*** 
 
0.08435            
(0.0886)* 
1.988917        
(0.0053)*** 
0.187357          
(0.0001)*** 
0.187492          
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.11875                
(0.1891) 
-0.42119              
(0.3482) 
-0.59165            
(0.0618)* 
0.141555   
(0.0021)*** 
∗  
-0.01554   
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00966        
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0109            
(0.0000)*** 
-0.0088          
(0.0000)*** 
∗  
-0.0061          
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00414          
(0.0000)*** 
-0.00355          
(0.0011)*** 
-0.00312         
(0.0000)*** 
∗  
0.010872       
(0.0000)*** 
0.010006   
(0.0000)*** 
0.007651     
(0.0006)*** 
0.008492   
(0.0001)*** 
 
-0.08183   
(0.0000)*** 
0.186405            
(0.0103)** 
-0.06702     
(0.0000)*** 
-0.06712     
(0.0000)*** 
 
-0.1599         
(0.0003)*** 
0.210736          
(0.0081)*** 
-0.01481         
(0.0006)*** 
-0.01848         
(0.0002)*** 
 
0.025647                
(0.0000)*** 
-0.03074               
(0.5876) 
-0.05818               
(0.1442) 
-0.03894           
(0.3904) 
Adj. R
2 0.943229 0.947489 0.947082 0.947327 
Σe
2
 0.007977 0.007378 0.007241 0.007208 
J-Stat Prob. 0.98992 0.977317 0.983808 0.984602 
PP Prob. 0.0017  0.0005  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Table F2: Combined uncertainty regression results: 2000 – 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
